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ABSTRACT
This study examines the employment of undocumented workers by Los Angeles
manufacturers of automobile parts. It suggests that this is part of a
broad trend towards primary labor market erosion. The laborforce is
termed transitional because it is seen as facilitating firms during the
current period of industrial change. Insight into the role of these
workers is derived from eight case studies representing 926 workers.
Regressions on the determinants of wages and the percent undocumented in
the workplace are developed from 21 firms and 2321 workers.
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9CHAPTER 1
TRANSTIONAL LABOR IN A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
Introduction
As the global economy takes on what some are calling "a new international
order," economic, social, and spatial forms of societal organization at the national
level are also undergoing major redefinition. For example, internationalization has
led to interdependencies among developing and industrialized countries that is
redefining the basis for national sovereignty. Viewed another way, the
hypermobility of capital and labor across international boundaries has so
destabilized social constructions that states and localities have become weak
partners to private sector corporations, and in the process has forced working class
people to suffer material setbacks in the name of technological and economic
progress. Integral to the emergence of the new international order in the U.S. has
also been a strategic role played by "illegal," or undocumented workers. Segments
of labor that had previously been marginal, such as the undocumented, became
linch-pins in the economic transformation, which in retrospect spanned from the
mid-sixties to the early 1980's. This study is an examination of how undocumented
workers factored into the process of economic destabilization and reconstruction
during this period.
Historically, undocumented workers and immigrants have come to national
attention whenever there has been an economic crisis accompanied by high
unemployment. However, the current situation takes on a different light because
of the pivotal role played by undocumented workers toward the ushering in a new
era, which, by some accounts, constitutes a "second industrial revolution." As a
10
consequence, the theoretical bases for understanding the process of "development"
as it pertains to industrialized nations are correspondingly being revised in order to
come to terms with the appropriate significance of undocumented workers. The
purpose here is to explore that territory--to look at how undocumented workers
surfaced in the U.S. economy, and to examine what this means with respect to the
concept of "development." Along these lines, the following discussion will focus
first on recently emerging critical functions of undocumented workers based on
observations in Los Angeles, and secondly on the theoretical implications of these
trends on the development literature.
Undocumented Workers in the Los Angeles Economy
Undocumented workers have the unenviable distinction of personifying
leakages and imperfections in a society. Their presence is a reminder of the
fraility of borders, while their employment acts as a bellweather to the poor health
of an industrial base. Periods of profound reconstruction further heighten public
sensitivity to the existence of this population. Yet, in spite of the interest they
generate, there are many aspects of their utility in the laborforce that remain
partially understood. This study is one effort to bring added clarity to the picture.
Within the U.S., the undocumented workforce is expanding, and has been
since the mid-sixties. This period marked the closure of the Bracero Program
(1964), a contract labor program based on a bilaterial agreement with Mexico for
the temporary employment of workers in U.S. agriculture. In anticipation that
Mexican communities would have difficulty re-incorporating thousands of newly
jobless persons, Mexico established a Border Industrialization Program (BIP) in 1965
modelled after other export processing zones (EPZ). Previous to the BIP, there
were only two EPZ's, or industrial zones characterized by various tariff and tax
exemptions in the world. The purpose of the BIP was to create jobs for the
11
displaced masses by attracting U.S. and other firms into the protected zones.
Firms could only engage in intermediate steps of production within the BIP, but the
advantage was that they were taxed solely for the value added by low-cost labor
which was paid at a fraction of the U.S. equivalent. The first firms attracted to
the BIP were primarily garment and electronics that began employing women, not
the men who had been Braceros. With no prospect for jobs, hundreds of thousands
of Mexicans began making their way across the border, often without the benefit of
legal documents (hence, undocumented).
This growing source of labor coincided with a rising demand for low wage
labor in the U.S. as illustrated in the case of Los Angeles. During the mid-sixties,
the economic prosperity generated by post-war growth began to seem illusory. The
first indicator was the Watts riots of 1965 which brought attention to the fact that
unemployment was a deeply rooted problem. Subsequent Chicano demonstrations
added to the civil unrest. 1 A relative economic stagnation then hit Los Angeles
County resulting in enormous welfare expenditures. 2 The shakey foundation of the
economy was further jarred by cessation of the Viet Nam war build-up which came
to an abrupt recessionary end in 1969. The recession of 1969-70 also marked the
end of a decade of prominance by manufacturing in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles
County workforce employed in manufacturing had peaked at 35% and began a sharp
decline, while employment in services, wholesale and retail trade, finance, and
government grew. 3 By the end of the 1973-75 global recession, and the recession
of 1979-80, it was apparent that a significant industrial restructuring had begun.
During this long period of economic contraction, many manufacturing firms
in the U.S., particularly those in the declining sectors, were pressed to find options
for remaining viable. If their method of production consisted of discrete steps that
required minimal skill and were labor intensive, and if they had the financial
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capacity, these firms could move part of their production to the BIP or other EPZs.
This was an early trend among many highly competitive manufacturers in
electronics and the garment industry. What it did to their competitors remaining
in the U.S. was force them to meet the lower costs of production. As this
occurred, the employment of immigrant, and especially undocumented, labor
became particularly important.
Since then, the firms locating production units in the Mexican industrial zone
have come from a broad range of manufacture. Of the over 200 firms cited in a
1976 Congressional hearing as having factories in the Mexican border towns of
Tijuana, Tecate, and Ensenada, approximately 50% were headquartered in Los
Angeles. 4 They included corporations like Hughes Aircraft, Northrup, and Rockwell,
as well as numerous small firms involved in apparel, food processing, furniture, auto
parts, and electronics. 5  With each firm that moved to the border or other
international sites, a circuit was strengthened that affected L.A. workers and
producers alike. This circuit consisted of the export of production to Mexico and
the importation of labor, ties that became stronger with each recessionary set-back.
Because of this symbiotic relationship, it is now possible to think of the border as
the outer boundaries of the Los Angeles regional labor market.
Within Los Angeles, the undocumented workers became identified with nearly
all sectors of the regional economy. In the last decade, they were particularly
important among three categories of employers. The first, and most traditional,
were the classically immigrant industries, such as garment that retained a highly
competitive structure, were frequently small, and paid low wages. These industries
had developed a system of sub-contracting that allowed sweatshops (firms operating
below minimum wage and labor standards definitions) and homework (industrial work
performed at home) to proliferate. The concept that urban undocumented workers
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were an excessively exploited laborforce emerged out of the recognition that entire
sectors had become not only immigrant dependent, but organized around substandard
methods of production.
The second group of employers consisted of basic manufacturing firms faced
with the necessity of rapidly adjusting to the repeated recessions, a situation made
worse by the international competition that had seriously penetrated the U.S.
market. These employers were extremely problematic since they signalled the
extent to which market uncertainties were triggering radical solutions. Initially,
this situation was seen as anomoly isolated to a few firms which had simply taken
advantage of the available labor, a problem generated by conditions of labor supply.
A closer examination proved otherwise. As the findings of this research indicate,
the occurrance was instead structural, and rooted in the process of economic
transformation. The employers used undocumented workers as a controllable
laborforce that could be easily released as a temporary strategy for maintaining
production until longer term market solutions could be established, such as moving
to Mexico or elsewhere, changing product lines, or automating. For this reason,
they have been termed transitional labor, since they aided in the economic
transformation of troubled manufacturing firms.
The final set of employers consisted of the growing service and high-tech
sectors known for having a dual employment structure: a few well-paid, highly
skilled positions on the one hand; and a large base of unstable, low-wage jobs on the
other. U.S. workers, freshly out of work from good paying manufacturing jobs with
commitments that tied them to higher wages and benefits, found that the emerging
employment base was a step backward into a downwardly mobile lifestyle. Instead,
the immigrant laborforce became absorbed into and linked with the poorly paid jobs
in the growth sectors. This in turn alerted the U.S. to both the nature of the
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emerging labor demand, and the critical factors (such as a poorly paid, unstable
workforce) necessary to the recovery and place of international dominance by major
urban centers.
The concept of an "advanced" economy where growth is linked to high
technology employment implies an association with progress. In fact, the
prominence of immigrant labor, and in particular undocumented labor, tells us
something about the nature of"progress," or economic development in industrialized
nations. What is suggested is that the transformation of the U.S. economy has not
been smooth, nor simple, nor uniformly beneficial. Rather than advancing all
segments of society equally, the effects have been felt selectively. Here, the
economic development literature has been insightful with respect to the uneveness
created by the internationalization of capital. More recently, we are coming to
understand the full impact of the coincident internationalization of labor on
"development." A brief review of a few points illustrate this.
Reflections on Economic Development
Early generations of political economists were concerned with the systemic
disequilibrium of the global economy that followed the expansion of capitalism. For
example, the literature on imperialism focused on the relationship between
underconsumption and the inherent drive by capitalism into economies wielding less
market power. This led l.A. Hobson to postulate that incomes would always be
unequally distributed under capitalism. 6  His argument was that a shortage of
purchasing power among the poor, coupled with a saturation of demand resulting in
forced savings by the rich, would create excessive production relative to
consumption that would be exaccerbated over time. Thus, the imperialistic drive
into colonies and semicolonies initiating the process of unequal development was
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motivated by a dual need for new outlets in which capitalists could invest their
ever-increasing savings, and by a search for markets in which they could sell their
surplus products.
V.I. Lenin advanced this position with the observation that imperialism
actually was characterized by monopoly capitalism, or that stage of capitalism
distinguished by the concentration of ownership. 7  The emerging conglomerates
were exerting oligoplolistic control over local product markets, while simultaneously
forcing an increased worldwide competition in the search for areas to invest their
surplus capital. Since foreign investment led to lower costs of production, it
enabled entrepreneurs to lower prices while maintaining profits. In addition, the
process of accumulation and expansion created a surplus laborforce in the
industrialized countries due to the loss of jobs to workers in the periphery. As Rosa
Luxemberg later noted, capital could simultaneously extract surplus value from
urban workers in industrialized countries who were constrained in their demands by
a local pool of redundant labor, while on a similar basis maintain leverage over
workers in predominantly pre-capitalist economies. 8
Development in the peripheral countries often involved the amassing of
agricultural land required for large-scale farming, thereby releasing large numbers
of people, coupled with restructured urban employment absorbing deskilled workers
to the point of saturation. The residual to this pattern of growth were mobile mass
workers who were drawn by the potential of employment into advanced nations. In
retrospect, the expansion of capitalism not only generated internationally mobile
workers, it also encouraged class distinctions among workers based on the immigrant
status in the advanced countries. This was exemplified in Lenin's comment that, "in
the U.S., immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the most
poorly paid occupations, while American workers provide the highest percentage of
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overseers or of the better paid workers. Imperialism has the tendency to create
privileged sections even among the workers, and to detach them from the main
proletarian mass." 9
A fractionalization of the working class with respect to immigrant status (as
well as race and sex) was developing in the U.S. that was further shaped by national
policies. As Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Harry Braverman, among others noted
monopoly capitalism led to broad changes in the structure of state power which
were required to maintain the economic system. 1 0 These state policies included
tariff and tax measures that rewarded mobility by capital to international sites.
Subsequently, as more economically advanced societies entered a period
distinguished by an increased use of automation, it became apparent that de-skilled
production workers could be replaced abroad by foreign workers and at home by
automation through a process facilitated by the state.I1
From one perspective the world economic system was becoming increasingly
integrated, but from another, the emerging global order was instead becoming
increasingly delineated, as illustrated in the concept of a world economic system
developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Under this formulation, once the economic
system was set in motion, it was retained due to class interests. It is Wallerstein's
contention that:
The division of the world-economy involves a hierarchy of occupational tasks,
in which tasks requiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalization are
reserved for higher-ranking areas. Since a capitalist world-economy
essentially rewards accumulated capital at a higher rate than "raw" labor
power, the geographical maldistribution of these occupational skills involves a
strong trend toward self-maintenance. The forces of the marketplace
reinforce them rather than undermine them. And the absence of a central
political mechanism for the world-economy makes it very difficult to intrude
counteracting forces to the maldistribution of rewards.12
According to this conception, the world can be thought of as abstractly divided
into core, periphery, and semi-peripheral zones, each characterized by different
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productive processes, occupational categories, and means of controlling labor. An
inherent imbalance in the global economy is postulated to exist because surplus
labor was continually generated at the periphery and absorbed at no cost of
reproduction by the industrialized countries. This imbalance was seen as
perpetuated by social rewards accrued to dominant class interests and supported by
the state in both the core and the periphery. In the tradition of dependency
theorists and advocates of irreversible structural uneveness, it was argued that
wealth was parasitically transferred from the periphery to the core.13
At the root of uneven development is capital accumulation and the search for
ways that capital can extract ever-increasing value from labor, such as through
capital mobility. In the process, this creates unequal returns among capitals, and an
"unequal exchange" in the transfer of value across economic spaces. 1 4 However,
there is nothing fixed about the relationships that develop among capital, between
capital and labor, and across space, since the ease with which capital can extract
value must be conditioned by mass struggles in regions of underdeveloped social
formations, and by proletarian struggles in areas of developed social formations.
That is, labor can define critical constraints within which capital makes its choices,
and the spatial consequences can be a blurring of the distinction between core and
periphery. For example, within the U.S., the struggle between capital and labor
during the period of economic transformation was marked by capital flight on the
one hand, and the employment of immigrant and undocumented labor on the other.
Eventually, however, even the transitional undocumented workers were also too
demanding. As the research will indicate, their continual opposition with employers
through union disputes, rising demands, and workplace conflicts made them a
temporary solution. Thus, the actions taken by capital to circumvent these workers
led to a further integration of the global economy (in contrast to the divisions
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suggested by Wallerstein). The active participation by labor in shaping capitalist
economies also illustrates a far more dynamic role by immigrant labor than had
been understood by Lenin when he made his f irst observations.
From the position that labor places limitations on capital, the previously
described categories for understanding immigrant workers take on added dimensions.
Workers associated with either marginalized, declining, or growth sectors could be
understood as encountering distinct class conflicts, and different struggles with
capital. Numerous studies analyzing the role of immigrants as marginalized workers,
and more recently, as contributors to growth have touched on this. The research
presented here focuses on the demand for undocumented workers within declining
sectors during the conjuncture of capitalist periods. Yet, in all three roles,
immigrants (and undocumented workers) actively shape the development of
industrialized economies. It is from this perspective the following study of
undocumented workers as transitional labor is presented.
Overview of the Research
The focus of the study is how firms caught in the economic transformation
used undocumented workers. As such, it is an analysis of the labor process, or the
way in which production is organized as a strategy by capital to control labor. This
research combines methods of inquiry from several disciplines to arrive at the
conclusions. On one hand, the study draws from theories on the absorption of
immigrant labor. On the other hand, it develops an analysis of the automobile
industry in the process of industrial change. Jointly, these set the context for in-
depth plant studies, followed by an aggregate statistical analysis on the employment
of undocumented workers.
The Los Angeles automobile industry became the object of analysis for several
reasons. First was because of the large undocumented workforce in the region.
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Secondly, auto is one of the most highly linked manufacturing industries in the U.S.,
and historically has been one of the most prominent in setting industrial trends in
the labor process. Thus, trends in the Los Angeles automobile industry would
directly or indirectly affect many other industries.
The auto industry case studies concentrate on manufacturers of wheels,
headers (exhaust manifolds), and batteries since these product lines illustrated
different options available to firms as they encountered extreme market pressures.
Each firm is analyzed acording to the state of their technology, character of the
product market, and structure of the industry in order to understand the basis for
their demand for labor. Thus, the case studies provided the background for
undertaking an aggregated statistical analysis.
The text is structured in the following format. Chapter 2 presents a model for
looking at the roles of immigrant labor using Marxist categories of surplus labor.
Here, it is suggested that transitional workers perform a latent reserve function in
the economy. Chapter 3 focuses on industrial restructuring in the U.S. (the causes
and outcomes), with special attention to the automobile industry. The emphasis is
on distinguishing between the way in which parts producers and the auto makers
responded during the economic downturn. This distinction later characterized their
performance towards the economic recovery. Chapter 4 is a study of eight Los
Angeles parts producers in wheels, headers, and batteries that demonstrated
different short-term and long-run solutions during the period of change. Primary
attention is given to their usage of undocumented workers. Chapter 5 is a
statistical analysis based on 21 Los Angeles manufacturing firms. The purpose was
to isolate the most significant characteristics of employers of undocumented
workers, and to further show which firm and worker attributes are most highly
correlated with wage levels. Chapter 6 is an analysis of national policy discussed in
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light of the findings. The policies considered involve pertinent immigration, urban,
and industrial legislation. Lastly, the appendices discuss the methodology used in
undertaking the research, and present descriptive statistics of the firms studied.
In sum, the research proposes not only a new category of undocumented
workers, but an alternative way of seeing immigrant labor. The view presented
within the emerging global economy, "more-developed" nations are encountering a
greater dependence on "internationalized" labor. These marginalized workers are,
in fact, integral to the emerging international order.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF IMMIGRATION AND THE ABSORPTION OF UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS INTO THE U.S. LABORFORCE:
OBSERVATIONS BASED ON THE LOS ANGELES EXPERIENCE
Introduction
A paradox has emerged in the Los Angeles labor market. Undocumented
workers in violation of immigration laws once commonly ascribed to menial tasks in
agriculture, services, or light manufacturing, have entered into new areas of
employment. During the recent period of economic decline and high unemployment
in the U.S., they became prominent among basic manufacturing sectors in Los
Angeles. Although these workers had never previously been linked to auto and other
basic industries, the economic climate shaping labor market conditions substantially
changed the demand for undocumented workers.
Viewed historically, the seemingly contradictory trends in the Los Angeles
economy can be traced to a legacy of interdependence between immigration and
economic growth. For example, economist Brinley Thomas has shown that
expansionary periods of the industrial revolution were both the outcome and cause
of rapid growth among low cost immigrant labor.1 The current situation reveals
that immigrants, particularly temporary workers such as the undocumented, can be
equally important during the structural transformation that accompanies economic
downturns.
The contemporary U.S. experience has a parallel in post-war Europe. During
the Second World War reconstruction, labor shortages heightened the demand for
production workers in highly industrialized countries. From the 1950's to the
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1970's, guestworker programs were established among European Economic
Community and Common Nordic Labour Market nations. 2  They drew from
different sources (such as the citizenry of former colonies, or neighboring low-
income countries), and allocated the workers into various sectors; construction,
mining, services, and manufacturing. Illustrative of the significance of the
laborforce, in 1973, foreign workers constituted 10-12% of the working population
in Germany and France, and 3096 in Switzerland; 3 and from a sectoral perspective,
46% of the semi-skilled assembly workers in the Paris automobile industry were
immigrants. 4 Following the OPEC oil crisis of 1973, the number of work permits
issued dropped sharply, and flows began to stabilize at a much lower level. 5 But
previous to this restrictive period, rising unemployment due to cyclical
contractions and structural job loss was accompanied by increasing immigration
(guestworker and clandestine) leading Manuel Castells to conclude that immigrant
workers were linked to the structural "discrepancies and disequilibria resulting
from uneven development ... explained primarily by the internal dynamic of
advanced capitalist societies.",6
As in the European case, the present absorption of immigrant workers in Los
Angeles has coincided with high unemployment and a prolonged recession.
However, the difference is that the temporary workforce of the Los Angeles are
undocumented, not guestworkers. Furthermore, the present stage of industrial
transformation has expanded the demand for immigrant labor beyond the "arduous
and badly paid jobs" observed by Castells. Given a redefined role for immigrant
labor, the focus of this analysis is not on backwater sectors or marginal workers in
peripherialized industries, but on a temporary workforce integral to the
transformation of primary labor markets due to changing economic conditions.
Thus, this section will address questions originally posed by Castells: "why capital
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is ready to provide jobs for migrants in the advanced countries.. .even in conditions
of unemployment"...and "why the dominant classes introduce a social and political
element (immigrant labour) whose presence contradicts their ideology and
necessitates more complex mechanisms of social controls,"7 in light of an
particularly relevant current issue, the implications of the spatial organization of
industrial restructuring on the demand for immigrant labor.
Historical Roles of Immigrant Labor
Perhaps the best way to situate the function of this new immigrant group is
in terms developed by Karl Marx. When Marx analyzed the role of labor in the
perpetuation of the capitalist system, he noted that part of the laborforce is
actively employed, and part constitutes a surplus population, a reserve army of
labor, that is variously employed and unemployed. This surplus labor keeps wages
in check by acting as an available supply for capital. It also serves as disposable
labor during cyclical or structural periods of unemployment. The categories he
gave to workers making up the reserve laborforce were floating, latent, and
stagnant. 8 Unemployment created by the substitution of capital for labor
(corresponding with greater productivity and periods of expansion), or due to
cyclical adjustments results in release of the floating reserve. In the contemporary
setting, these workers often have unemployment benefits, severance pay,
retraining assistance, or welfare to carry them over till they are re-employed, and
are comprised of the most secure of the surplus population, such as white males, or
unionized workers in basic manufacturing.
The second category, termed latent, results from shifts that occur in
productive activity, such as from agriculture to manufacturing, or within
manufacturing, from the declining basic sectors to the emerging high technology.
Here, job loss is accompanied by an erosion of wages. Depending on the sector
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generating the release of labor and other factors, institutional support of the
workers during the period of unemployment may or may not be available. Workers
commonly allocated to the latent reserve include white males, though in the
current industrial context it increasingly refers to women, minorities, and
immigrants.
The stagnant reseve is associated with the secondary labor market using the
conventions of segmentation theory. The concept is that part of the laborforce
receives "good" wages, can expect relatively stable employment, and are employed
in positions that offer occupational mobility and advancement. This is the primary
labor market. Another group, characterized by poor wages, high turnover, and
dead-end positions, comprises the secondary labor market. 9 Marx was essentially
describing secondary labor-market workers when he defined the stagnant reserve as
"...part of the active labour army, but with extremely irregular employment...its
conditions of life sink below the average normal level of the working class...it
forms at the same time a self-reproducing and self perpetuating element of the
working class..." 1 0  The workforce may be attached to peripheralized jobs
(subemployment), cottage industries, or sweatshops, but here, the cost of
unemployment is more frequently borne by the individual or family than in the
other reserve categories. The groups generally identified with the stagnant reserve
are women, minorities and immigrants, the most economically disenfranchised
populations.' 1
Immigrants have held contradictory class positions throughout the U.S.
industrial history--at times entering into active employment; at other times
becoming reserve labor; and occasionally acting as the fulcrum for other workers
being relegated to various forms of reserve labor. This analysis will explore the
different roles of immigrants in light of comparative models using Marx's
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categories of labor. However, in order to situate this position theoretically, the
discussion will first examine a more conventional view for analyzing the absorption
of immigrant labor.
Alejandro Portes once classified immigrants with respect to their mode of
incorporation into the economy as secondary and primary labor market workers,
and those entering into immigrant enclaves. On the basis of this distinction, he
noted that the effects of secondary labor market workers on society are:
1. ... to exercise a downward pressure on working-class wages and on the
security and job conditions of domestic workers...
2. ... to upgrade the health and work fitness of the laborforce...
3. Dominant classes in receiving regions collectively save the cost of
reproducing a sector of its laborforce...
4. Labor migration tends to fragment the solidarity of the working class as
native workers blame a deteriorating economic condition on the
migrants. Racists ideologies and discrimination obscure common
economic interests and prevent the emergence of a unified working
class front. Employers deliberately encourage this division through
practices such as ethnic preferences in work assignments. 1 2
Here, he also mentions that immigration into the secondary labor market often
coincides with high unemployment.
Proceeding with the other categories:
Primary labor market immigrants generally possess the following characteristics:
1. It tends to occur through legal channels...
2. Workers are primarily hired according to ability rather than ethnicity.
Employers seldom attempt to promote ethnic opposition among these
workers.
3. Immigrants tend to have mobility chances comparable to those of native
workers...
4. The function of primary sector immigration is usually to supplement the
domestic labor force, rather than to discipline it... 1 3
As a mode of incorporation into the receiving economy, immigrant enclaves also
posssess several distinct characteristics:
1. Their formation is not a product of deliberate economic politices by the
state or the labor needs of the capitalist class, but depends on the
initiative and resources of the immigrants themselves...
2. Enclaves are occupationally heterogeous...
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3. Ethnicity represents an important aspect of economic exchange within
enclaves...
4. Significant opportunities for economic advancement exist in the
enclave...
5. Functions which enclaves play for the larger economy are
ambiguous.. .Enclaves can serve as markets, as producers of goods and
services for the larger economy, and as sources of low wage labor.
Their central characteristic, however, is that all three functions tend to
be controlled by a "middleman" immigrant entrepreneurial class. 1 4
He further states that: "A necessary condition for the emergence of enclaves is
the presence of immigrants with sufficient capital," 15 thus suggesting distinct
class differences among these immigrant categories.
From a strict labor market interpretation of the absorption of immigrants,
the Portes outline is instructive. However, labor market segmentation is a
dynamic concept. Primary labor market jobs can become transformed into
secondary labor market positions, and in this transformation, immigrants have
played an important role. The observations of the recent changes in the Los
Angeles employment base illustrate this. The Marxian labor categories were
therefore introduced since they focus on the function of labor in the economy in
ways that are applicable to primary, secondary, and enclave classifications, yet by
distinguishing between active and reserve labor, they allow for an understanding of
how changes in labor market segments can affect the demand for immigrant labor.
The models that are proposed will focus on immigrants as production workers
necessary for the regeneration of the economic system. Secondly, they illustrate
how the role of immigrants varies in different regional and economic contexts.
Thirdly, they depart from a segmented labor market analysis, per se, but view
immigrants as supporting an active or surplus labor function, thereby suggesting a
broader framework for incorporating notions of segmentation. The models are
distinguished by the function performed by immigrant labor, and the outcome of
their role in society. Underlying the models is the concept that immigrant workers
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represent certain class positions which result in conflicts or acceptance by other
classes. The models most related to contemporary Los Angeles will be discussed in
greatest depth. These models will follow the categories of labor established by
Marx and are summarized accordingly:
Mo
M odel
1
2
3
4
Table 2.1
dels of the Absorption of Immigrant Labor
Example Outcome
European immigrants into Reserve labor expanded
U.S. (mid-1800's)
European immigrants into Reserve labor expanded
U.S. (late 1800's)
Latin immigrants in U.S. Regulation of reserve
(late 1800's to mid- labor; change in
1900's) production technology
Undocumented workers into Reserve labor expanded
U.S. industrial sweat-shops "de-facto"
(mid- to late 1900's) industrialization of low
wage labor
Model 1--Active Labor: During the ante-bellum mid-1800's, European male
immigrants entered into the economy in a broad range of jobs. Among these were
craft and service occupations previously held by free Northern Black workers.
According to one account:
... immigrants began to displace northern Blacks from jobs they had held at
times almost exclusively. There were colonies of free Black workers in
Northeastern cities, especially New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore.
Frederick Douglass explains that these Northern Blacks were "elbowed out of
employment by some newly arrived emigrants..." and that these White men
were becoming "house-servants, cooks, and stewards... porters,
stevedors.. .brick-makers, white washers and barbers...coachmen..." all
occupations performed mostly by Blacks. 1 6
Function
Active
Floating
Reserve
Latent
Reserve
Stagnant
Reserve
;
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While the immigrants assumed a position of active labor, they forced the Blacks
into the reserve laborforce. Displacement by one group of another is not a
requisite outcome, but in this case, Blacks, who had been the object of racial
barriers, were unable to prevent their own dislocation.
Model 2--Floating Reserve Labor: Later, during the Industrial Revolution (late
1800's), the introduction of mass production required extensive cheap labor of a
magnitude that surpassed the supply available from agriculture. This demand was
met by successive groups of immigrants, primarily from Europe. However, the
acceptance they received during the industrial expansion ended under loose market
conditions following World War I. Immigration quotas were established to restrict
new flows from Europe (1921 and 1924 immigration quota acts), and with the
decline of job opportunities, some immigrants returned to Europe. Nativist
movements attacking immigration policies peaked with employment declines. 1 7
Efforts to assure that the labor market did not become so tight as to result in
rising wages and a stronger voice for labor took several forms, including Northern
employers sending labor recruiters among Southern Blacks.1 8 Immigrant labor
became identified as a source to be drawn on during periods of increased
production, and restricted during economic contractions (i.e., floating reserve
labor). In order to justify this orchestration of the flow of labor, the prevailing
ideology adopted towards immigrants as that "on the one hand, the immigrant was
welcomed as a workers, and on the other hand, he was rejected as being inferior in
the social structure." 19 Though European immigrants were generally relegated to
the least desirable jobs characterized by low status and instability due to constant
major cyclical or seasonal fluctuations, 2 0 they nevertheless experienced upward
mobility. When Blacks and immigrants competed in the same labor market, it was
usually to the detriment of Blacks, who remained marginalized. 2 1 Thus, the
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employers utilized workers on the basis of class (citizenship) and race to maintain
the floating reserve.
In his analysis of the period, Alejandro Portes made an important distinction
between the industrial Northeast and growth in the West. He comments:
Underlying the support of northweastern industrial firms for the end of
immigration--or least the absence of their opposition to the move--was the
availability of another huge reservoir of labor in the southern
states ... Northern industrialists could thus attend impassively to the closure of
the immigration door. The same was not true in the West, where the labor
needs of rapidly expanding agriculture, railroads, and mines were not being
met. Southern blacks correctly opted for the superior wages and more
subdued discrimination of the North, thus depriving southwestern growers and
railroad builders of their labor. 2 2
Initially it was agricultural growth that led to a demand for immigrant labor, but
later it was to keep viable a backward industry.
Model 3--Latent Reserve Labor: Western agriculture developed differently from
the rest of the U.S. because of the massive size of the parcels under cultivation.
These had been remnants of old Spanish land grants, or land acquired by the
government. In recounting the acreage within private ownership, a report noted
that during the 1800's, one firm had "amassed almost 700,000 acres in California,
and through their control over water rights, they virtually owned still larger
tracts.. ." which led one owner to boast, "he could travel the length of California
and never spend a night off his property." 2 3 The large-scale farms characteristic
of the region were worked by armies of hired laborers, in contradistinction to the
family farms of the Midwest. The only other part of the nation that had a farms of
the Mid-West. The only other part of the nation that had a history of large farms
was the plantation South which had been supported by slavery and share-cropping.
The demise of slavery and introduction of the tractor, coupled with New Deal
agricultural policies which destroyed share-cropping, diminished the need for
agricultural labor in the South. Though some western crops also mechanized, labor
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intensive production continued on the basis of immigrant, and poor domestic
contract workers.
Initially, the immigrant workers were Chinese, and later Japanese, but these
groups quickly began to establish their own farms using methods of cultivation
from their homelands. Once they were perceived as self-serving and competitive,
they were barred from entering the U.S. through highly restrictive immigration
quotas (1881 was the first Chinese exclusion act; 1924 legislation excluded all
Japanese). However, during World War I, domestic workers, attracted to urban
centers, left a shortage of farm labor, so western growers turned to Mexico. The
growers' demand for labor roughly coincided with the Mexican Revolution of 1910
when the exodus from Mexico numbered in the hundreds of thousands. As the
people emigrating from Mexico and elsewhere grew, so did the campaign by
residents to regulate the flow. Among the important legislative controls enacted
were the Immigration Control Act of 1917 that put qualitative restrictions on new
immigrants, such as literacy, health, and skill requirements; and the National
Quota Act of 1924 that put numerical restrictions on immigrants, instituted the
day commuter program (green card), and created the Border Patrol. Through 1929
legislation, illegal entry into the country became a felony. Jointly, these acts
created burdens for the growers seeking low-cost seasonal labor.
With the Depression of the 1930's, thousands of Mexican workers were
deported, further limiting the supply of Mexican labor, though they were often
replaced by destitute resident workers. However, during World War II, domestic
workers again found more stable, better paying industrial and urban employment.
The serious challenge by other sectors for labor was a clear indication that
agricultural production technology required change. Instead, agricultural producers
treated the situation as though they were confronting another downturn. Rather
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than raise wages and restructure production to make farm labor jobs competitive
with urban industrial employment, growers lobbied for the creation of a contract
labor system, the Bracero Program, established through a bilateral agreement with
Mexico.
From its inception in 1942 to its dissolution in 1964, approximately 5 million
workers were under contract with the Bracero Program. It was structured such
that workers were assigned to agricultural employers, paid a subsistance wage, and
provided with basic necessities, though denied the right to organize. Recruitment
centers were located along the Mexican border for the convenience of U.S. growers
who paid the workers' transportation and subsistence costs. Often people not
accepted into the program simply ignored the boundaries and crossed illegally.
Thus, the growers benefited from both contract and undocumented labor.
Ultimately, however, with the loss of the Bracero Program, Bracero
dependent growers had to change their production technology, and they did so in
several ways. Strawberry growers, frustrated in their attempts to develop labor
saving technology and faced with growing competition from Mexico, hired green
card workers, instituted a piece rate system, and encouraged share cropping.
Lemon growers, also turned to green card workers, but they further upgraded the
work by initiating a minimum wage, providing benefits, and establishing year round
employment. White asparagus growers moved to Mexico, while sugar beet and
tomato growers mechanized. With mechanization of selective aspects of tomato
production and processing, women were introduced to do sorting at a much lower
wage than men. And in many instances, undocumented workers replaced the
Braceros. 2 4
Within Western agriculture, the immigrant workers functioned as part of the
latent reserve because the competition agriculture faced from other sectors in the
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region seeking labor, and international competition in the product market, kept
wages low. The immigrant labor helped to institutionalize low wage work and
regulation of the reserve laborforce through their temporary contract and
undocumented status. While domestic workers were at one time substitutable, in
many crops they were eventually passed over. Instead, the pool of undocumented
workers replenished the labor supply; a gender division of labor further
fractionalized the workers; while the potential for mechanization or moving kept
the latent reserve from becoming too demanding.
This situation contrasts with the European guestworker program since there
the contract labor was expelled when labor shortages eased (a floating reserve
function comparable to the pre-Bracero period). A further distinction can be made
with migrant Black workers in the mines of South Africa who are regulated by
governmental policies of apartheid. In reference to this, Michael Buroway notes
that: "The dominant division in the South African labor market is based on relation
to the state, whereas that in the United States is based on relation to the
economy." 2 5 With the state as an organizing element in production and market
relations, major segments of the population are subjected to a dualistic economy in
South Africa. In the United States, the affected population was, and is,
significantly smaller. But the primary difference is that in the U.S., agriculture
was being transformed, and contract workers provided cheap labor while growers
began the process of adjustment (such as research into mechanization). With the
termination of the contract labor program, the transformation of agricultural
production accelerated.
Model 4--Stagnant Reserve Labor: Though undocumented immigrants had been
entering the U.S. from Mexico well before the Bracero Program went into effect,
illegal migration picked up during its implementation, and grew even more
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when it ended. Today, Mexico contributes approximately half of all such migrants
to the U.S. 2 6 Research on Mexican undocumented workers conducted during the
late 1970's showed that the majority were employed in non-farm work. 2 7 Most are
here for short periods of time (less than one year per visit), however, the number of
long-term settlers appears to be increasing. 2 8 The longer an undocumented worker
remains in the U.S., the greater the likelihood of realizing a rise in occupational
status. For example, temporary migrants are primarily employed as non-farm
laborers, farm laborers and foremen, and similar positions that are referred to as
"low pay, low status." In contrast, many permanent settlers are employed as
operatives, laborers, or service workers in urban areas. One study also determined
that "25% of 563 formerly undocumented Mexican immigrants were found to have
obtained jobs above the operative level (as craftsmen, clerical and sales workers,
managers and proprietors, technicians and professionals) by the time they
succeeded in legalizing their status in the United States." 2 9 Approximately half of
these workers find their way to California, where Los Angeles is a particularly
favored location. 3 0 Here, despite the trend towards a rise in occupational status,
many remain locked into sweatshops where industrial exploitation takes the form
of less than minimum wages, lack of due compensation for overtime work, cash
wage payments with no contributions for taxes, social security, or unemployment
insurance, and no benefits, such as sick leave.
Sweatshops have been recorded in a number of sectors, though in Los
Angeles, the most fragrant cited abusers have been in restaurants and the garment
industry. 3 1 A variant to sweatshops is homework, where part of the production is
relegated to the home, an occurance common in electronics. 3 2 The workers are
classically secondary labor market in status, and the employers are usually entirely
dependent on an immigrant workforce. In many instances, employers are sub-
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contractors operating in a highly competitive climate, who bid the work at a low
rate then supply the product to a final assembler. The sub-contractor often
performs work that has in other firms been shifted to international subsidiaries
where wage levels are a fraction of those in the U.S. Thus, their options for
remaining viable are limited to labor intensive sweatshops; automating, an
expensive and often not feasible alternative; or also internationalizing. Within
these shops, stratification of workers by immigrant status, race and sex is a
frequent pattern. Whole job sites may be composed of one immigrant group, or
separated by department, and further segregated by sex, thereby preventing worker
unity by creating competition among them. 3 3
Workers in these industries appear to comprise the stagnant reserve. One
view of these workers is that their employment displaces domestic labor, and in the
process, puts many domestic workers into the stagnant reserve. In light of the
limited options, it is doubtful these jobs would ever be available to U.S. workers at
standards required for maintaining a subsistence level of income. However, some
sectors which were once dependent on sweatshop workers (such as electronics) are
beginning to automate. Should this become widespread, the process of industrial
devolution would in actuality be a step in their transformation, not a final
outcome, and the usage of stagnant reserve labor in the short-run can be viewed as
performing a latent reserve function in the long-term.
The examples given in the models show undocumented workers entering into
two roles, as latent and stagnant reserve labor. As latent reserve, they facilitate a
downward pressure on wages. For an industry in transition, domestic workers
expecting parity in their remuneration and a voice in the workplace could actually
inhibit this change. They may expect compensation for their employment
instability firms aren't willing to provide. Contract labor and undocumented
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workers give the employer leverage over wages and working conditions, which is
particularly important to industries in decline. In their conflicted position, latent
reserve immigrants support a declining capitalist class, who in turn, destabilize the
prevailing working class. By using workers in this way, unemployment is a natural
complement. Though domestic workers may seek jobs, immigrant labor is
preferred. This dual trend of domestic unemployment coupled with immigrant
employment is more apparent in contemporary manufacturing than was evident in
western agriculture. The farmworkers would rather have had industrial jobs, and
while manufacturing was expanding, they chose that option. Todays unemployed
industrial workers have neither the same potential for sectoral upgrading nor the
prospects of a growing employment base. In light of the structural transformation
of basic manufacturing, latent reserve also exemplifies the role of undocumented
workers in Los Angeles. The purpose of this labor is by definition a transitional
one, and in that respect, latent reserve more accurately describes the workforce
than do segmented labor market distinctions. Table 2 below illustrates these
points.
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Table 2.2
Labor Employment During Different Types of Economic Activity
Segmented
Labor Market
Categories
Characteristic
Employment
Enters during
expansion of
economic activity
Enters during
contraction of
economic activity
Supports change
in method of
industrial
production
Primary
Active
0
Floating Latent
0
o0
(could be
seen as
inhibiting
change)
Secondary
Stagnant
0
0
o (could be seen as
employed in
technically
non-evolving
industries)*
*perhaps a temporary condition
The Spatial Organization of Industrial Activity and the Role of Immigrants
The recent period of industrial restructuring in basic manufacturing has
redefined economic activity spatially. The previous urban order reflected different
productive and social relations from those manifested in the contemporary urban
hierarchy. Towards this change, immigrant labor contributed to the reorganization
of declining manufacturing activities, while in another capacity, helped usher in
the growth of services. Significantly, this labor tends to be distributed unequally
across the nation and is concentrated in the urban centers of rising prominance.
This section will discuss the urban restructuring taking place in order to illustrate
the spatial implications of the latent reserve function of immigrant workers in
basic manufacturing.
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Though many analysts have studied the sunbelt/snowbelt shift in productive
capacity, and the manufacturing/services transformation within the national
economy, the work of Thierry Noyelle and Thomas Stanback is particularly
illuminating because of their integration of the trends. In summarizing their
observations, Noyelle recently described the "current restructuring of capital and
labor in the United States and its impact on spatial organization" in the form of
three propositions. In his words:
The first proposition is that, over the past fifteen years, the U.S. economy
has been experiencing a major structural transformation that is closely
related to changes in the international economy. This transformation not
only consists of a restructuring of capital, in which domestic employment and
output in manufacturing have stagnated relative to parts of the service
sector while certain activities of United States corporations have become
increasingly internationalized; it also consists of the restructuring of labor--
both domestically and internationally--marked by an increased division
between highly skilled mental and technical labor and unskilled manual and
clerical labor.
The second proposition is that these structural changes in the American
economy are proceeding along with a transformation of the economic
structure of the U.S. system of cities. The reorganization of manufacturing
production and the growth of service activities are altering substantially the
economic base of many urban areas and redefining relations of dependence
among metropolitan centers.
The third and last proposition is that this urban transformation is thriving on
and occurring because of the simultaneous transformation of employment
systems within metropolitan labor markets characterized by the emergence
of new forms of segmentation.
A major conclusion...is that a new dual economy is emerging in U.S.
metropolitan areas, one that differs sharply from the dual economy of the
immediate postwar era during which the dichotomy between monopoly and
competitive firms constituted the main axis of segmentation. The new dual
economy is the result of the two new axes of segmentation: (1) the tendency
toward increased bifurcation within the large corporation's labor force itself,
and (2) the tendency toward increased specialization in the large
corporation's use of geographical space. 3 4
The underlying concept is that Taylorist principles of task fragmentation
combined with Fordism (mass production, mass consumerism, welfare economics,
military-industrial growth, and U.S. international superiority), fundamental to the
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structure of manufacturing production, disintegrated beginning in the late 1960's
due to a combination of factors (including a change in the basis of international
monetary exchange, a challenge by foreign producers in U.S. markets, the mobility
of production, and a crisis of collective consumption). As U.S. manufacturing
production became increasingly decentralized, locating in sites with ever cheaper
labor (such as the South, but particularly in foreign locations), ownership and
control became more centralized, and dependent upon distributive and producer
service activities for their maintenance. Distributive and producer services refer
to "intermediate inputs in the production process," such as "transportation,
communications, utilities and wholesale trade," or research, banking, insurance,
real estate, accounting, legal services, and the like, respectively. 3 5 The shift in
productive activity has led to a dichotomization of work: a heightened need for
both highly skilled and low-skilled labor (a vast expansion of the stagnant reserve in
the broadest sense, not simply sweatshops). Intermediate level jobs were lost
through deskilling and the reorganization of production.
Urban areas that had previously been centers of manufacturing suffered from
unemployment, a loss of their base of revenue, and a drain on their social services.
Those locations that had not developed a strong service sector became dependent
on cities which had captured this capacity. Ultimately, a new urban hierarchy was
taking shape, "one in which new relationships of economic dominance are being
developed, between service-oriented, decision-making centers on the one hand and
production-oriented, dependent centers on the other...,"36 with the most nationally
prominent of the distributive and producer service centers being New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco.
The emergence of these centers required a successful transition from a
manufacturing to a service based economy. Studies on New York and Los Angeles,
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in particular, call attention to the pivitol role of immigrant and undocumented
labor, though the same observations apply to Chicago and San Francisco, which had
also been significant recipients of this laborforce. 3 7  First, immigrants and
undocumented workers, by their employment in basic manufacturing, performed a
(temporary) latent reserve function which led to a lowering of the prevailing wage
and fractionalization of the working class. Among Los Angeles automobile parts
suppliers (to be discussed in subsequent chapters), this disengaged employers from
workers' expectations of high wages and employment stability, while providing
control in the workplace over the resident population. The relatively unnoticed
transformation accomplished through the substitution of one form of labor for
another had a more visible counterpart in the wage and benefit concessions of
organized labor. Both were part of the dismantling of labors' position vis-a-vis
capital.
Secondly, immigrant and unodcumented workers constituted the bulk of the
stagnant reserve feeding into the peripheralized sectors such as garment, where in
reality, they are comparable to Third World workers (i.e., they are the Third World
brought home).
Thirdly, they constituted a portion of the stagnant reserve accompanying the
rising service activities. In restaurants, hotels, laundry facilities, car washes, and
the like, they support the lifestyles of the high-tech, high-finance, international
business segments of the population who are increasingly disassociated with the
home. Thus, they are integral to the reproduction of the new social strata.
These functions performed by the immigrant and undocumented laborforce
have been indispensible to the restructuring of the dominant urban areas. The
marginalization of production and service work characteristic of the contemporary
period necessitated a devaluation of the domestic workforce. However, lowering
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the average U.S. worker to immigrant standards would be destructive to the
economy because working class capacity for mass consumption which regenerates
the economic system would dissipate.
Concluding Remarks
Immigrants, and particularly undocumented workers, pose difficult problems
in society. Within the sphere of production, working class conflicts arise over the
allocation of jobs; degradation of work; race, sex, and citizenship based
stratification of workers; and fragmentation of power. The class conflicts benefit
owners and managers, who further profit from immigrant workers in the realm of
social reproduction, since the social costs for maintaining and recreating the
laborforce are transferred to the family or the home country, rather than society
at large, or the employers. Historically, the social disruption generated by the
immigrant and undocumented workers have led to a dismantling of the apparatus
allowing their usage (e.g., termination of the European guestworker programs and
the Bracero Program), or to further state intervention into the regulation or
availability of labor (e.g., immigrant exclusion acts). Unless immigrant dependent
sectors can turn these measures to their favor (e.g., creation of a guestworker
program), the outcome is increased control by the state in the private arena. State
intervention is felt unevenly, however, since the most competitive and
peripheralized industrial sectors generally are the main targets.
The social costs of restrictive legislation given the present reorganization of
productive capacity are extensive. First, institutionalization of a temporary
workforce, such as guestworkers, would simply provide a grace period for less
efficient producers. Alternatively, actions to prevent the existence or employment
of undocumented workers through increased surveillance, employers sanctions, and
worker identity cards will force employers to adopt radical responses for sheltering
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their market positions (e.g., hiring underground labor, automating, restructuring
work, or moving to foreign locations), while simultaneously placing domestic
workers in the uncomfortable position of becoming more like these workers (by
lowering their social benefits and wages) in order to be suitable replacements.
Both of the latter developments seem to already be unfolding. Lastly, if the
situation is left alone, the sectors dependent on stagnant reserve immigrant labor
would probably continue on their course, while latent reserve dependent firms
would do so only until they have completed their period of transformation. In this
latter instance, the workers are transitional labor, a concept that will be analyzed
in greater depth in subsequent chapters beginning first with an overview of the
automobile industry, followed by case studies.
Considerable debate over appropriate immigration, industrial, and urban
policy has developed out of the recent crisis of production and collective
consumption in the U.S. Rarely are the issues integrated in a way that illustrates
the importance of latent and stagnant reserve immigrant workers in the U.S. labor
market. The concluding chapter will return to this point with a discussion of policy
implications in light of the role of immigrant, and particularly undocumented labor
in a changing economy.
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CHAPTER 3
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
Introduction
For nearly seventy years, from the 1910's to the mid-1970's, the automobile
industry dominated manufacturing trends in the U.S. Mass production technology
developed by Ford and General Motors (GM) became models for other industries.
Industrial relations forged between the auto makers and the United Auto Workers*
(JAW) set nationwide wage and bargaining patterns. After World War II,
automobile manufacture and consumption had become so integral to national
prosperity that by 1979, one out of six jobs were directly or indirectly related ot
automobile production. 1 But during the prolonged recessions of the late '70's and
early '80's, the industry showed a significant lack of resilience. Major automakers
faced bankruptcy, unionzed workers conceded numerous hard won gains, and plants
ordered lay-offs and closings. Beyond any simple adjustments, the industry faced
major reconstruction. According to one industry analyst, "the profound changes
made by the automobile industry between 1976 and 1982 may [have constituted] the
largest shift in technological, human and capital resources in...U.S. industrial
history." 2
Numerous factors including heightened foreign competition, rising oil prices,
and management intransigence weakened the auto companies during the '70's and
jointly accelerated the industry's rapid loss of prominence throughout the decade.
*United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
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Yet, in reality, the manufacturers had begun to lose their competitive edge earlier.
Key indicators revealed the long decline. From 1955 to 1980, U. S. production of
all autos made in the world dropped from 72% to 20%.3 In 1980, the number of
vehicles produced in the U.S. returned to the same number produced in 1960, only 8
million. 4 Industry profits plummeted. Finally, by 1980, "U.S. automobile factories
were running at only about half of capacity, and the industry lost more than $4.2
billion--an amount that may [have been] a record for one concentrated sector." 5
Production losses among the four large auto makers accounted for only part
of the problem. Thousands of auto parts suppliers and their employees were also
affected. According to one estimate, in 1979, approximately one million workers
were employed by vehicle manufacturers, but "nearly twice as many were
employed by the parts suppliers." 6 As hundreds of thousands of workers in the "big
four" began to lose their jobs and relative bargaining power, untold others working
for sub-contractors suffered parallel experiences.
Although some of the industry's problems were the result of decisions or
conditions specific to auto producers, in many ways they were illustrative of a
larger industrial trend. A wave of disinvestment in basic manufacturing swept the
country resulting in what was referred to as the "deindustrialization" of America. 7
The late 1970's and early 1980's marked an unusual period in U.S. economic history.
It ws apparent that basic manufacturing industries in the U.S., such as auto, steel,
and rubber, were struggling in an increasingly competitive international market.
During the previous decade, the United States suffered two severe recessions:
December 1969 to November 1970; and November 1973 to March 1975; and began
1980 with yet another recession. For firms in older manufacturing industries, these
were not felt as mere cyclical or seasonal fluctuations in the economy. With each
downturn, those in particularly weak market positions submitted to hard times by
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shutting down. Chronic capital flight became symptomatic of the period. Survival
for other firms necessitated severe employment cut-backs or major changes in
their production technology. It became immediately important for them to have
access to low-cost, easily-dismissed workers. As the nature of jobs changed, so did
the demand for labor. With each recessionary swing, new employment patterns
emerged. The economy in transition moved towards employment in high
technology, light manufacturing, and services, and away from the rapidly declining
heavy manuf acturing.
This period of industrial transformation had a profound effect on labor. Many
of the older jobs had been associated with the primary labor market, and with the
loss of basic manufacturing, these were lost as well. Just the threat of closure led
to wage and benefit concessions on the part of workers attempting to salvage their
positions. Even more unsettling, the industrial change was accompanied by the
employment of undocumented workers in Los Angeles, a major U.S. industrial
center. The shift toward a labor force normally identified with marginal sectors in
the nation's most important, albeit declining, industries was problemmatic. It
suggested that the bargaining position and employability of U.S. workers had lost
even more ground than had originally been acknowledged.
The appearance of undocumented workers in a period of transformation,
however, also provided an opportunity to learn more about the impact of the
industrial change on labor. The automobile industry was therefore studied because
it has been one of the nation's key manufacturing industries. In addition, the auto
industry sheds light on both oligopolistic and competitive segments of the economy.
Within the automobile industry, assemblies represent "core" firms that dominate
product market conditions. Relative to assemblies, parts suppliers operate at the
"periphery" of the product market since their demand is a derivative of the demand
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for either new cars (the original equipment market, OEM), or for replacements and
accessories (the after-market). The manufacture of automobiles consists of
approximately 10,000 parts that are assembled by the major auto makers. Only the
most critical parts, like the engine, or body are made by the auto makers or their
subsidiaries. The remainder are supplied by a variety of firms scattered around the
U.S., but largely concentrated in the Midwest. The assemblies and suppliers
responded in different yet parallel ways during the industrial restructuring. Thus,
the automobile industry illustrated how the current economic crisis was felt by
firms with vastly different capacities for sheltering themselves from the
vagrancies of the economy. The Los Angeles experience further showed how the
strategies for survival among these firms included the employment of
undocumented workers. Because the auto industry is offered as a window for
understanding the broader process of industrial change, the analysis will be cast
within a conceptual framework of structural transformation. The theoretical and
historical framework described in the following section will set the context for the
subsequent discussion of the automobile industry.
A Framework for Analysis
There have been several phases of industrial transformation in the U.S.
During transformations, new socio-economic relations, or what Michel Aglietta in
A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The U.S. Experience calls structural forms,
emerge. These structural forms embody relations within capital, and between
capital and labor, in light of prevailing social institutions (e.g., governmental
regulations, consumptive patterns, labor organizations). Each transformation
arises from crises, or ruptures in the system. The dynamic behind the crises is a
constant drive by capital to produce more and at lower costs in order to derive
profits, yet acting in tension with labor striving for higher wages and a greater
stake in the forces governing their socio-economic well-being. Out of the struggle
develop the new structural forms.
Several social historians and analysts have formalized the major periods of
transformations, notably (though not restricted to), Mandel; Aglietta; Davis;
Gordon, Edwards and Reich; and Soja. 8  A synthesis of their periodization is
offered below.
Table 3.1
Periods of Capitalist Structural Transformation
(1) 1790's to mid-1840's Mercantile Capital
(2) mid-1840's to late 1890's "Competitive" Industrial Capitalism
(3) late 1890's to 1940's (WWII) "Monopoly" Capitalism--introduction
of "Taylorism" and "Fordism"
(4) 1940's to present "Global" Capitalism--"Neo-Fordism"
Although these periods of economic expansion met by crisis and
transformation capture distinctly different structural forms, there is a continuity
in the interactions between capital and labor from one period to the next. A brief
review of some particularly salient characteristics of monopoly and global
capitalism illustrate this point. The focus is on the structure of capital,
characteristics of the industrial laborforce, the utilization of labor, and the role of
working-class consumption.
The term "monopoly" capitalism is attributed to the works of Baran and
Sweezy to connote a tendency for surplus to accrue in the monopoly sector. 9
According to this conception, productivity gains result in super profits which are
distributed among monopolies, in contrast to the notion that large corporations of
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advanced countries also experience a falling rate of profit. Use of monopoly
capitalism here does not assume the relationships posited by Baran and Sweezy.
Rather, it refers to a consolidation of capital and an expansion of the sphere of
competition to the international arena, supported by the acquiesence of labor and
state institutions. From this perspective, "monopoly" capitalism began with rapid
industrialization during the turn of the century. New enterprises initially
proliferated the economic landscape, but through successive waves of vertical and
horizontal acquisitions and mergers (1890-1905, and mid-1920's through the 1930's),
the competitive pool kept shrinking. 1 0  With the rise of conglomerates, the
concentration of production, and extensive overseas investment (imperialism),
control of product markets consolidated around corporate giants.
The industrialization absorbed labor off the farms and from foreign countries.
Many European immigrants sought refuge and opportunity in the U.S., while
bringing their socialist or anarcho-syndicalist traditions that led to the
establishment of unions. Embracing aspirations of assimilation, their purpose for
unionization was to enfranchise themselves economically within the existing
political and economic system.1 1 Yet, as they were repeatedly subjected to erratic
spurts of mass employment and unemployment, coupled with expolitative labor
processes, this nascient industrial workforce clashed violently with the burgeoning
industrialists.
The labor process refers to the way in which labor is employed as a strategy
for controlling production. Karl Marx identified the main elements as labor, the
products that are transformed, and the technology employed. 1 2 Employers use the
labor process to exert control over workers through the organization of work (e.g.,
allocation of tasks,. supervision, spatial division of labor). Alejandro Portes and
John Walton incorporated the notion of control over labor when they defined the
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labor process accordingly, "by this we mean the modes in which workers are
controlled and utilized in different areas of the world-system and their reactions to
the changing organization of surplus extraction and political domination."1 3 In
light of this definition, the labor process characteristic of monopoly capitalism
were Taylorism and Fordism. The labor process is linked to the periods of
capitalism in that the way in which labor is used defines the structure of
production. Furthermore, the wage relationship establishes the stability and extent
of personal disposable income which, in turn, become the basis for both the extent
of working class consumption and the social institutions needed to maintain this
consumptive behavior.
Taylorism, or "scientific management," came to prominence through the time
and motion studies of Fredrick Taylor (1890's-1920's). Taylorism refers to the
reorganization of production into discrete tasks in conformance with the machinery
used for the purpose of accelerating the completion of work. As tasks became
fragmented, production workers lost the ability to oversee the entire manufacture
of an item, while simultaneously transferring some of their skills to machines.
Physical tasks were further separated from the mental skills that supported them.
Thus, in the name of efficiency, work groups that had been the basis of production
were destroyed and replaced by norms of personal efficacy, thereby alienating
workers from each other.
Fordism succeeded Taylorism. Under Fordism, a concept popularized when
Henry Ford introduced the conveyor belt (1914), tasks became routinized and
mechanized. The semi-automatic assembly-line production, combined with the
fragmentation of tasks (Taylorism), revolutionized work, facilitated the speed-up
of production, and challenged the early craft-union structure. Widespread adoption
of Fordism extended beyond production into the sphere of social reproduction
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through commodity relations and national policies. By stabilizing wages and
introducing mass production, consumer durables were generated for the working
class.
Yet by the 1930's, consumer goods poured into an emanciated market. With
the Great Depression, an agitated working class, suffering from high unemployment
(on the heels of constantly fluctuating employment), weak consumptive capacity,
and alienation at work, fought back. The labor insurgency that ensued, and
collapse of the economy required radical solutions. One was the historic contract
between the UAW and GM (1947) in which workers gained assured cost of living
raises combined with wage increases based on improved productivity.1 4  This
agreement marked the beginning of the "social contract," a tacit agreement
between workers and their employers that domicility and productivity on the part
of labor would be rewarded with relative stability in employment and decent
wages. Another development that benefited both capital and the working class was
the expansion of credit systems and social institutions ("the social safety net") that
further stabilized the nominal wage of workers and encouraged their consumptive
behavior. Lastly, Keynsian policies of demand management through fiscal and
monetary controls shifted some of the market uncertainty from capital onto the
state. Thus, Fordism ultimately redefined the social system by the combined use
of Taylorist principles, generalized mechanization, mass production, and
macroeconomic and income redistributive policies.
The reconstituted capitalism that emerged from the Second World War,
bolstered by extensive governmental institutions yet encumbered by the
expectations of labor, entered the period of global capitalism. In contrast to
monopoly capitalism, global capitalism is defined by capitalist expansion made
possible by a loss of national controls over capital and labor with respect to the
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regulation of production, in large part because of the mobility of capital, and
technological advances. With a new set of rules to abide by, the economy picked
up. Another series of acquisitions and mergers followed (1949-55, 1964-68, 1973-
80's), continuing the trend toward concentration of power in the market place. 1 5
At the same time, corporations began to decentralize production around the United
States, ostensibly to place themselves closer to the final market, but frequently as
a strategy to capture lower cost labor. And as a result of monetary agreements
favoring U.S. investors coincident with a fundamental reconstruction faced by
other industrialized nations, U.S. corporations intensified their foreign
investments. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison summarized the developments
in the following way:
The United States emerged from the Second World War with the only major
functioning army, with more than half of all the usable productive capacity in
the world, and as the banker and creditor to both former allies and
enemies....
America's domination of the global economy was cemented by the
establishment of the dollar as the capitalist world's principle reserve
currency at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.... Under the system of
international payments that prevailed until 1971, each nation was responsible
for keeping the value of its currency within 1 percent of its par value. To
keep it within that range, the central bank of each country was required to
sell or buy its own currency on foreign-exchange markets. By running
persistent and large capital-account deficits in its balance of international
payments, the United States effectively forced foreign central banks to buy
excess dollars with their own currencies in order to decrease the supply of
dollars in circulation. This provided American investors with the francs,
marks, and other European currencies necessary to buy assets in France,
Germany, and elsewhere. Thus, the price for international stability, foreign
central banks were put in the awkward position of financing the takeovers of
their own countries' industry.
In this environment, American corporations were able to make massive
investments abroad in new plant and equipment, producing commodities for
foreign markets, and later on, for re-importing back into the United States
itself. These direct shifts of private American capital became truly
enormous during the 1960s.... The proportion of total plant and equipment
investment located outside the United States doubled in the metal and
machinery industries, from an annual average of 14 percent during 1957-61 to
28 percent during 1967-70. By the early 1970s, nearly one third of the annual
U.S. automobile company investment was being placed abroad. 16
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With the dollar as the basis for trade and finance, U.S. corporations
dominated international markets. However, during the 1960's, the U.S. dollar was
seriously overvalued, which threatened the stability of the Bretton Woods system,
and inhibited investment in the U.S. Finally, in 1971, President Nixon allowed the
dollar to float, marking the end of the accords. Non-U.S. corporations penetrated
U.S. markets, taking the lead in the production of some goods (e.g., televisions,
radios), and seriously challenging others (e.g., auto, steel, electronic devices). U.S.
corporate profits plunged. From a 15.5 percent annual return in the mid-sixties,
profits dropped to 9.7 percent by 1978.17 The search for new avenues of
investment sent U.S. corporations in several directions. Buy-outs of related
industries for the purpose of milking them while letting physical capacity
deteriorate was one solution. Another was to simply purchase firms in completely
unrelated industries so as to gain a quick profit. Alternatively, U.S. corporations
interested in foreign markets would trade their technological knowledge for a
license to operate or buy stock in foreign firms, and engage in co-production
agreements with foreign companies producing for international markets under U.S.
labels. 1 8 Second-sourcing, a practice made common by the U.S. defense industry,
and parallel production further cut the costs of multinationals until a global level
of economic competition eventually defined the climate for survival.
Internationalization of production combined with the use of interchangable parts
spawned a new generation of production technology typified by the "world car."
Seen as a way to undermine labor insurgency, Ford introduced the Fiesta in 1976,
the first car to be assembled from parts made around the world. With the different
locations competing against each other for the production of parts, Ford
maintained ultimate control over labor demands.
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The movement to international sites were two-fold: to penetrate the foreign
markets, as previously described; and to produce goods more cheaply for the U.S.
markets. Towards these ends, favorable tax codes and tariff items facilitating the
moves were instituted. For example, U.S. tariff codes 806.30 (passed in 1930) and
807.00 (passed in 1963) supported the export of the assembly of products by taxing
only the value added upon re-entry. By 1963, U.S. electronics firms were
establishing "integrated global assembly lines" in the export processing zones
(EPZ's) of Asia and in 1965, with the creation of the Border Industrialization
Program (BIP) in Mexico, electronics and garment firms were flocking there as
well. The EPZ's mushroomed in Third World nations, attracting firms in every
conceivable type of manufacture. In 1965, there were twelve plants in the initial
12.5 mile strip of the BIP in Mexico. By 1979, 476 plants were located in the
border zone, and another 55 in zones established in Mexico's interior.1 9 Each U.S.
firm that moved to EPZ's around the world forced competitors in the U.S. to meet
the lower costs of production, whether by automating, lowering their labor costs,
or also moving.
That firms were geographically mobile was in part a function of their
technological maturity in the product life cycle. Product life cycle "is the name
given to a set of concepts describing the development of an industrial product and
the state of the art in producing it from the stage of innovation, through the stage
of rapid change and development, to the stage of maturity and standardization." 2 0
During its early stages, a product goes through continuous innovation and constant
changes in design. As a result, research and production work need to be located
near each other. But as the demand for a product stabilizes, mass production can
shift to areas where labor is inexpensive. Thus, the stages are associated with both
a change in demand for different types of labor, and location. Furthermore, the
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product life cycle concept introduces an element of time into the location decision
in that the choice to move is no longer viewed as solely constrained by the
existence of resources or markets, but by labor conditions, as well. Accordingly,
automobile assembly plants, representing mature segments of the industry, have
looked for low-cost labor and access to the final market since 1910. Parts
producers, on the other hand, subjected to constant re-tooling, could only move to
areas of low-cost labor if they reached the point of mass production, so most have
remained in locations with concentrations of skilled machinists. Seen in this light,
capital mobility has often been a geographical response by industries in conflict
with labor made possible for technological reasons.
The hyper-mobility of the period destabilized labor in the U.S. and globally
since capital could orchestrate production to the lowest cost, least labor resistant
sites through moving, parallel production, and second-sourcing. Workers in
developing nations became proletarianized and linked through the assembly-line to
workers in the industrialized nations. Proletarianization meant the newly
industrialized workers were increasingly dependent on the consumption of mass
produced goods, though their incomes remained a fraction of that earned in the
U.S. U.S. production workers, on the other hand, were faced with job loss, wage
and benefit concessions, and few employment alternatives resembling the high-
wage jobs or employment security they had struggled for in basic manufacturing.
In place of the Taylorist and Fordist processes of the previous period, some workers
were reorganized into job enrichment groups coupled with sophisticated automated
machinery which jointly allowed for a more continuous flow of work while
simultaneously disrupting the craft and assemblyline basis for union organization.
This new form of labor control led Christian Palloix to term the contemporary
labor process "Neo-Fordism." 2 1
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The effect of the deindustrialization in the U.S. was to undermine workers in
the "subordinate primary" labor market. Traditional segmented labor market
classifications are divided into secondary and primary categories. The secondary
labor market is composed to low-skilled, low-wage jobs with little or new job
security. In contrast, jobs in primarly labor markets offer stable employment, job
security, internal occupational mobility, higher wages, and employee benefits.
Building on the work of Michael Piore, Richards Edwards points out in Contested
Terrain that segmentation of the laborforce is a fluid concept which requires
periodic redefinition. 2 2 In response to contemporary occupational shifts, Piore and
later Edwards refined the primary labor market concept into "subordinate" and
"independent." Independent primary jobs (such as technical or professional
positions) are of high value to the employer, and therefore are retained at high
costs. Subordinate primary jobs, on the other hand, obtain their favored position in
large part through constant struggle by workers. They would resemble secondary
labor market jobs were it not for gains extracted by organized labor. However,
with many basic industries in disarray, these jobs are being devalued. Rising to fill
the void in basic manufacturing jobs has been employment in the lower paying
service and light manufacturing sectors which, as Emma Rothschild notes, are
generally slotted for women, and characterized by shorter work weeks, fewer
occupational ladders, higher turnover, and less union security. 2 3
In some parts of the country, like New York, Houston, Chicago and Los
Angeles, the displaced and other workers (underemployed, low-skilled, and workers
in industries undergoing transformation) were further marginalized by employers'
preference for immigrants. The expanded labor supply allowed employers to
redefine workplace conventions. For example, many electronics and garment
manufacturers, noticably challenged by foreign competition and the trend towards
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production in export processing zones, relegated their most labor intensive work to
subcontractors who, in turn, established sweatshops or revived the practice of
homework, both aimed at taking advantage of immigrant workers. 2 4 Other firms
wouldn't violate labor standards legislation, but simply paid the minimum wage
which seriously lagged behind the cost of living. With wage levels that forced
families into poverty level incomes, U.S. workers deferred jobs to immigrants. 2 5
Finally, firms in the midst of industrial restructuring turned to the immigrant
population as a temporary strategy for maintaining production until a longer term
market solution could be established, such as moving abroad, changing their
product lines, or automating. Together, the new patterns for employing
immigrants put a downward pressure on prevailing wages, weakened working class
solidarity, and assisted in the transformation of the employment base.
As employers responded to their loss of markets and drop in profits by
abandoning U.S. sites or undertaking exploitative labor practices, the "social
contract" was irrevocably violated. Given a subsequent decline in productive
capacity and high unemployment, social institutions supporting the social wage
were overtaxed relative to the contributions (productivity) of labor. Public and
private savings ebbed further inhibiting investment, while pricing based on
regulation in public or semi-public industries meant that the cost of these goods
had become inflated. 2 6 Finally, at the height of transformation, the decline of
global capitalism was distinguished by dual tendencies for increased concentration
of ownership coupled with dispersed production; capital mobility; heightened
subcontracting, out-sourcing, parallel production, and automation; destructive
corporate investment policies; erosion of the subordinate primary labor market; the
marginalization of labor; and a crisis of collective services.
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Restructuring of the Automobile Industry
During the transformations of monopoly and global capitalism, automobile
manufacturers adopted corporate policies that were intended to place them in
advantageous market positions. Some policies worked in the short run, but
backfired during the crises. Others set the pace for industrial trends. But in many
ways, these policies seemed to capture the prevailing corporate positions across
industries, evident by tracing historical developments in the auto.
Initially (early 1900's), auto and other metal fabricating industries were
concentrated in the Midwest largely because of their ties to regional steel mills
and iron ore extraction. The first manufacturers applied two fundamental concepts
to their method of production previously used in the bicycle industry: precision-
made interchangable parts; and mass production. These production concepts
standardized the flow of work and inadvertantly, facilitated the mobility of firms.
Due to an accident, a fire at the Olds Motor Works plant in 1901, the assembly unit
was built apart from the other operations, and it was learned that different steps in
production could be physically separate. Later, as a conscious decision, Henry Ford
built an assembly plant in Kansas City, Missouri (1910) illustrating that the benefits
of locating an assembly unit near consumers overshadowed the freight rates for
shipping parts. With these moves began the pattern of assemblies locating close to
their regional markets while parts producers remained centralized near Detroit.
As one author noted: "Taken jointly, these moves recognized and probably
encouraged the development of economies of scale in component manufacturing,
while they minimized the employment impact in any one region [created by the
assemblies].''27
At approximately the same time the industry began to decentralize, Henry
Ford introduced another innovation that had an equally significant impact on labor,
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the moving assembly line (1912). Though technically efficient, the assembly line
was plagued with a 60% labor turnover rate. 2 8 Ford's well-known solution, the
eight hour workday at $5 per day (double the previous rate of pay), so changed
productivity it set a precedent for other industries, and became the basis for Ford's
initial formula for success in the market.
In the early years, car makers proliferated. Sixty-nine automobile
manufacturers were producing cars in 1909, but seven years later, this number had
been reduced by one-half, and by the '20's, the field was dominated by Ford, GM,
and Chrysler. During this highly competitive period, technological, organizational,
and marketing innovations flourished, giving the lead to the most aggressive and
creative firms. At first, the market leader was Ford, but they lost out to GM in
1926, and dropped to less than 25% of the market share by 1930.29 Insight into the
corporate policies of Ford and GM resulting in the dominance of GM is instructive
because these policies were repeated during the economic crisis of 1970-80's.
In the 1920's, Ford's market strategy was to produce a standardized product
for mass consumption. They kept designs straight-forward, easy to assemble, and
relatively undifferentiated. For several years, the car design was fundamentally
unchanged. To maintain consumer interest, they dropped the selling price. GM, on
the other hand, adopted continuous innovations which added to the production time
and the cost of the final product, but allowed variety in the market. Apparently,
the GM approach appealed more to purchasers who, through their selections, gave
the lead to GM. In hindsight criticism of the Ford strategy, Alfred Sloan, former
president of GM once commented:
Mr. Ford had unusual vision, imagination, and foresight - [his] basic
conception of one car in one utility model at an ever lower price was what
the market, especially the farm market, needed at the time.... [However], his
concept of the American market did not adequately fit the realities after
1923. Mr. Ford failed to realize that it was not necessary for new cars to
meet the need for basic transportation...used cars at much lower prices
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dropped down to fill the demand.... The old master failed to master
change." 3 0
Change became the hallmark of GM. The industrial giant introduced new
models, style changes, and innovations on a yearly basis. As the consumer market
grew, the company encouraged multiple car ownership and trade-ins, packaging
cars as trendy objects to be discarded when the new fashion appeared. At times
their methods for assuring a market were even more manipulative. During the
1930's and '40's, they supplied the finances for a bus service, National City Lines,
Inc., to buy up trolley systems across the country, which the company then
abandoned. The lasting effect of this action was reported in the following account:
Perhaps the most striking example of what happened is in Los Angeles....Los
Angeles once had a heavily used urban rail system extending from Newport
Beach and Long Beach, through downtown, on to Pasadena, and into the San
Fernando Valley - perhaps the best system in the country. [GM and National
City Lines] bought and dismantled it in stages during the 1940's. Taxpayers
now are faced with building a similar system at a cost of billions. 3 1
By destroying urban mass transit systems, GM fostered a dependency on the
automobile that changed the urban landscape across the nation. However, when
consumer purchasing power dropped during the 1930's, personal car sales declined
as well, and didn't pick up until the end of the Second World War. The heightened
demand for autos during the 1950's sent parts suppliers and assemblies searching
for ways to increase output. Key parts producers responded by introducing new
technology, while the assemblies decentralized at a faster pace, seeking proximity
to their distributors, and a dispersed laborforce.
Automation, combined with the newly introduced "systems analysis," swept
through suppliers, changing the method of production among sophisticated and
simple parts manufacturers alike. The following examples are illustrative of the
developments of the period:
Transfer lines were coupled with automatic machine tools to create long
machinery lines that could produce engine parts, such as the cylinder block,
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virtually without operator intervention. In body-parts manufacturing,
automatic-feed mechanisms were coupled with high-speed stamping presses
to increase producitvity in sheet-metal forming. In many other areas where
designs were relatively stable, such as radiator production, entire automated
lines replaced manual operations. 3 2
The only function that couldn't automate at the same rate was assembly, so
selective automation along with lower labor costs at dispersed sites became the
method for increasing productivity at this stage.
The move away from Detroit became significant during the 1950's as a
combined result of defense policies, labor unrest, increased automation, and the
rising suburban market. The most minor factor was President Truman's National
Industrial Dispersion Program of 1951. This was introduced as a strategy for
protecting the nation's industrial base from foreign aggression. Were Detroit
selected as a war target, auto (a prime defense industry) could conceivably be
destroyed. The idea behind Truman's program was to encourage the relocation of
plants outside of defined target zones through accelerated tax amortization
schedules. 3 3 While this was hardly the decisive factor leading to decentralization,
it nevertheless rewarded firms that moved.
Far more significant was the fact that industrial concentration also
concentrated the forces of labor insurgency. Particularly problemmatic were
strikes and union demands over job instability. Employment in the industry has
constantly fluctuated because of planned obsolescence and annual style changes
which, in turn, required frequent periods of retooling. A unified laborforce that
could demand compensation for economic uncertainty was also seen as powerful
enough to resist new labor saving technology. In order to introduce automatic
controls and electronic devices, auto makers found it was easier to move to non-
unionized areas and automate new plants than to stay in unionized locations. And
with each work stoppage, the move away from Detroit accelerated. One industry
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analyst described the situation the following way:
The most unpredictable labor market in the entire economy is to be found in
the automotive industry and the most mercurical labor center is
unquestionably Detroit. .... Work is seasonal; mass lay-offs invariably occur
during the model change-over period.... The instability of the industry is
further aggravated by the fact that the product marketed is one whose
purchase can be deferred if signs of recession set in....
This uncertainty has led to the creation of the powerful United Automobile
Worker's Union which has secured high wage scales for its members to offset
the disincentives of assembly-line monotony and seasonal lay-of fs. Few
industries have had labor-management relations which have been so marred
by mutual bitterness and class antagonism.... Critically dependent upon a
large urban pool of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled employees, the industry
has reluctantly yielded to union requests.
The auto industry's labor situation has serious locational implications: it is a
general principle of locational theory that a less costly center of labor
diverts the industrial process from its cheapest transportation point at that
moment when labor savings at a new site exceed the additional transportation
costs....
The result is a tendency to seek plant sites in areas where labor is cheaper,
less troublesome and free from a tradition of hostile labor-management
relations. Although industry-wide bargaining insures equality of payment
throughout the nation, definite advantages nevertheless accrue to, say, a
Southern location rather than one in the mid-West. Workers there will be
much more satisfied with wage rates than those in a city with a high living
standard. Secondly, no tradition of labor strife exists. Thirdly, management
can install labor-saving machinery and automatic equipment more readily in
such a branch plant than in an established one. .... [Consequently]. there has
been a real decentralization at work in the industry....34
In a carefully worded statement, Chairman of Ford, Philip Caldwell seemed
to confirm this analysis when he recently "speculated" that "30 years ago auto
executives may have deliberately spread their plants around the country to keep
their newly unionized workers dispersed as much as possible." 3 5
Lastly, as the two-car suburban market grew, the industry increased its
factory branches, and company controlled dealerships as a strategy to cap sales.
Cities like San Jose, Atlanta, and Arlington, Texas were favored for new plants,
while Los Angeles became a West-Coast anchor, second only to Detroit in its
extent of employment in the auto industry.
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The mobility of auto production was largely confined to the assembly plants.
As the assemblies decentralized, so did some of the parts producers, but the
majority remained in the Midwest. Parts manufacturers that did open in other
locations often produced for both the new car market (original equipment market,
or OEM) and the replacement or accessories markets (after-markets). Some
locations, like Southern California, developed reputations for innovations in high-
speed equipment which spawned regional specialty shops. By the 1960's, the
geographical structure of the industry was relatively defined: assemblies were
dispersed; suppliers, for the most part, were concentrated in the Midwest, though
moderately dispersed reflecting characteristics of regional markets.
The strategies auto makers adopted for making cars worked well for
producing quantity, but throughout the 1960's, Detroit was also establishing a
reputation for poor workmanship. This came to a head when Ralph Nader in his
book, Unsafe at Any Speed, discredited GM's Corvair. In contrast, foreign cars
were seen as reliable, safe, and less expensive. Imports picked up sales from 7.6%
of the market in 1960 to 14.7% in 1970.36 When the dollar was allowed to float in
1971, import sales soared, reaching 22.6% in 1979, and the reality of international
competition hit home. 3 7
From the mid-sixties to the eighties, the auto makers tried several
approaches for recovering their profit base. GM entered into different product
lines, such as airplane engines, diesel locomotives, navigation systems for guided
missiles, and appliances, but sales of these items never became a significant focus.
Finally, in 1979, the company sold off its Frigidaire unit. They also accelerated
their policy of providing profit-making options onto cars, or as one top auto
executive once said, "you put in a clock that costs $10 and charge $30 for it." 3 8
But most of all, they concentrated on capturing the U.S. market. Though they had
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established subsidiaries in Germany, Australia, Britain, and Brazil (in Germany as
early as 1929), by 1978, 92% of GM's sales still came from the United States and
Canada. 3 9  Because GM did not integrate their international and domestic
businesses until 1978, they abidcated foreign sales to Ford despite strong overseas
sales. This was a major decision since overseas sales (Britain, Germany, and
Australia) grew 18% between 1956 and 1970 in contrast to domestic (U.S. and
Canada) sales which grew 4% from 1956 to 1979.40 One reason GM chose to
concentrate on the U.S. market was because they could sell large cars here. Large
cars were preferred over the small cars due to the observation that GM could make
"style changes to the more profitable large vehicles for which labor costs might be
only 30% higher than those for a compact, while selling prices could differ by
174%".41 But in their relentless drive to produce cars, they began to saturate the
U.S. market. By 1960, there was already one car for every three Americans, so GM
was forced to look to replacement sales and sales increases resulting from
population growth, which had dropped to 2% per year. 4 2 Yet their goal was
attained. In 1979, GM had captured 46.5% of the U.S. market, imports accounted
for 22.6%, Ford 20.3%, Chrysler 9.0%, and American Motors 1.5%.43
Ford, on the other hand, beginning as early as 1960, actively concentrated on
its overseas production. By 1982, this represented 33% of their sales. 4 4 That Ford
was first in introducing the world car (1976) was consistent with both their
committment to produce for international markets, and their original marketing
strategy of making simple cars for a common market. The world car was built
from interchangable parts arranged to meet the specifications of different
countries on an individual basis. Ford's potential for expanding their market was
so great it attracted the attention of GM which reluctantly responded to the
challenge by 1978.
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With the crisis of the 1970's-'80's, competition intensified and the auto
makers began to transfer more of their parts production to overseas subsidiaries, or
to purchase them from foreign producers, which in turn, had a profound effect on
the domestic parts suppliers. Despite a relatively stable market for auto parts, a
major survey by Arthur Andersen and Company in 1979 of automotive suppliers
projected that 1980's market shares would contract. 4 5 Foreign producers were
expected to make major in-roads into U.S. markets because their lower cost labor,
easy access to non-unionized skilled labor, and newer physical capacity could
translate into lower cost products. Subsidiary parts producers owned by the auto
makers were projected to show less growth through vertical integration, in part
because of increased foreign sourcing by the major assemblies. Independent
supplier plants, on the other hand, were predicted to become increasingly
concentrated.
Two factors will ultimately determine whether the market for parts will
move toward either increased foreign sourcing or concentrated domestic
production. One is the extent to which parts are made by the major assemblies.
Penetration into the parts market reflects the relative strength of an auto maker.
During 1980, GM made nearly half of its parts, Ford about 40%, Chrysler
approximated 39%, while the estimate for American Motors was 20%.46 On the
supposition that this relationship holds in the future, the next step is to look at the
market shares of these firms. By 1990, GM is projected to control approximately
50% of the new car market in the U.S., Ford 18%, Chrysler 5%, and American
Motors 2%.47 With its dominance in the U.S. parts market, GM will be the
company to watch for the trend toward greater foreign sourcing. The second
consideration is the extent to which demand for a product lies in the original
equipment market (and therefore controlled by the assemblies), or aftermarket
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sales. Firms unable to successfully switch from the original equipment to the
aftermarket will probably drop out. As a result of this shake-down, domestic parts
production is expected to become more concentrated.
A follow-up survey conducted two years later by Arthur Andersen and
Company reinforced earlier projections. The predictions of the 1981 study were
that:
-- U.S. vehicle manufacturers will increase their dependence on suppliers
by expanding the share of parts out-sourced by 5 to 15 percentage
points, with GM out-sourcing proportionately less than the other U.S.
manufacturers.
-- Parts suppliers are expected to absorb some parts operation out-sourced
by vehicle manufacturers, becoming more integrated in the process.
-- The panels [of experts] also predict a declining number of parts supplier
companies during the 1980's.... This decline, along with increased
vertical integration, indicates the 1980's will see a smaller number of
larger suppliers in the automotive industry.
-- ... there will continue to be two parts supplier employees for each
vehicle manufacturer employee through 1985. [Since vehicle
manufacturing employment has been dropping], this would result in a
permanent parts supplier employment reduction of about 400,000.48
The anticipated trend is clear: those parts made for new cars by subsidiaries
of main assemblies are projected for replacement by domestic and foreign
producers, while domestic makers of specialty aftermarket and original equipment
items are expected to undergo accelerated market concentration.
The projected trend that auto makers will shed some of the parts production
allows them to shift market uncertainty onto domestic and foreign suppliers. With
this arrangement, assemblies will be in a good position to reconcentrate production
in fewer locations, automate more of the assembly process, and institute the
Japanese "kanban" system of introducing inventories "just in time," the proposed
direction for organizing production in the 1980's. The kanban system was actually
"pioneered in Ford's own Rouge Industrial Complex, a mere 3 miles from today's
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Ford headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan. Henry Ford had set up the Rouge
facility in the 1920's to concentrate all aspects of his auto production, from steel
making to final assembly, in a single location." 4 9 The difference is that Rouge was
more vulnerable to labor initiatives than the system now projected with its
increased automation and supplier networks.
Recently, corporate affiliations with foreign companies have become a
significant avenue for building small cars by U.S. automakers. For example, GM is
exploring the option of entering into a joint venture with Toyota at their Fremont,
California plant with Toyota introducing innovative methods of production. In this
way, GM could control a larger share of the small car market without having to
make a committment to it. In order to facilitate this venture, GM and Toyota are
now disavowing the UAW's claims on the laborforce associated with the old
Fremont GM plant as they simultaneously seek to obtain a free trade zone status
for the facility.
Entering the 1980's, it is apparent that the way the assemblers shielded
themselves during the '70's distinctly affected the parts producers. Reflecting a
legacy of acrimonious relations between capital and labor--especially in
"peripheral" locations vis-a-vis the Detroit heartland (e.g., California, Alabama,
Delaware)--major manufacturers were responding primarily to nationally organized
workers demanding standardized union contracts. In order to avoid (and undermine)
this high cost labor, and improve the flow of inventories, auto makers began
internationalizing, reconcentrating U.S. production, automating, and sub-
contracting more product lines to reduce their variable costs. Suppliers, on the
other hand, were less often unionized and operated in a far more variable terrain
shaped by the demand for original equipment, the aftermarkets, and local labor
markets. The shutdown of assemblers in places like Los Angeles meant the demise
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of supplier firms unable to successfully switch over to the aftermarket. For most
suppliers, product demand has historically fluctuated with seasonal swings
characteristic of the automobile industry. The depressed economy heightened their
need for malleable workers. While avoiding high cost union labor was one concern,
another was for a flexible laborforce that could be easily laid-off and re-hired.
Consequently, in Los Angeles, many of these firms began employing undocumented
workers, the most vulnerable laborforce available.
Observations on the Contemporary Economic Restructuring
Since each industry is distinguished by its particular structure, trends in the
auto industry are only illustrative of those that may apply elsewhere in the
economy. Yet they are significant in their own right if auto alone continues in its
present course, and even more so if the potential direction becomes widespread.
Given the influence assemblies exert over other manufacturers from suppliers to
numerous linked industries the policies assemblers adopt have far reaching
implications. Two, and the focus of this research, are the short- and long-term
effects on labor.
Although there has been a movement toward international production, the
U.S. market is still one of the strongest in the world. Explorations into a joint
venture, previously unheard of for GM, is a drastic compromise on the part of a
company attempting to retain its market lead. If the deal succeeds, a new
corporate entity will be established with GM and Toyota splitting the profits
equally. Toyota will be responsible for organizing the workplace (from the use of
equipment to the implementation of labor-management relations), while GM will
handle the distribution. 5 0 After 12 years, the new company will reassess future
actions.
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It is possible that other industries will mimic this arrangement, but
replication is unnecessary for this to have a profound impact beyond GM. With a
reconcentration of production, implementation of the kanban system, and increased
automation, GM can achieve nearly the same labor discipline at other sites with
just the hint of more joint ventures, as can other firms that follow suit. Similarly,
by transferring some of their manfuacturing process to supplier companies, the
suppliers must, in turn, compete with foreign subsidiaries and other foreign
producers. Thus, the auto makers will further destabilize the market for parts
producers. The prospects are very unsettling. Currently, the three major auto
makers maintain between 95 to 98% local content, 5 1 but this could "double or even
triple in the next five years." 5 2
These corporate policies coupled with automation will put thousands of
workers out of jobs. The potential effect of automation was recently explained by
Harley Shaiken in this way:
.... General Motors will purchase 20,000 robots in the next ten years. The
company's experience is that each robot does the work of 1.7 workers in an
assembly plant and 2.7 workers in a manufacturing plant, even after
accounting for workers who install and maintain the robots. This means that
robots alone could displace another 40,000 to 50,000 workers in the 1980's. 5 3
The trend toward automation is not exclusive to sophisticated robotics. As one
International Labor Organization report noted, there is now a worldwide tendency
towards automation even among "low-tech" industries, such as textiles, apparel,
shoes, and electronics assembly that had previously been labor intensive. 5 4
Automation had been characteristic of key auto parts, like engines, for some time.
Now it is beginning to show an impact on less important components, like headers.
These developments have led the parts manufacturers to also mechanize
when possible, or move to locations with cheap labor. For example, Los Angeles
firms have found it advantageous to assemble their products in Mexico while
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retaining distribution in the U.S. Firms that can merge (thereby consolidating their
financial base), move to Mexico, and automate are on the cutting edge of the
market. Clearly, regional ties place a constraint on producers. Those in the
Midwest are less mobile, but they have greater access to the original equipment
market. Manufacturers in the more distant locations, like Los Angeles, must
constantly weigh their potential for expanding into the aftermarket. As some
firms find ways to lower their costs by moving or automating, others have lowered
their domestic labor costs by employing undocumented workers. The
undocumented laborforce provides them with the flexibility to manuveur until a
more permanent method of production can be obtained. One danger is that this
could evolve into sweatshops. Another is that plants in weak market positions will
be forced to change product lines or go out of business. In any case, the direction
among the parts suppliers leads to few jobs for U.S. workers, or jobs that are vastly
downgraded.
As this scenario suggests, the process of internationalization has come full
circle with core and peripheral firms alike forcing U.S. workers to accept
employment standards resembling those of other nations. Integral to the industrial
transformation in the Southwest has been the employment of undocumented
workers. In time, these workers may become redundant. But for now, they remain
important for firms adjusting to the change arising from the economic
restructuring, as demonstrated by the following case studies.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC SURVIVAL AMONG AUTOMOBILE PARTS SUPPLIERS
Undocumented Workers as Transitional Labor
Clearly, the extraordinary pressure put on firms throughout the industrial
transformation resulted in a demand for ever cheaper and more controllable labor.
However, long established workplace conventions (such as the presence of a union
that could demand high wages) kept employers from slipping into sweatshop
situations. This was not necessarily the case in other nations. In Italy for example,
auto production had devolved into homework.' Los Angeles auto companies, in
contrast, responded to the foreign competition by employing undocumented labor
as transitional workers. Transitional here refers to the fact that this labor force
performed a valuable function until their employers could capitalize, move
overseas, or take other measures to make themselves more competitive. Being
"transitional," they are also more yielding to employers' immediate needs. Through
selective use of undocumented workers, employers gained an element of control
over wage determination and work place practices. This kept costs of production
low while they weathered difficult economic conditions.
What is meant by transitional labor is graphically illustrated through case
studies. In order to study industrial plants that were representative of primary
labor market erosion, eight supplier firms were analyzed at the outset of the
market slump, and throughout the duration of the recessionary period. These eight
plants were selected among producers of wheels, headers, and batteries because
they exhibited different short-term and long-range strategies for lowering their
production - costs. - Wheel manufacturers provided insight into how and why
undocumented workers were introduced to a worksite. The headers cases show the
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significance of technology in replacing the undocumented workers, and the advantage
firms gain by moving their production to foreign sites despite the employment of
undocumented workers in the U.S. Batteries further illustrate the constraints
regional product markets place on firms, in addition to suggesting the flexibility
corporate subsidiaries have in their choice over future directions relative to
independent firms.
Methodology
The case study data was assembled from interviews with workers and
substantiated by union data and public documents (such as the California
Manufacturers' Register). Plants were selected on the basis of : (1) being
automobile parts suppliers; (2) having a concentration of undocumented workers or
operating in competition with employers of undocumented workers: (3) paying at
least the minimum wage; (4) producing for the original equipment (OEM) and
aftermarkets; and (5) having a history of participation with organized labor. Union
cooperation was important because it was necessary to observe the role of
unionization within these plants. Union officials also identified the specific plants
they thought employed undocumented persons, as well as the names of
knowledgable persons at the workplace, or key informants. The key informants
were questioned extensively about their place of work. Non-unionized plants
observed in this study were usually those in which a union had waged an
unsuccessful campaign, or had been decertified. Consequently, union data could be
used to corroborate most of the workers' information. Several unions have
organized in the automobile industry and assisted in this study. In order to insure
anonymity, names of the union locals, plants, and individuals are withheld.
80
The non-random sampling technique of identifying firms through union
leaders presumably led to biases in the data, however, this must be qualified.
Daniel Quinn Mills, among others, has noted that non-unionized firms can be
classified as "low-standards employers" or "better standards employers," where
unionized firms set the standards. 2 The most significant omission in this study is
of low-standards employers. Their exclusion was purposeful because the intent was
to study the methods firms employing subordinate primary workers would use to
protect themselves in the market. This is not to imply that low-standards firms
don't exist among auto-parts producers (one case is cited in the text), however,
they do not represent the common type of manufacturer as yet.
Secondly, by interviewing only workers in firms with prior union experience,
there may be a bias towards observations of a laborforce that actively interacts
with management. Perceptions of workplace relations may have been shaped by
the consciously adversarial setting created between the union and management.
Where these workers might have felt their status had been violated by some
incident, workers in plants with no prior union experience might have seen the
same situation as merely a condition to be reckoned with. This is an important
distinction because the information sought included history of unionization,
company status (subsidiary or independently owned), wages paid to the workers,
benefits, workplace relations, and method of production. However, it was also
anticipated that access to undocumented workers would have been nearly
impossible without an entre, such as that provided by the union leaders, thus the
bias was unavoidable.
Since key informants provided the bulk of the information, only as many
interviews were obtained as considered necessary to validate the data. In all of the
cases, two informants were submitted to 3 to 4 hour interviews, except for
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Company E, where only one respondent was used. Consequently, this information
reflects the views of fifteen workers who participated in structured interviews, as
well as the opinions of union officials, and management. In general, the
interviewees reported only on a portion of the workforce, such as their shift, or
departments they were acquainted with. Among the case study firms, this
represented between 41 and 87 percent of the total employment. As previously
mentioned, this information was corroborated with union or other data. Lastly, the
workers were identified as citizens, greencard holders, or undocumented. Here,
greencard holders refers to permanent resident aliens entitled to engage in
employment in the U.S., with the exception of government jobs limited by federal
and state statutes. For an expanded discussion of the methodology, see Appendix I.
Table 4.1 is a summary of the plants studied. Table 4.2 situates the plants in the
context of the Los Angeles industrial base.
Overview of the Case Studies:
The primary focus of the case studies is on the responses by companies to
market conditions over time. Given sustained market pressure, firms usually adjust
their variable costs of production, particularly labor. If changes in the market are
significant, fixed costs are next to be modified, such as investments in capital
(equipment) or land (location). Corporate planning may involve a number of short-
and long-range policies affecting the allocation of labor, capital, and land.
The specific action taken by a firm is often constrained by labor conditions.
Employers regulate their labor costs through the labor process, a concept that
includes workplace conventions and practices, the interaction among workers and
between workers and their employers, and the way work is organized (including
plant floor lay-out, production technology, and locational decisions). Strategies in
the labor process include:
Table 4.1
Summary of the Plants
(B)
Number of
Undocumented
(C)
B as % Greencard C
of A **
(D)
as % D as %
of A Citizens of A
Wheels A 350
Wheels B 300
Headers C 120
Headers D 110
Headers E 53
Batteries F
Batteries G
Batteries H
205 59
122
327
41
83 69
74 67
46
203
113150
270
150
TOTAL:
87
75
185 69
98
398
926
67
*---actual size (employment).
**--foreign born non-citizens holding work permits.
Plants by
Category
Size of
Firm*
(A)
Number of
Workers
Studied
A as
% of
Total
123
41
164
60
33
511
69
80
57
35
10
38
7
0
4
54
58
42
68
41
151
0
0
31
31
51
92
89
0
0
32
71.
12
83
32
5
0
3-7
6
99
57
162
282
11
1
11
96
47
10
9
1
5
15
107
86
10
203
298346
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o the introduction of undocumented workers to weaken union strength and
keep wages low;
o stratification of workers by race and citizenship;
o automation; and the
o relocation of production.
Another constraint in a firm's decision to lower costs is the availability of
finance capital, which, in part, is a function of the corporate structure.
Subsidiaries have the wealth of their parent companies to draw on, while
independently owned firms rely on a smaller and generally more volatile,
undependable resource base. Independent companies can sometimes overcome this
limitation by becoming acquired or through mergers.
The eight companies analyzed illustrate various short-term and long-run
market adjustment strategies. Their responses to the market reflected both their
labor situation and their corporate structure. (A profile of these responses is
summarized in Table 4.3.)
*
Table 4.2
Los Angeles County Industrial Context
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Plants in Plant Employees Plants Employees
SIC Study Size Studied in L.A. in L.A.
Storage batteries 3691 3 570 396 16 1,268
Motor vehicle parts 3714 5 933 530 208 10,000-
24,999
TOTAL 8 926
SIC -- refers to Standard Industrial Code
* -- Data based on March 1979 County Business Patterns.
** -- Includes nearly all types and parts producers.
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Responses to the
Typee
Wheels
Company
A
Wheels B
Headers C
Headers D
Headers E
Batteries F
Batteries G
Batteries H
Union
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Table
Market by the
4.3
Case
Ownership
Subsidiary,
to non-auto
Subsidiary,
to non-auto
Independent
Subsidiary,
to non-auto
Independent
Subsidiary,
to auto-
related
Subsidiary,
to auto-
related
Independent
Study Firms (1979-1981)
Responses
Employed primarily
undocumented workers
Paid high wages
ostensibly to
prevent unionization
Automated, merged,
moved to Mexico
Closed in L.A., moved
to nearby county
Remained in L.A., retained
labor intensive production
Automated
Closed in L.A.,expanded
Midwest facilities
Employed primarily
undocumented workers
Since labor was usually the initial factor of production affected by the
companies policies, this will be discussed first. The main points of inquiry are how
labor contributed to the cost of production, the reaction by firms to unionization,
and the relationship between unions and undocumented workers. The second area
of analysis is the role of technology in lowering variable costs. The last section
will concentrate on location as a fixed cost variable. These sections will draw on
the experience of all the firms, but will be viewed in light of one of the product
lines. The analytical sequence will be in the order of wheels, headers, and
batteries. Regarding the cost of labor, all of the eight firms (except Companies F
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and G) employed undocumented workers. Each of these companies exhibited clear
and parallel tendencies in their hiring, promotion, and employment policies. The
wheels firms provide special insight into the situation.
At the time of this study, approximately twenty-two wheel manufacturers
were identified in the Los Angeles region. Of these, two major manufacturers
presenting interesting contrasts were analyzed. Though similar in size, Company A
had a workforce of 60% undocumented, whereas Company B was composed of
nearly 60% citizen workers. Both were subsidiaries of major corporations.
Company A was unionized by a large international union; Company B was non-
unionized, yet it paid over $2.00 per hour more on average. Company A made steel
and cast wheels while Company B made only cast wheels. The manufacture of
steel wheels is less dangerous than cast wheels since the hazardous part of
production is usually relegated to foreign producers. In contrast to steel wheels
where production itself has become internationalized, cast wheel producers
commonly use internationalized labor (i.e., undocumented) in the manufacture of
their product in the U.S.
Unionization was clearly a very important contending factor for employers.
With a union, employers must constantly enter into collective bargaining over wage
rates, job classifications, benefits, and other considerations that make the costs
associated with labor quasi-fixed. There are several ways employers can confront
this situation. One is to shut-down the plant at the outset of unionization and
relocate. This was the case in Company D (headers) where the parent holder
(disassociated with the auto industry) was interested in the firm only as long as it
returned a healthy profit. Here, the price of a union didn't fit into their plans.
Another tactic is to "buy-off" workers with decent wages, which occurred in
Company B. According to the workers, the higher wages were offered as a means
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to prevent unionization. If unionization had been successful, a company could
encourage the employment of undocumented workers as a way of undermining the
union's strength. Company A sheds further light on this strategy.
The role of undocumented workers was key in Company A's effective
defensive posture towards their union. Significantly, undocumented workers
became prominent in the plant only after it was unionized (1971). Since one of the
management's prerogatives was to retain control over hiring, this could be
selective, favoring family members and undocumented workers. A worker's
citizenship status was deduced from his speech (use of Spanish) and references.
Often jobs went to friends or family members of the undocumented production
workers. In time, the union found itself with workers whose rights were difficult to
protect. This was illustrated by the union's reluctance to challenge the company
decision to fire an undocumented worker over a minor issue. Similarly, workers
allege that the company will sometimes not pay the full rate for overtime work as
a result of the union's deteriorating power and influence. Consequently, the
workers are dissatisfied with their union, and the union is frustrated by its
weakened adversarial role.
Although unionization seeks to standardize wages and workplace practices, a
union's presence tends to erode once the employer begins to take advantage of the
undocumented workforce. One clear violation of union ethics was promotion of the
undocumented workers based on favoritism or other non-tenure or skill-related
reasons. Through continual disregard for union policies, employers could
effectively dismiss the union as a viable force for contention. The observations of
a worker in Company H (batteries) convey much about this problem: "To be
promoted, you have to be on good terms with the foreman or supervisor,
participate in the soccer or baseball team, or at least be a cheerleader."
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Once undocumented workers entered the workplace, the employers could
stratify workers according to both their citizenship and race. In Company C
(headers), stratification led to a significant element of control over the workforce
since a perceived difference was then created among the workers. In the words of
one worker: "The employer, I suspect, is racist since he never talks to any of us
and looks at us like we are animals. He only talks to supervisors who are all white
and they are the ones in charge of communicating orders to La Raza." The
tendency towards stratification surfaced frequently and was distinguished by higher
average hourly wages paid to citizen workers and progressively lower wages for
green card holders and undocumented workers. There was also a close relationship
between the workers' citizenship status and average years on the job. The lower
wages reflect the relative newness of the undocumented workers to the jobs. Since
they were employed more recently than citizens workers, they were assigned lower
skilled entry level positions. Consequently, lower wages for undocumented workers
were the function of both job tenure (in part a reflection of human capital
attributes), and a management tactic to impose a system of hierarchical control
among the workers. Table 4.4 compares average wages and time on the job for the
eight companies by citizenship.
The headers cases further illustrate the inability of undocumented workers to
guarantee a market advantage for firms over the long term. Headers are exhaust
manifolds for new high performance cars and used passenger cars, pick-ups, and
recreational vehicles. They increase the efficiency and horsepower of engines by
recycling residual exhaust fumes. During the late 1970's, approximately sixteen
manufacturers operated in the Los Angeles region. In the period of a few years,
two companies moved to Mexico, and at least one went out of business. This study
looked at one company that moved, one that remained, and one that closed. These
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Table 4.4
Average Hourly Wage and Average Years on the Job by
Citizenship Status for the Case Study Firms
Wheels
A B
Citizen (#)M
Pay ($)
Time (Years)
Greencard
Pay
Time
Undocumented
Pay
Time
TOTAL (#)
Pay
Time
11
$5.82
4.62
69
6.73
3.88
Headers
C D E
9
7.05
7.33
1
4.40
.50
5
5.35
11.00
Batteries
F G H
107
9.07
9.70
86
11.38
6.47
10
5.20
16.35
TOTAL
298
$8.81
7.38
71 12 32 5 - 6 99 57 282
$4.39 6.47 6.74 5.10 - 9.75 11.42 5.15 $7.49
2.74 4.56 4.12 4.80 - 13.17 5.95 5.77 4.97
123 41 42 68 41 - - 31 346
$4.15 6.19 6.01 3.57 3.82 - - 4.92 $4.99
2.24 4.80 2.06 2.08 2.86 - - 3.17 2.65
205
$4.32
2.54
122
6.89
4.26
83
6.40
3.43
74
3.69
2.24
46
4.00
3.75
113 185
9.19 11.40
9.88 6.19
98
5.09
926
$6.87
6.03 | 4.88
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three companies were similar in several respects: they were relatively small; they
operated in the same labor market; and their labor demands were nearly
identifical, they all relied on undocumented workers.
The headers cases were instructive of several points. When the technology
lends itself, a firm can adopt combined strategies of automation, merger, and
flight to other countries. In Company C, the production work was increasingly
performed by numerically controlled machines. In the process, the company
trained some of the benders as computer programmers, who were also
undocumented. Fewer production workers were then needed with the new
operation, and those necessary were reduced to performing simple tasks. However,
the company was unable to obtain the economic benefit they expected since the
union was strong enough to maintain the redundant workers and keep the wage
level for the now de-skilled jobs at the previous skilled rates. As a counter-
measure, the company consolidated its financial resources by merging with another
Los Angeles company, and moving to Mexico where wages were significantly lower.
With the move, wages dropped to approximately $1.60 per hour compared to
$6.50 in L.A. In Mexico, they no longer had to pay workmens' compensation (which
had previously come to 7% of the wage bill), social security, or state disability.
Rental space came to 90 per square foot (or $50 per month) as opposed to the 26C
per square foot they paid in the U.S. The plant in Mexico operates in a special
industrial zone from which they export duty-free to Canada. Imports to the U.S.
are taxed only for the value added to the header in the manufacturing process
which consists of the cost of low-wage labor. When they moved, two pipe suppliers
moved with them. Company C took a new name after it merged but retained the
Los Angeles plant as the corporate headquarters and distributor to western states.
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Many of the existing Los Angeles headers producers have remained labor
intensive and employ primarily undocumented workers. Indicative of the extremely
competitive climate, one company has been drastically underpricing its product. If
a price war is started, Company C can easily underbid all the other manufacturers
and emerge as one of the few, if not the sole, producer of headers. Competitors
which can not adopt similar measures taken by Company C (automation, merger
and moving), could easily be forced to evolve into sweatshops in order to remain
viable. Though not common among auto parts producers, sweatshops (violators of
minimum wage and labor standards legislation) has been observed in the production
of steel wheels by a local firm that competes primarily with foreign
manufacturers. According to one plant manager, the company probably saves very
little per rim by using sweatshop labor as opposed to buying them from Mexico, but
even this small savings creates an incremental advantage in the market.
While the headers case makes a clear statement about locational advantage,
batteries show how the ability to use international sites or internationalized labor
can be constrained by regional product markets. Three battery companies out of a
total of fourteen in Los Angeles were observed. Though all made automotive
batteries, the products from two companies were of higher quality than of the third
and appealed to different markets. These two manufacturers produced for the new
car market, and for them, the loss of major auto assemblies in Los Angeles was
particularly devastating. After suffering a major loss of sales, one of the firms
decided to dismiss the West Coast altogether and reconcentrated its production in
the Midwest. The other firm refocused its sales towards the high quality
aftermarket since in the west aftermarkets have been more profitable. The
manufacturer of the lower quality batteries sells to government agencies that seek
the lowest bid, and to jobbers who resell the product under a brand name.
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The distinction between the two types of battery manufacturers was
reflected in their method of production and use of labor. The manufacture of
batteries involves the use of dangerous chemicals. In order to minimize potential
chemical hazards and reduce the number of workers involved in the production,
some firms have mechanized several of the steps. Because handling of this
equipment requires semi-skilled labor, workers in the more automated plants tend
to be paid higher wages than in the labor intensive firms where most of the work is
done by hand. Furthermore, the products from the more automated firms are of a
better quality. On the other hand, batteries made by the more labor intensive,
hazardous method are of poorer quality, but they are also much lower priced.
Reflecting the different methods of production, the differences in labor
demand among the battery makers were striking. The two manufacturers using
capital intensive methods of production drew from the resident and greencard labor
pool. On average, the wages paid per hour in these plants were double those paid in
the labor intensive firm. In contrast, the labor intensive company resembled the
wheels and headers employers of undocumented workers where wages were
stratified by citizenship. These variations existed despite the fact that all three
firms had contracts with the same labor union. Thus, unionization was less
important than the strength and location of the product market, and the method of
production in determining the special demand for labor. It is worth noting that the
first two firms were also subsidiaries of larger corporations, while the third was an
independent manufacturer, once again repeating a tendency for corporate structure
to be related to a firm's position in both product and labor markets.
Several key points emerged from the case eight studies. Throughout the
economic recession, the drive to control production costs was consistent across all
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the firms. Some relied primarily on lower paid, easily controlled labor to achieve
this. The most common pattern was for employers to give preference to
undocumented new hires, be selective in promotions, and stratify the workers by
citizenship and race. Where the technology lent itself, automating led to even
lower costs, as did locational decisions, but these were often constrained by the
corporate strength of the firm. Locally bound and independently owned firms had
less opportunity to take advantage of these other steps that required a capital
outlay, and therefore, they seemed to have a slightly higher propensity to employ
undocumented workers than did subsidiaries. Although this reflected one trend,
some parent companies also found it in keeping with corporate policy to extract as
high a profit as possible with a minimum of effort, so employing undocumented
workers was a compatible policy for them as well. These observations will guide
the reader through the case studies. The cases that follow proceed in the order of
wheels, headers and batteries. In each case, the general market for the product
will be highlighted first, followed by the method of production. This will serve as
contextual information to the plant by plant analysis.
Case Study I--Wheels
The Market for Wheels
Splashy mag wheels speeding down an open road make a strong advertising
statement. They appeal to aspiring drivers of finely tuned, fully equipped cars, or
in the words of one sportswriter, the "performance cult." Wheels, along with
oversized tires, customized steering, and camshafts convey a racy image
businessmen package to enhance the selling of new cars and expensive acessories.
These products are claimed to be counter-recessionary since during hard times the
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need to display such symbols of personal efficacy heightens. Parts like wheels
confer an individualized appearance to otherwise standard or medium priced cars,
and are an object of affection and extension of self for many drivers. As one
manufacturer of hot-rod equipment noted, "the average American has a love affair
going with his automobile. In a manner of speaking, we make the valentines." 3
Merchandisers have also recognized the strong market for speed items, and a
number of promoters from speciality magazines to accessory retailers have
developed around these lines. One commentator on the souped-up equipment
market noted that during 1970:
Sales of such items have taken off in drag race fashion during the past decade,
at least partly because of the merchandising efforts of auto supply chains,
discount houses and the new "speed houses" that are sprouting all over the
Southwest, catering to the black-leather-jacket-and goggles set. Eric Grant,
S.E.M.A. [Specialty Equipment Manufacturers Association] managing director,
estimates that total volume will reach $1.2 billion this year, up from about $1
billion last year. Indicative of the industry's explosive growth, he says that in
1960 the total probably wasn't much over $100 million. 4
By the 1980's sales remained strong largely due to the continued salesability of
"muscle cars." At one time, these cars included Ford's Mach I Mustang, GM's GTO,
and the Plymouth Road Runner, and more recently GM's Camaro and Firebird.
Other accessory oriented models doing well during the '80's recession were higher
priced automobiles such as Cadillacs, BMW's, Porsches, Lincolns, Buicks, and
Volvos. 5
As opposed to parts made by both subsidiaries to assemblies and subcontracted
producers (e.g., batteries), wheels are supplied entirely by firms that are
independent of the major auto makers. Producers for the original equipment wheel
market might have high volume orders from major auto makers, but the assemblies
control the price of products through year-to-year agreements stipulating that only
increased costs of *materials, labor and overhead can be passed on to the parts
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producer during the contract period. In contrast, the custom and replacement
wheel after market are more variable within any year, but prices for the products
are unconstrained.
The importance of custom steel and cast wheels to the new car market is
remininscent of a concept social commentator Emma Rothschild calls "Sloanism, or
GM's variety marketing." As Rothschild writes, "former GM president Alfred
Sloan's idea for upgrading consumer preferences was that automobiles should
change each year and should each year become more expensive (at least relative to
the cost of production)." 6 So the design strategy of the auto makers was one of
making style changes to the more profitable large vehicles. Detailing like stereos,
vinyl roof coverings, fancy paint and wheels became key for new car sales,
especially as the market for cars became progressively more saturated. But with
the switch to small "basic cars" caused by costly gasoline, demand for accessories
such as custom wheels heightened. The observation of marketing consultant
Edward L. Kaufman was that:
One of the motivations for buying high styled steel wheels in recent years has
been downsizing. The popular priced domestic and foreign cars produced in
recent years are frequently described as "plain little boxes." As a result, a lot
of people who never had any fantasies about being "Indy" drivers have found it
worthwhile to buy a set of wheels for their VW Rabbits or little GM, Ford, or
Chrysler sub-compacts. 8
Despite the continued demand for wheels, wheel manufacturers operate in a
highly competitive terrain that has led to a perceived rise of bankruptcies. The
climate is one of firms trying to undercut each other by lowering their costs of
production. These costs vary with the method of production of which two are
prominent corresponding with the manufacture of cast versus steel wheels.
Wheel Production
For many years, wheels were made from steel strips rolled and riveted into
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rims. Spiders, the center part that bolts onto the axle, were spot- or arch-welded
to the rim. Together rims and spiders combined to form steel wheels and were
standard equipment on a new car. Steel wheels are still popular, but increasingly,
cast aluminum or magnesium wheels are capturing consumers' preferences. Though
more expensive than steel, cast wheels are easily styled into attractive
configurations. Plus they are considerably lighter in weight (15 lbs. each as
opposed to 20 or 25 lbs. for steel wheels).
The steps to making a steel when are as follows: (1) first, sheets of metal
are cut into strips; (2) the strips are rolled into a circle; (3) each circle is welded
into a rim; (4) excess metal is cut from the weld; (5) the rim is trimmed and
ground; (6) and form-pressed to give it a flange; (7) next the rims are shaped on rim
rollers; (8) expended or stretched to the proper size; (9) and polished, chromed, and
repolished; and (10) finally, the spider is arch- or spot-welded to the rim.
Cast wheels are more labor intensive, require less skilled labor, and involve a
more dangerous process. For these reasons, one labor organizer said that he
expected undocumented persons might be employed to do casting. The production
of cast wheels occurs in the following ways: (1) the metal is melted in a foundry;
(2) poured into molds and subjected to hydraulic ovens (called heat treat); (3) next,
the cast wheel is taken to the machine department where, with a lathe, excess
metal is cut off and; (4) using a drill press, the wheel is perforated at the points
bolts should go; (5) then the wheel is polished and chromed, or polished and painted.
The most modern method of cast wheel production is fairly sophisticated and
was explained in detail accordingly:
[The] process begins with ingots of aluminum and an induction furnace.
"An induction furnace is used because it will raise the temperature of the
aluminum to its melting point (710 C), much faster than the more
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conventional gas furnace... Fast melting through induction is important, not
just to minimize production time but to maximize the quality of the wheel..."
The molten alloy is then poured from the induction furnace into a large ladel
and from there into holding tanks at the base of each molding machine.
"At this point the aluminum alloy is ready to be used in the molds... Filling
the holding tanks and removing the wheels are the only non-automated areas
of producing the casting."
Mold sections, which are made from tooled steel with a coating of refractory
paint, are brought together to form one mold directly over the alloy....After
cooling, which takes just over two minutes, the wheel is removed from the
machine.... Now the center hole is bored. From this point on, the center hole
will be used as a reference when working on the wheel....
The wheels then undergo a solution heat treatment: "For eight hours, each
wheel is subjected to a temperature of 540 C.... This temperature is
sufficiently beneath the alloy's melting point that the wheel maintains its
shape. However, at such a high temperature, the molecular structure of the
alloy is allowed to change its position, almost as if it were a liquid...."
To temper the metal, the wheels are aged at 140 C for four hours..."Aging
increases the hardness of the metal..." At this point, the outside rim and the
back of the wheel are machined. With computerized precision, automatic
machining takes about two minutes.
An intensive six-stage wash procedure follows..."After coming out of the
wash...the wheel goes through a drying over at about 120 C. When it's dry,
the wheel is sprayed with an acrylic color coating and then baked in an oven
for 20 minutes at 205 C."
At this stage the entire face of the wheel has a coating of paint on it.... Now
the wheels are put back through the six-stage wash.... The final step is the
application of a protective clear coating.
The wheels are packaged by hand to minimize the chance of damage, and
from there they are ready for the customer's car. 9
Three broad categories of wheels are now made: standard equipment steel
wheels; custom steel wheels; and custom cast aluminum and magnesium wheels.
Standard equipment wheels usually consist of black rims and simple spiders covered
by a hub cap. Custom steel wheels are generally chromed and have ornate spiders.
Cast wheels have flexible designs limited only by engineering feasibility and
structural integrity. Illustration 4.1 shows examples of the variety in wheel design.
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Illustration 4.1
Examples of Wheel Designs
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Plan 4.A
A Basic Floor Plan in the Manufacture of Wheels
(broken lines indicate general work areas, not rooms)
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Today, only a few U.S. companies continue to make steel rims. The chroming
and polishing of rims create a fine metal dust and involves the handling of
hazardous material that has made the production processes the object of extensive
regulation. Rather than meet health and safety standards, U.S. companies either
buy rims from firms in Mexico, Brazil, or Peru, or open subsidiaries in Mexico. The
remaining U.S. companies tend to make standard equipment steel wheels which
require less noxious production methods. Therefore, most steel wheel firms either
buy already chromed rims, or make undecorated rims and weld simple spiders to
them.
Although cast wheels are considerably more expensive than steel wheels (they
can range from $80 to $700 each as opposed to approximately $50 for steel), one
worker commented that the quality is suspect and government inspection of
production standards lax. Sometimes a plant will produce only one kind of wheel,
but often companies will make both types and for both the original equipment and
aftermarkets.
At the time of this study, approximately twenty-two wheel manufacturers
were identified in the Los Angeles region. Among these, perhaps five were major
original equipment producers, and two were major standard equipment makers.
The remainder were small specialty producers. Compared to the rest of the nation,
California housed approximately 81% of the wheel manufacturers, with Los
Angeles figuring at nearly 68%.10 This study analyzed two major custom
manufacturers.
As previously noted, the two companies studied presented interesting
contrasts. Though similar in size, Company A had a work force of 60%
undocumented, whereas Company B had nearly 60% resident workers. Company A
made both steel and cast wheels while Company B made only cast wheels. Both
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were subsidiaries of major corporations. Company A was unionized by a large
international union while Company B was non-unionized. Yet, Company B paid over
$2.00 per hour more in their average hourly wage. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 summarize
this information.
The following company profiles clarify the specific purpose of undocumented
workers within the two wheel companies.
Company A Profile
Company A is a subsidiary of a corporation that manufactures a number of
different auto and non-auto products. This plant began operating at the current
site in 1977 although it had previously located elsewhere in Los Angeles under a
different name. The company has been unionized since 1971 by a strong
international union but relations had been poor from the start. At the time of the
election several pro-union workers were fired. Since then, there have been
continual battles between the union and management. In several significant ways,
it appears that the union is steadily losing ground.
Prior to unionization, the workers were paid minimum wage and a few
benefits (life insurance and pensions). Promotions and job security were based on a
workers' influence--a system that favored old timers, people related to the
managers, and company supporters. After unionization, wages increased
somewhat, but nothing else improved. In fact, it was the perception of one worker
that "benefits have been decreasing gradually since the union."
When the company continued to abuse the conditons of the contract, the
workers initiated a strike. The strike took place in 1978 with the workers
demanding higher wages, more benefits, and better working conditions. Many of
the strikers were undocumented, but then so were many of the strikebreakers.
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Citizenship Status of the
Table 4.5
Workers in the Wheels Case Studies (1981)
Number of
Size of Workers 2 as % % %
rm Firm/l Studied/2 of 1 undocumented/2 greencard/2 c
350 205 59 60 35
300 122 41 33 10
Table 4.6
Average Pay Per Hour Based on Citizenship Status for Wheel Companies
(1981)
itizens/2
5
57
Citizen
#* Pay**
11 $5.82
69 $6.73
Greencard
# Pay
72 $4.39
12 $6.47
Undocumented
# Pay
122 $4.15
41 $6.19
Total
# Pay
205 $4.39
122 $6.89
* -- number studied
**--average pay per hour
Fi
A
B
Firm
A
B
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After seven weeks, the union was defeated and wages remained low. During the
strike, the company claimed to have lost customers and was contemplating a move
to Orange County, in part, to get away from the union. Instead, they diluted the
union's strength by introducing undocumented workers and stratifying the
workforce as discussed in the overview.
Worker stratification is demonstrated graphically in Plan 4.A which is a
schematic floor plan in the manufacture of wheels. In this floor plan the following
processes are shown: steel wheels--(A) machining, welding, chroming, painting; (B)
packing; (C) shipping; castwheels--(l) foundry; (2) heat treat; (3) machine shop; (4)
painting and packing; and (5) shipping. Table 4.7 is keyed to Floor Plan 4.A and
illustrates in detail the distribution of the workers according to occupation, race,
citizenship, time on the job, and wages. Within the plant, the undocumented are
concentrated in either the dangerous jobs (e.g., foundry) or the more unskilled
positions (e.g., packers).
Compared to many smaller wheel manufacturers, Company A appears to be
surviving this economic crisis. In 1981, gross sales were reported to be $3 million,
reflecting a contract with a major auto maker. In addition to hiring undocumented
workers, another corporate strategy for maintaining control over costs has been to
diversify its manufacture of wheels within the OEM and aftermarkets, and among
steel and cast wheels. Cast wheels appeal to the image-conscious market, while
steel wheels are sold as standard equipment or as more modest custom wheels. The
advantages of the steel wheels are that they are cheaper, require less material, and
are a faster operation.
Although Company A does not engage in this practice, another Los Angeles
company has found yet another way to lower its costs in making steel wheels. This
plant employs undocumented workers to polish rims at night in a dingy sweatshop
I __________________________________________
Table 4.7
Company A - Production Worker Profile (all male)
Wheels
Department
Foundry
Occupation
Furnacemen
Code
622
Citi-
Number of Sub-Group Race zenship
Workers Number **
60 1 L G
3 L
56
Heat Treat Heat Treaters 446 10 6
4O Machine Shop Machine Operators 692 66 24
10
22
10
A Steel Wheel Welders 680 3 1
2
Drill Press Operators
Precision Machine
Operators
Painters
650
653
644
3
3
3
A C
3
1
2
1
1
1
#
Q_
Average
Time on
the job
(Yrs.)
2.58
2.58
2.58
4
1
5
5
.5
.5
.17
4
3
3
3
.42
1.5
5
Average
Hourly
Pay
(S)
6.00
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.17
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.47
4.00
5.60
5.00
5.00
5.00
4.50
4.50
4.50
I - ____
Table 4.7 (continuation)
#, Department Occupation
Average
Citi- Time on
Number of Sub-Group Race zenship the Job
Code Workers Number ** (Yrs.)
Forklift Operators
Misc. Laborers
Inspectors
O Packing
]
0 Maintenance
C
TOTAL
Packers
706
780
610
643
3
11
3
30
1
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
9
21
Electricians
Misc. Mechanics &
Repairmen
Deliverymen
430
492
705
10
205
2
4
4
A C
A C
A C
2 4.00
2 4.00
.42 3.75
2 3.75
5 3.75
1 3.75
.5 3.75
3 4.80
1.17 3.70
1.17 3.70
1 6.00
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1.17
6.00
6.00
$4.30
Department numbers are keyed to
1970 Census Occupational Codes
A = Anglo; L = Latino
C = Citizens; G = Greencard;
the floor plan
U = Undocumented
Average
Hourly,
Pay($)
I,
*
**
0
-P,
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factory. The workers are not given goggles, face masks or other protective
equipment, so they must work dressed in layers of old clothes and with rags tied
around their faces and hands. Against their palms they hold metal so they can hear
if the rapidly revolving rim they steady with their hands as it is being polished has
worn through the fabric. A metal dust chokes the air and leaves a film on the
workers bodies, even through their clothes. The pollution goes undetected as it
filters into the night air since health and safety regulators rarely scout out
violations at 2 a.m. As the rims are completed, the workers stamp "Made in
Brazil." Acording to one plant manager, this company saves a few dollars per rim.
With sweatshops and foreign producers as competitors, Company A is forced
to have a "hard-nosed" attitude towards production costs. As yet, they are not a
sweatshop. However, neither are they nearly as fortunate as Company B which is
part of a vast and wealthy conglomerate.
Company B Profile
Company B began production in the middle of the 1974 recession. In 1978,
the current owner, a large diversified conglomerate, bought the plant. The plant
produces only cast wheels, but it sells to numerous domestic and foreign
automakers, so product demand has been stable. Nationwide, this company is a
leader in the market.
From the beginning (1974), there had been undocumented workers. They were
essentially an inheritance passed on to the company. These workers are fairly well
dispersed throughout the plant, and they were paid quite well.
The company seemed less concerned with lowering production costs by
lowering wages than with simply keeping out unionization. After three years of
campaigning, in early 1982 a strong international union attempted an organizing
drive. When the management realized that this was taking place, they became
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friendly with the workers. In talking to the workers, they learned that wages were
an issue so pay was increased by 50 per hour. Benefits are extremely good and
overtime generous. Consequently, for many workers, unionization didn't seem
worth while.
The workers inclined towards a union wanted more control over decisions that
affected workplace relations. But many workers, especially those that had
received favorable treatment, didn't value a union very highly. Significantly,
neither did many of the undocumented who were afraid that the union would ask
them for their immigration papers. It has since become company policy to require
immigration documents and physical examinations of new hires. Consequently the
workers who were with the plant before the change in ownership (1981) had a
vested interest in minimizing questions about their identity. Together, the
undocumented and the workers who identified with the company successfully
blocked the union effort.
Company B shows an interesting side to the industrial picture. It appears
that this company did not know that some of their workers were undocumented and
were actually making an effort to keep these workers from their establishment, but
inadvertantly, they now have a workplace ally. The workers' loyalty reflects their
gratitude for a decent job. Jointly, the workers and the management acted to
limit the workers' power. That the employer can pay moderate wages is a function
of the strong demand for their product and of the resources it can draw from the
parent firm (research, financing, spill-over contracts). These qualities are
extremely important for the employer to be indifferent to the downward pressure
on wages that accompanies the availability of undocumented workers.
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Case Study II -- Headers
The Market for Headers
Headers are exhaust manifolds installed directly onto the engine block for
the purpose of drawing out residual exhaust fumes. In California, the Air
Resources Board must license any auto part, factory system, or the like that could
change the air quality through emissions. While headers make an engine both more
fuel efficient and more powerful, they also change emissions just enough to create
licensing difficulties in California. This has not applied to any other state.
Consequently, the market for headers has been constrained in California. Other
than this regional obstacle, the market for headers has been expanding slightly
reflecting car owners increasing concern with fuel efficiency.
Manufacturers of headers make a profit on volume sales because per unit
returns are relatively low. Twenty years ago, a header normally sold for $115 and
$135. Today, with the introduction of automated cutting, bending and welding, the
price has dropped to an average of $75 to $90, with some of the more popular lines
being even less. Warehouses and retailers treat this as a "lead-on" item attracting
buyers into the business. They assign a low mark-up to headers, and hope for a high
turnover. Manufacturers might realize at 10% profit on each product before taxes,
or 3 to 5% after taxes. Per unit, profits can be as low as $2.00 so they, too, depend
on a high volume of sales. Though the market for headers is favorable, much of
that is credited to producers going out of business. Given a slightly expanding
product market combined with a tendency toward concentration among the
manufacturers, a few producers have realized a fairly decent return.
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The Production of Headers
Headers are a relatively simple auto part, generally 20 feet long, consisting
of three of four steel tubes approximately 2 inches in diameter, attached from the
exhaust pipe to the engine. At the exhaust pipe, they are welded together, but
separate and fan out where they meet the engine. Header production consists of
cutting and bending steel tubes to conform with the shape of the underbodies of
different car models, and the welding together of these tubes. Because car models
change every year, a manufacturer must constantly adjust bending and welding
patterns. This creates a seasonal aspect to the work. Part of the year, generally
from March through June, there is overtime to meet new orders, but from October
through December, demand decreases.
In the last ten years, production has become increasingly automated.
Through automation, the need for labor is reduced, and though equipment may
initially be expensive, over the long-run, production costs are lowered. It is easy to
understand how automation has been introduced by looking at the method of
production. In this study, all three companies used the same basic steps: (1) first
the tubes are cut to the appropriate length; (2) then they are bent according to the
configuration of the engine and chassis (underbody); (3) the ends of the tubes are
"swaged" or forced into squares or other shapes in accordance to engine or exhaust
pipe openings; (4) the tubes are next welded together and a plate is attached for
stability where they anchor against the engine block; (5) the ends are ground until
even in length; (6) holes are drilled into the plate where it will be connected to the
engine; (7) the header is inspected; (8) then painted; (9) and finally, packaged and
sealed. The following illustration shows header configurations.
Despite the regulation limitations, producers have located where they have
access to a reasonable share of the market while maintaining competitive
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Illustration 4.2
Examples of Headers
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production costs. Los Angeles, the largest city in the state with the highest
concentration of sports cars in the country, has both a well established system for
distribution (forward linkages) coupled with a diversified base of suppliers
(backward linkages). A handful of header manufacturers can reach a large portion
of the national market. Because racing can take place throughout the year,
Southern California is also known for generating innovations in "speed" accessories.
So for various reasons, header producers have congregated here. During the late
1970's, approximately sixteen manufacturers operated in the Los Angeles region.
In the period of a few years, two companies moved to Mexico, and at least one
went out of business. This study looked at one company that moved, one that
remained, and one that closed.
These three companies all relied heavily on undocumented workers. Even
though people with green cards were identified, the workers in each of the
companies were quick to point out that most of the greencards were often
falsified. If undocumented and greencard holders are combined, they account for
89 to 99 percent of the work force for all the companies. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show
the citizenship characteristics of the workforce in the three companies.
The resemblances of the companies went beyond drawing from a similar labor
pool. They also used similar methods of production, and sold in similar markets.
Headers are such common items that during 1981 they could be bought for between
$45 and $60 retail in auto parts dealers or stores like J.C. Penney or Sears. What
distinguished the competitive position of one company from another were their
reactions to unionization, corporate strength as reflected through the means of
ownership, and ultimately, the ways in which they responded to economic
conditions. Because of their similarities, Company C will be described in greatest
detail.
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Table 4.8
Citizenship Status of the Workers in the Header Case Studies (1981)
Size of
Firm/l
120
110
53
Number of
Workers
Studied/2
83
74
46
2 as % % % %
of 1 undocumented/2 greencard/2 citizens/2
69 51 38 11
67 92 7 1
87 89 0 11
Table 4.9
Average Pay Per Hour Based on Citizenship Status for
Header Companies (1981)
Citizen
#* Pay**
9 $7.05
1 $4.40
5 $5.48
Greencard
# Pay
32 $6.74
5 $5.10
0 0
Undocumented
# Pay
42 $6.01
68 $3.57
41 $3.82
* number studied
** average pay per hour
Firm
C
D
E
Firm
C
D
E
Total
83
74
46
Pay
$6.40
$4.00
$3.73
112
Company C Profile
Company C, though small and specialized, has changed hands a number of
times. It began in 1962. In 1972, it was bought by another firm, and from '72 to
'76, it operated as a division of that firm. In 1974, a large international union was
certified after a difficult campaign. The management waged a major effort
against the union. They passed out anti-union material and threatened to close the
plant and move to Chicago. Undocumented workers were further intimidated by
deportation threats. There was an air of confidence by the company that the union
would not win the election, yet they did by a close election (58 to 46). In the
opinion of the local president, unionization made the company less attractive to
the parent holder. In 1976, some of the individuals associated with the parent firm
bought Company C, and maintained it as an independent corporation until 1982
when it merged with a company operating in Mexico, and subsequently moved the
production unit there.
After unionization, the company became increasingly dominated by
undocumented workers. In 1974, 25 to 30 workers out of 80 were non-Spanish-
surname. But by 1982, when the plant moved, nearly all were Spanish-surnamed
and most were undocumented. The workers mentioned that U.S. workers wouldn't
stay on the job because wages tended to be poor. However, this claim could not be
substantiated by the data. In 1982, wages ranged from $4.25 to $12.00 per hour
with $6.40 being the average (and $3.35 the legal minimum). Instead, several other
explanations for the increase of undocumented workers seem more plausible. First,
there could have been a self-selection process on the part of the U.S. workers.
Previous to unionization, job security and promotions were determined at the whim
of the supervisors, significantly, all of whom were white. After the plant was
unionized, a seniority system was instituted. If U.S. workers could not get
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preferential hiring and promotions from the supervisors, they had less incentive to
stay on the job.
A second consideration has to do with the control over the work force gained
by the employer with the introduction of undocumented workers. Several
employers mentioned the problem of worker dissatisfaction over promotional or
personal disputes (if suspected undocumented workers were given promotions),
since documented or U.S. workers have been known to call in the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). As a defense, some employers have separated their
labor force by race or citizenship in order to avoid this problem. As noted in the
overview this can be accomplished through selectivity in hiring.
Sometimes employers contend that they don't know the citizenship status of
their workers, but in this case, the management knew that at least some were
undocumented. In 1976 or '77, there was a factory raid by INS and 30 workers were
arrested and deported. Afterwards, the union and the company maintained an
informal understanding that a deported worker had a two week grace period to
return to the job without losing seniority if arrested by INS. (This type of
agreement has at times actually been written into a contract, but is hard to
enforce.) Another indication that the employer knew who was undocumented was
the distinct difference in average hourly wages paid to the citizen, greencard, and
undocumented workers.
Despite the temporary work stoppage created by the raid, the company
seemed financially well off. According to union files, in 1977, the company
reported an after-tax profit of $500,000, an unusually high amount for a company
of this size. In 1978, it's gross sales reached $7.1 million, and in 1981, the
California Manufacturers' Register listed sales at between $5 and $10 million. It
seems a little incredulous that the company would cite money problems when they
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moved in 1982. Instead, it appeared the flight was motivated by a desire to escape
the union, to lower production costs by automating, and to capture a greater share
of the market by merging with another company, despite the benefit they gained by
hiring undocumented workers.
Mechanization had been taking place in Company C over a series of years.
Automation was introduced in the cutting, bending, and painting steps, with each
automated step, a process requiring skill in the handling of the tubes was
transferred from humans to computer controlled machines. Though fewer workers
were needed, the union kept wages high and prevented the employer from releasing
redundant workers. The successive changes in Company C's method of production
and use of labor illustrates how the employment of undocumented workers can
sometimes be just one step in a firm's search for lower production costs. In this
case, the union was instrumental in keeping the wages and benefits high. With
lower labor costs, it is conceivable that the company might have stayed in Los
Angeles longer, but the move to Mexico put them in a strong competitive position
relative to other Los Angeles header companies. Floor Plan 4.C illustrates the
flow of work by situating the workers spatially. Table 4.10 is keyed to the
floorplan and is a profile of the production workers. As the floorplan and table
show, undocumented workers were clustered in the lower paying jobs (cutters,
benders, or grinders) relative to the greencard holders or citizen workers.
Company D Profile
Company D was started in 1972. It was one of seventeen companies held by a
Delaware based corporation, all of which were unrelated in their product of
manufacture. The corporation was interested in operating Company D only as long
as it returned an easy profit. In part, that meant employing primarily
undocumented workers and paying them the minimum wage. According to the
Table 4.10
Company C - Production Worker Profile (all male)
Headers
Department
Cutting
-Occupation
Cutting Operators
Number of
Code Workers
612 12
Sub-Group
Number
1
6
Average Average
Citi- Time on Hourly
Race zenship the job Pay
** *** (Yrs.) (S)
B C 11
2.5
8.00
5.15
5 U 4.5 5.25
Bending Benders 446 12 6 5.5 6.15
6 L 5.5 6.15
Swaging Swagers & Grinders 690 18 3 L C 4.5 6.15
& 1 t 4.5 6.15
4 3.5 6.15
1 . 1 6.15
9 1 2 6.15
O Welding Welders 680 31 5 L C
3
9
1
2
4
1
6
8
8
3
1
5.5
3
1
5
7.40
7.40
7.40
7.40
7.40
7.40
7.40
7.40
#
UA
Table 4.10 (continuation)
# Department
O Painting
TOTAL
Occupation
Painters
* Number of
Code Workers
644 10
Citi-
Sub-Group Race zenship
Number **
1. L
I L
4 L G
4 XxX
83
Department numbers are keyed to the floor plan
1970 Census Occupational Codes
A = Anglo; L = Latino; B = Black
C = Citizens; G = Greencard; U = Undocumented
Average
Time on
the Job
(Yrs.)
5
4
3
1
Average
lour ly
Pay
($)
6.15
6.15
6.15
6.15
I,
*
**
,!I:,.:;.,I;..1;..Il. ; ,,$ 6 .40eYa
- -- - _L_ VM.Aat&. __
$6.40
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Plan 4.C
A Basic Floor Plan in the Manufacture of Headers
(broken lines indicate general work areas)
Transformers
Exit
Machine to
Clean Parts
Welding
35% U
48% G
1 7%O C 1
Grinders
55% U
28% G
17% C
Exit
Exit I Tube Cutting Machine Shop (other
I(Dyna Cutter) 9 machines, tools, etc
8% C
IStorage
I Drill
and
'eld- 'Swag-I Band
Iing ers I Saws Bending Machines
50% U
Inspection 50% G
I Paint-IN iK,
60%
Exit
Warehouse
Exit
U = Undocumented
C = Greencard
C - Citizen
* Applies to 0 and
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workers, the company always employed undocumented workers and gave those they
suspected to be undocumented preference in hiring. Although this company was
approximately the same size as Company C and paid their workers nearly half the
wage, they sold their product for slightly more. As noted in previous examples,
this company also differentiated average wages paid to the production workers
based on their citizenship status.
In 1980, the same union and local as in Company C began an organizing drive.
The company threatened, harassed and intimidated the employees. Active union
organizers were fired or disciplined because of their involvement. Despite a
difficult campaign, the union won an election with 74 votes in favor of union
representation and 13 against. Relations between the union and the company
remained poor. The company filed charges against the union stating it coerced the
workers, and the union filed counter charges that the company refused to bargain
in good faith. The employees wanted a $1.50 per hour increase in wages, but the
company countered with a 10. per hour offer. Negotiations broke down. Before a
contract was signed, the company closed in June of 1981. The labor negotiator
representing the company claimed that the company was in financial trouble, and
that the corporation was trying to make it look profitable so as to sell it.
Allegedly, no one was willing to make an offer, so the company was discontinued
though it later resumed operations in another part of Southern California.
In general, the management of a company reserves a right to determine
whether the company is profitable. In this case, the return didn't satisfy profit
level goals. Previous to unionization, there was enough work to maintain two shifts
on a regular basis. Despite an apparent demand for the product, one month after
unionization letters were sent to customers stating that the company was going to
discontinue unprofitable product lines, headers being one. With unionization, the
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anticipated increase in wages would have reduced the level of profit, and this was
enough reason for the corporation to close its subsidiary. Studies on plant closings
have shown that it is not uncommon for conglomerates to close plants that are not
returning at a level they think to be satisfactory. But as Company E suggests,
independent firms, because of their limited financial resources relative to
subsidiaries, have more necessity to adjust to the economic situation where they
are located.
Company E Profile
Company E, about half the size of the other two, is independently owned. It
had been in the same location since 1976, and before that, it had been operating
elsewhere for seven years. During the recent period of operation, most of the
workers had been undocumented. Several of the undocumented workers had been
with the company for as long as 11 or 12 years, but the average was 3 years.
Despite the relative stability of the work force, the workers were dissatisfied with
their low wages. Paralleling the experiences of the other companies, most of the
production workers were undocumented and received considerably less in wages
than the resident workers. No greencard holders were identified.
The owner must have known about the citizenship of his workers because
there had been two INS raids and several of the workers were arrested. The
undocumented workforce is maintained because job openings usually go to friends
of employees, who are themselves predominantly undocumented.
Inequalities in pay bothered the workers. Welders and janitors received the
same wages, and all were paid low wages. The workers had heard that a
particularly weak international union (one that usually organized in a completely
different industry), organized undocumented workers, so they sought out this union.
The union had to call a strike that lasted four weeks before the company signed the
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contract. During this strike, the foreman and friends of the owner acted as
strikebreakers. Despite management resistance, the union began representing the
workers in 1979. As in the previous instance, the owners simply did not want to
recognize the workers, so they immediately sold the company to new owners. The
new owners were unwilling to concede anything to the workers, yet the union
lacked sufficient experience to effectively represent them. Because of their weak
organization, none of the conditions changed after unionization.
If stability in the size of the work force is an indication of stable demand,
then the company appears to remain competitive. However, it had done so largely
by using low-cost labor. One worker commented: "They treat us very bad. They
humiliate us and make us work in things that are out of our capacity. They always
do this because we don't have documents." This particular company has not
automated the bending process but the workers are aware that their competitors
have and that they have moved to locations of even lower cost labor. Perhaps the
company will continue to be competitive by retaining this type of labor. But if the
workers begin to effectively demand higher wages, it is probably a matter of time
before they will not be able to compete with the other firms.
The headers market is clearly very competitive. In 1981, another remaining
header company in Los Angeles went bankrupt and paid 8 on the dollar for their
debts. This company was sold to another party and is still operating. Nearly all of
the workers are undocumented, and at present, they are unorganized. The same
union local that organized Company C is attempting to organize the workers in this
company, but it will probably be another uphill fight. This particular company has
been underpricing its product and talk of a potential price war has surfaced.
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Case Study III -- Batteries
The Market for Batteries
Automotive language for the most common maintenance and replacement
parts is TBA--tires, batteries, and accessories. Since they are fundamental to both
new and used cars, TBA products are nearly recession-proof. Due to their relative
immunity to vagrancies of the market, one national marketing firm predicted TBA
to grow 130% from 1977 to 1985 (from $14.7 billion in gross sales to $33.9
billion). 1 0 Of this, battery sales were projected to grow from $2.4 billion to $6.8
billion, an increase of 145%.
Despite the anticipated growth in sales, not all battery manufacturers or
even dealers have profited. Some have been hurt by the tendency of car owners to
drive less. In addition, drivers now have the option to buy longer lasting
"maintenance-free" batteries. Though the technology behind these batteries has
been available for over thirty five years, they were only recently sold for popular
consumption. In late 1974, J.C. Penney introduced the maintenance-free battery
with an average life of 41 months, followed by Montgomery Ward in 1975.12 Today
these batteries are either standard or optional equipment on nearly all new cars
and trucks. In recent years, the tendency in battery marketing has been toward
eliminating the middle men. For example, mass merchandisers like Sears and J.C.
Penney can handle the warehousing, thereby minimizing the role of jobbers. The
stable product demand has also caught the attention of auto makers and
conglomerates who have learned about the lucrative aftermarket in TBA. These
large firms have the ability to enter in and out of both the original equipment and
aftermarket which makes them formidable competitors to manufacturers not
directly connected with either the major assemblies or other large firms.
122
The majority of battery manufacturers in the U.S. are located in the East and
Midwest, close to the main assembly plants. For these producers, the original
equipment market is particularly important. In the West Coast, aftermarket sales
are more significant, so most of these firms are oriented toward the replacement
market. At the time of this research (1981), fourteen firms were operating in Los
Angeles.
The Production of Batteries
In the manufacture of batteries the production proceeds in eleven steps: (1)
lead dust is melted; (2) and cast into grids; (3) the grids are taken to the pasting
department where oxide fillers and water are mixed, put into pasting machines, and
pressed onto the grids to form plates; (4) which are dried in dryers; (5) in the
forming department, the plates are put in acid tanks to create a positive and
negative electrical receptivity; (6) the plates are then stacked in the stacking
department, alternating positive and negative and each time separated by
insulation, to create battery cell elements; (7) the cells are then "burned" or
welded together; (8) and in the assembly line, the elements are put in a container
which is welded shut; (9) the battery itself is now charged wth an electric current--
in "wet" charging, acid is poured into the battery and then subjected to an electric
current; with a "moist-dry" process, the battery is emptied after it is charged;
"dry" batteries use what is called "by-pass charging" where the elements are
charged in tanks of acid before they are placed in the container; (10) the charged
battery is now cleaned, labelled, and boxed; and (11) loaded for shipment. See the
following illustration of a battery.
In capital intensive plants, stacking and welding are done by machines.
Though more hazardous, this work is still completed by hand in many firms. Among
the firms studied, only the low quality, labor intensive producer employed
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Table 4.11
Citizenship Status of Workers in the
Battery Case Studies (1981)
Size of
Firm/l
150
270
150
Number of
Workers % % %
Studied/2 undocumented/2 greencard/2 citizens/2
,113 0 4 96
185 0 54 47
100 32 58 10
Table 4.12
Average Pay Per Hour Based on Citizenship
Status for Battery Companies (1981)
Citizen
#* Pay**
108 $ 9.07
86 $11.38
10 $ 5.20
Greencard
# Pay
5 $ 9.75
99 $11.42
58 $ 5.15
Undocumented
# Pay
0 -
0 -
32 $4.92
* - number studied
** - average pay per hour
Firm
F
G
H
2 as %
of 1
75
69
67
Firm
F
G
H
Total
#
113
185
100
Pay
$ 9.19
$11.19
$ 5.09
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Table 4.13
Average Hourly Wage Based on Citizenship, Race, Sex,
and Years on the Job for Company F
Variab le Number
110
3Female
Average
Hourly Wage
$9.22
8.00
Standard
Deviation
1.61
1.32
CL Citizen 107 9.07 1.81
Greencard 6 9.75 1.29
Undocumented 0 0 0
Anglo 26 9.38 1.58
Black 38 8.75 1.75
Latino 46 9.43 1.45
Asian 1 9.50 0
Other 2 9.00 2.83
TOTAL (Total in Company 150)
Male
rj~
113 $9.19 1.6
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Illustration 4.3
A View of a Battery
Neatiive terminal
Cell walls
Positive
terminal
plate
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undocumented workers. As the detailed case studies show, the workers are
structured very differently within the labor intensive versus capital intensive
firms. The company profiles will focus first on two capital intensive firms,
followed by an analysis of a labor intensive producer. These three companies
accounted for 20% of the battery manufacturers in Los Angeles in 1981. The
differences in labor demand among the battery makers is summarized in Tables
4.11 and 4.12.
Company F Profile
Company F is an old Los Angeles establishment. It was started around 1932
when manufacturing was still undeveloped in the region. During World War II when
labor was in short supply, this employer made a verbal commitment to their
workers insuring good wages and working conditions. But when the war ended and
the labor supply increased, the employer was reluctant to honor the expectations
that were created. In order to stop the deteriorating terms set by the employer,
the workers sought affiliation with a strong international union. With a vote of 3
to I in favor, the workers became unionized in 1946. Despite occassional strikes
over wage disputes, rapport between the company and the union has been generally
amiable.
In 1975, the company was sold to a large multinational conglomerate that has
approximately fifteen other plants in the U.S., two in Canada, and one each in
Mexico, Guatamala, and Indonesia. Their manufacture ranges from the production
of batteries to smelters and mining. Since 1979, Company F has suffered from a
drop in sales, but is still doing quite well. The California Manufacturers Register
reported that gross sales for 1980 were within a range of $25-100 million.
When it comes to hiring, Company F draws from a mixture of Anglos, Blacks,
Latinos, Asians, and other races. According to one worker, they discriminate
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against women when it comes to hiring, but apparently not with regards to race.
This company hires almost solely among U.S. citizen workers, although it
occassionally employs a greencard holder. Table 4.13 shows the wage differentials
based on citizenship, race, and sex.
Since the 1979 drop-off in sales, there has been a 16% drop in employment.
The first to go have been mostly Black and Latino. Although there has been some
talk about undocumented workers starting to gain employment in the plant, no
evidence to that effect surfaced. Instead, as illustrated in Table 4.13 citizenship
did not seem to be an issue affecting wage levels. Rather, it appears that there is
a tendency towards stratification of wages based on race with Blacks faring least
well. This pattern is repeated in Company G and will be analyzed in greater depth
when that plant is discussed.
When several major auto assmblies shut-down in Los Angeles, this firm lost its
primary market. Finally, in 1982, it closed the West Coast plant and focused
production in their Midwest operations. In contrast, Company G, which also
depended on contracts with automakers, simply switched to the high quality
battery aftermarket. Although Company G responded differently to the changed
market, it drew from the same type of workforce and used comparable production
technology as in Company F. Consequently the following analysis should provide
insight into the employment situation for Company F as well.
Company G Profile
Company G in many ways resembles Company F. Their primary product
consists of high quality original equipment and replacement batteries. It is owned
by a multinational corporation that has seven other facilities in the U.S., in
addition to one in Japan and one in the Philippines. However, this firm is much
newer than Company F. It was started around 1958. Shortly, thereafter, it was
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Table 4.14
Average Hourly Wage Based on Citizenship, Race, Sex,
and Years on the Job for Company G
Variable
Male
Female
Number
181
4
Average
Hourly Wage
$11.40
11.22
Standard
Deviation
1.23
0.50
Average
Years on Job
6.27
6.00
-- Citizen 86. 11.38 1.10 6.56
a Greencard 99 11.42 1.32 5.70
Undocumented 0 - -
Anglo 28 11.63 0.90 8.12
Black 7 10.79 0.90 4.17
Latino 149 11.39 1.28 5.78
Asian 1 10.50 0 6.00
185 $11.40 1.22TOTAL (in Company 270) 6.27
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unionized by the same local that had unionized the workers in Company F. But in
contrast to their competitor, they are experiencing an increase in product demand.
In 1979, they added a third shift and in 1980, their gross sales were reported to be
within $10-25 million (California Manufacturers Register). A large part of the
increase in demand is attributed to a contract with a major auto-maker.
Workplace relations, hiring practices, and patterns of employment also
closely parallel Company F, but differ sharply from Company H. It is noteworthy
that relations between the union and the company are generally good, although in
1975 there was a strike over cost of living wage increases. For the most part, it is
not wages but safety and other factors that influence and structure workplace
relations. This was immediately apparent with regards to the employment of
women. It was explained that women of childbearing age are not employed because
of the dangers presented by exposure to lead. It was also specifically mentioned
that undocumented workers are not hired because federal government contracts
require verification of citizenship on the part of the workers. While it is
conceivable that some of the greencards are falsified, it is significant that workers
are not sought for their undocumented status. Hiring practices are another
indication of the lack of preference for undocumented workers, or even greencard
holders. Although people learn about jobs by word of mouth, newspaper ads, or the
union, in order to be hired they must first pass a physical exam, then another exam
covering basic knowledge about production, and finally, they must have some proof
of legal citizenship. To pass these entrance requirements, they must have a
working command of English, which is an obstacle for many undocumented workers.
Consequently, it is not citizenship but race, gender, and time on the job that
explains variation in wages among workers. The newer job openings have been
taken primarily by Blacks, and to a lesser extent women, resulting in them having
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the lowest wage rate. Table 4.14 shows average wage levels based on citizenship,
race, and sex for Company G.
Analysis of the race and gender distribution of the workforce with respect to
departments and occupations shows them to be fairly well dispersed, although
newer workers, such as Blacks, are more heavily concentrated in the less skilled
positions. Using Floor Plan 4G which identifies the eleven basic production steps
previously outlined, Table 4.15 situates the workers by department and according
to the flow of production. Stacking and welding are highly automated. These
steps, in partiuclar, distinguish the production technology used by Companies F and
G from Company H. Other integral distinctions exist as well. Significantly, the
capital intensive firms have access to the financial strength of a corporate parent
to support their capitalization. In an independent firm, the risk associated with an
investment decision is absorbed by a smaller corporate base. Consequently, such
decisions may need to be deferred. And, as Company H illustrates, in order to
compete in the market, a firm might have to draw from a different labor pool, and
utilize a different method of production.
Company H Profile
This company was established in 1968 and is a family run enterprise. The main
products are batteries for autos, boats, and other vehicles, and a lead based
chemical used in lamps. The auto batteries sell at nearly half the price of those
produced by the other two companies. They tend to be of lower quality and are
sold to government agencies and jobbers who resell the product under a brand
name. They do not sell their product directly to large distributors, such as Sears.
In the last few years, there has been an increase in sales that led to an expansion of
the workforce. Consequently, they realized gross sales of between $10 and $25
million in 1981 (California Manufacturers Register). In part, they have been
Table 4.15
Company G - Production Worker Profile
Batteries
Department Occupation
Grid Casting Grid Casters
Code
503
Number of
Workers
14
Sub-Group
Number
14
Average
Citi- Time on
Sex Race zenship the Job
** *** **** (Yrs.)
M L G 9.3
Operators
Process Attendant
690
780
11
7
Processors
Lead Person
Operator
COS Workers
Welders
@ Charging Laborers
690 2
780 22
680
780
22
5
2 M L C 3 12.00
9 M I 3 12.00
1 M A C 10 10.80
I M L C 12 10.80
5 M L G 2 10.00
I M A G 8 11.80
I F L 0 5 11.50
I M B C 5 11.20
21 m L G 6.5 11.20
1 F A C 6 10.50
2 M B C 4.5 10.50
16 M L C 7.5 10.50
3 M L 7.5 10.50
1 M B C 2.25 9.00
4 M V 2.25 9.00
-~ ~--.
#
0
0
Pasting
Plate
Forming
Average
Hourly
Pay
__(M
14.00
0 Welding
HAL )
HA
Table 4.15 (continuation)
Department
Finishing
o Shipping
and
Receiving
Code*
753
Occupation
Loaders
Lead Person
Lead Person
Assistant Lead
Assistant
Group Leaders
Packers and
Wrappers
Number of Sub-
Workers Nin
9
770 12
753 5
Group Sex
ber **
2 M
7 M
I M
4 M
7 M
I HM
I F
3 M
780 25
I
Race
L
L
A
A
L
L
A
L.
A
L
A
A
B
B
L
L
L
L
L
Average
Time on
the Job
(Yrs.)
6
6
2
2
2
16
10
4
Average
Ilourly
Pay
__($j
10.40
10.40
11.23
10.63
10.63
13.00
11.60
11.60
Citi-
C
G.
C
C
C
C
C
G
C
C
G
G
C'
C
C
C
G
C
C
2 M L C
2.25 10.00
.5 8.90
14 11.60
4 11.30
3 11.60
3 11.30
12.3 11.60
4 11.30
3 11.60
3.5 11.60
3.5 11.00
H
r',3
3.5 11.00
Ogg m_'.-
Table 4.15 (continuation)
# Department Occupation
Drivers
Mechanics
Number of
Workers
20
2
Sub-
huim
I
Croup Sex
ber **
5 M
3 M
2 M
1 M
Average Average
Citi- Time on Hlourly
Code*
715
481
Race zenslilp
*** **** 
_
A C
L C
L C
A C
the Job
(Yrs.)
16
6
6
2
Pay
13.00
13.00
13.00
12.00
I M A C 1 10.80
Maintenance Mechanics "A" 492 8 8 M A C 8.8 12.00
Mechanics "B" 8 1 M A C 6.5 11.00
4 M L C 6.5 11.00
3 M L G 6.5 11.00
Helpers 780 3 3 M L G 6.5 9.00
Testing Lead Person 610 10 1 M L C 10 12.00
1 M B C 6.5 11.40
8 H L G 6.5 11.40
TOTAL 185 $11.40
I
*
**
Department numbers are keyed to the floor plan
1970 Census Occupational Codes
H - Male; F Female
A - Anglo; L = Latino;. B = Black
C - Citizen; G - Creencard; U = Undocumented
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Plan 4.G
A Basic Floor Plan in the Manufacture of Batteries
(broken lines indicate general work areas)
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successful because they have cut corners on wage rates and working conditions.
But the poor situation merely coalesced the workers around the need to unionize.
From its inception, the company found ways to lower production costs. They
employed undocumented workers, paid the minimum wage, provided minimal sick
leave, vacation time or other benefits, and promoted workers based on favoritism.
The workers had to pay for their own health insurance and received straight-time
pay for overtime work. A series of conditions led to the struggle for unionization;
low salaries, discrimination in promotion, and job security. In 1972, the workers
chose to hold elections for representation by a strong international union. During
the organizing drive, the managers tried to win the trust of the workers, for
example, by relaxing pressure over production quotas. As the campaign gained
momentum, so did the company offensive. One worker described the company's
actions in the following way: "Whereas before they wouldn't say 'hello' to workers,
all of a sudden they began to talk to us. They sent us letters explaining.. .their
point of view about the union. During the last days prior to elections, they tried to
convince the workers that we could work without a union. They guaranteed our
jobs unless we were incompetent." Despite the company's overtures, the workers
voted on behalf of the union.
This situation is very interesting because in contrast to the other two battery
manufacturers, here wages remained low and many other things were unchanged
regardless of the union (in fact, the same union local). Benefits and negotiated
work rules go unenforced because of three factors: the union has not aggressively
supported the workers; the workers do not have confidence in their shop stewards
and fear disciplinary or repressive actions by the foreman; and lastly, because the
employer is difficult to negotiate with. Again, it is the workers words that best
describe the situation: "The son of the owner is one of the few despot persons I
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have known. He sees Latino workers as machines, as things which are no good, but
at the same time...usable to making him rich, but [without]...rights to receive any
type of guarantees. For him the worker is only a productive machine which is
[simply discarded when he is] no longer productive..." As a result, workplace
relations remain hierarchical at best. Promotions still depend on favoritism. As
for the undocumented, "as long as you have a good recommendation from the
foreman [this] is sufficient, even if you could not speak English correctly." The
union is clearly very weak. The contract has been revised three times, but it has
resulted in few changes. Rather, the contract discussions have strained relations
between the workers and the union. During negotiations over the second contract,
the workers wanted to strike but the union would not support them. Consequently,
the workers accepted a contract they thought was against their own interests.
Strikes appear to be a common mechanism for bringing attention to workplace
disputes. Since 1973, there have been three strikes, the latest accurred during the
time of the interview over the extent of health benefits.
The perception of the workers is that their work is difficult and dangerous,
and that they are poorly paid. The labor intensive work coupled with the chemical
hazards, continual verbal abuse by the supervisors, and a generally repressive
atmosphere has created tremendous resentment among the workers. As one worker
said, the job requires "that the persons be willing to kill themselves, to commit
suicide for this little wage." Despite the poor working conditions, new jobs are
going to friends and family members of the production workers, especially if the
worker has good relations with the foreman. Thus a type of "compadre" system is
in place where the foreman is able to tap into the workers' network of kin and
friends.
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With the recent increase in product demand, the company has responded
several ways. First, it has added some new equipment, but none of it has
necessitated a more skilled labor force to operate it. The new machines have been
for casting and pasting. Stacking and welding are still performed by hand.
Secondly, it has expanded its laborforce, which is primarily undocumented.
Thirdly, it has introduced speed-up in the production line to get the same
workforce to manufacture more batteries. At the same time, the workers have
been forced to increase the speed of production, they have been given lower quality
lead and paste to work with which are heavier and more difficult to handle.
Fourthly, they have made overtime obligatory. Refusal to work overtime is
grounds for a warning and three warnings are sufficient for a lay-off. This
unpopular action led one worker to comment: "I...thought that the war against
slavery had ended, but it still exists." These combined measures have allowed the
company to survive the market so far. But the labor situation is very unsettled and
could be a catalyst forcing the employer to change either the place or method of
production in the future.
Summary
If there is one characteristic common to firms employing undocumented
workers, it is that of an underlying instability. This surfaced in a number of ways,
one being the repeated union antagonism. Companies secure in their market
positions would have less need to be constantly combative. Another illustration of
instability was the frequent reference to change in ownership, especially coincident
with union drives or a drop in profit levels. But the most important indicators were
the long-run positions taken by the firms in their efforts to remain viable. The
instability, though rooted in the market, was manifested through mobility,
technological change, or changes in the employment structure. Ultimately, the
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instability was passed on to the laborforce: to workers who lost their jobs due to
capital flight; to those in the downgraded jobs that resulted from the restructuring;
and to the undocumented who were constantly paid lower wages than their co-
workers.
Though the wheels, headers, and batteries firms were very different in their
produciton requirements and product markets, their shared dependence on
undocumented workers calls attention to some salient areas of similarity. One is
the lack of manueverability the firms encountered in the product market. Wheel
makers were constantly fluctuating between the OEM and aftermarket; battery
producers seemed more channeled, either they produced for the OEM, or they
produced for the aftermarket; headers were predominantly an aftermarket item.
When the major assemblies left California (except for one plant in Van Nuys), OEM
dependent producers, such as the battery manufacturers, simply closed-up. With
only the afterinarket sustaining the regional economy, other OEM producers shifted
toward this direction, thereby adding to a relative excess in the number of
producers. Among the other lines where the OEM had not been so well developed,
market pressures were more keyed to consumer demands. For these firms, if they
could remain in the market, demand was forthcoming, but that was also a function
of many competitors dropping out. In both cases, a rapid alternative was not to be
found through other avenues, such as switching to foreign markets, or changing
product lines. These firms were constrained by their narrowly defined product
markets.
Another common trait among the firms was the consistency in the way in
which they employed undocumented workers. At the job sites, the undocumented
were usually the most recent entrants, the least senior with respect to job
classification, and least well paid. In general, they were hired because an employer
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was labor dependent in the method of production, and could use them to lower the
wage-bill. By the way work was organized, an employer could also introduce
increased control in the workplace. Among the cases presented, the undocumented
workers were often skilled or semi-skilled. This contrasts with the conception that
these workers only engage in rationalized work, that is, work that is deskilled and
necessitates a cheap, compliant laborforce. Though they were skilled, they were
nonetheless treated like cheap labor. Consequently, as the case studies illustrate,
the undocumented workers were a bridge for the Los Angeles automobile parts
producers as they began to adjust their cost structures to their best advantage. In
this capacity, they supported the transformation of the industry, including the
erosion of subordinate primary jobs, and in the process, were themselves subjected
to the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed.
The purpose of the case studies was to observe the changes that occurred in
the automobile industry during a critical period. However, auto is only one
industry that contributed to the "deindustrialization" in the U.S. during the 1970's
and '80's. A broad trend towards industrial restructuring was evident among many
manufacturers. Thus, the next step was to understand whether the employment
and wage trends observed in the case studies were characteristic of other
industries, particularly those undergoing structural transformation. The case
studies were therefore complemented by an aggregate analysis of manufacturing
firms in order to determine, first, the main characteristics of employers of
undocumented workers, and secondly, the process of wage allocation within firms
when citizenship becomes a prominent factor.
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CHAPTER 5
WHY AND HOW "TRANSITIONAL" FIRMS EMPLOY
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
Introduction
Given the widespread transformation of basic manufacturing, it was
important to learn to what extent the case study findings could be generalized.
Consequently, the sample of firms was broadened to twenty-one firms
representative of several manufacturing industries. The analysis was along two
dimensions. The first was to look at firms in the aggregate in order to identify the
characteristics of those with the greatest propensity to employ undocumented
workers. The second was to observe within-plant data for the purpose of discerning
how wages are allocated when citizenship is a significant consideration. Based on
the broader sample, this analysis used regression and descriptive statistics. The
findings will be discussed first at the level of the firms, and secondly, at the level
of the workers. These discussions are preceded by an overview of the firms and of
the workers, respectively.
Overview of the Firms
The twenty-one firms were similar to the casee studies in that they were
selected from the manufacturing sector, and they all paid above the minimum
wage. But, as with the case studies, they also exhibited a diversity that reflected
their positions in the product and labor markets. For example, some were strong
core firms in terms of their position in the product market (including an auto
assembly plant and an ordnance manufacturer), while others were weaker core
firms (such as a producer of industrial trucks). Most operated in the periphery in
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that they responded to product markets defined by the core, however, they too
ranged from holding relatively dominant market positions (such as some of the
battery manfuacturers), to those that were clearly struggling (hardware and
fabricated plate work). Among these firms, 13 were unionized, 8 were not non-
unionzed; 11 subsidiaries, while 10 were independently owned. The largest firm
employed 2,400 workers, and the smallest only 35. Lastly, though some hired
undocumented production workers exclusively, the majority had varying numbers in
their workforce, while others had no undocumented workers at all. The average for
all the firms was 43% undocumented workers.
The 21 firms provided data on 2,321 production workers. The method for
obtaining the information was the same used in the case studies, however the
criteria for selection were expanded to include a broad sample of producers. Table
I identifies the products associated with the plants, their union status, and form of
ownership. Table 2 shows their representation among related Los Angeles County
industries, and Table 3 summarizes the citizenship characteristics of the workers.
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Table 5.1
Firm Products, Union Status, and Ownership
Firms SIC* Product
1. assembly
2. assembly
3. assembly
4. assembly
5. wheels**
6. wheels**
7. wheels
8. wheels
9. headers**
10. headers**
11. headers**
12. batteries**
13. batteries**
14. batteries**
15. spring brakes
16. alternators, clutches
17. non-auto
18. non-auto
19. non-auto
20. non-auto
21. non-auto
* Standard Industrial Code
2451
3792
3711
3737
3714
3714
3714
3714
3714
3714
3714
3691
3691
3691
3714
3714
3429
3079
3443
3469
3489
mobile homes
travel trailers
motor vehicles
industrial trucks
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
storage batteries
storage batteries
storage batteries
motor vehicle parts
motor vehicle parts
hardware
miscellaneous plastics
fabricated plate work
metal stampings
ordnance
Union Subsidiary
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
** Case Study Firms
Analysis of Firms by the Extent of Undocumented Employment
Though the economic downturn was felt industry-wide, as the case studies
illustrated, this did not lead all the firms to begin employing undocumented workers.
Yet, among those that did, the extent to which they relied on this laborforce varied
tremendously. This diversity became an object of inquiry. If clustered into groups
according to the percent undocumented employed, within the 21 firms sample, the
distribution was fairly wide: 4 had no undocumented; I had between 1% and 24%; 3
had between 25% and 49%; 7 had between 50% and 74%; 5 had between 75% and 99%;
and 1 had 100%. Given this range, it was therefore possible to undertake an analysis
of the variables most closely associated with the tendency to employ undocumented
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# firms
SIC in study
2451
3079
3429
3443
3469
3489
3537
3691
3711
3714
3792
Total
*
Table 5.2
Los Angeles County Industrial Context
Sample Los Angles
total # of # employees # firms # employees
employees studied in L.A. in L.A._
320
1,000
140
35
105
1,500
300
570
2,400
2,717
150
21 9,237
154
339
55
25
64
108
113
396
259
695
113
2,321
9
697
110
76
181
6
26
14
9
191
24
1,343
610
27,607
8,362
5,044
6,431
1,000-2,499
921
1,124
5,000-9,999i
5,000-9,999
500- 999
indeterminate
% L.A. firms
studied
11.11
.14
.91
1.31
.55
16.67
3.84
21.43
11.11
4.71
4.17
1.56
Total manufacturing establishments
in Los Angeles County: 18,491
Total establishments in Los Angeles
County: 167,523
Total manufacturing employment
in Los Angeles County: 929,210
Total employment in Los Angeles
County: 3,173,460
*Los Angeles County data based on March 1981 County Business Patterns.
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Table 5.3
Citizenship Characteristics of the Workers
(B)
% of # Undocu-
Total mented
B as %
of A
(C)
# Green- C as %
carders of A
(D)
# Citi-
zens
D as %
of A
1 320 154 48 71 46 59 38 24 16
2 150 113 75 107 95 6 5 0 0
3 2,400 259 11 0 0 38 15 221 85
4 150 113 75 18 16 46 41 49 43
5* 350 205 59 123 60 71 35 11 5
6* 300 122 41 41 33 12 10 69 57
7 1,000 10 1 8 80 0 0 2 20
8 550 18 3 18 100 0 0 0 0
9* 110 74 67 68 92 5 7 1 1
10* 53 46 88 41 89 0 0 5 11
11* 120 83 69 42 50 32 39 9 11
12* 150 113 75 0 0 6 5 107 95
13* 270 185 69 0 0 99 54 86 46
14* 150 98 65 31 32 57 58 10 10
15 300 93 31 59 63 25 27 9 10
16 93 44 47 31 70 10 23 3 7
17 140 55 39 37 67 0 0 18 33
18 1,000 339 34 249 73 68 20 22 7
19 35 25 71 19 76 4 16 2 8
20 105 64 61 43 67 19 .30 2 3
21 1,500 108 7 0 0 0 0 108 100
1,006 43 557 24 758 33
*Case study firms.
(A)
# Workers
Total 2,321
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workers. The first step was to distill from the case study material likely factors
related to the extent of undocumented employment.
The case studies indicate that labor intensive, low-paying firms with either a
parent holder interested only in extracting high profits, or financially constrained
independent firms were likely employers of undocumented workers. That many of
these employers encountered difficult product market conditions which
necessitated access to easily released labor revealed that high labor turnover, in
addition to low wages, were important in helping them keep down production costs.
These factors suggested that variables related to production technology, product
market conditions, and corporate strength were associated with the employment of
undocumented workers. In order to learn more about this relationship, a regression
was run on the 21 firms with selected firm characteristics, using the percent
undocumented as the dependent variable.
Production technology, here, refers to the usage of labor relative to other
factors of production (capital, land). Ideally, the variable selection would have
included time series data on the rate and extent of automation, such as
capital/labor ratios. In the absence of this data, the analysis depended on readily
available information. Therefore, production technology was represented by
laborforce characteristics, which in this instance consisted of the average hourly
wages in the firm. The assumption is that low wages are correlated with labor
intensity, especially if the work is correspondingly low-skilled, and this, in turn,
would be related to the propensity to employ undocumented workers.
Product market conditions were represented by the extent of labor turnover
and the average years workers were employed in a firm on the assumption that
market stability affects the level of employment. Another indicator that was not
available would have been inventory accumulation and usage.
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Corporate strength was seen as a function of a firm's corproate status
(subsidiary or independent) and size of employment. Subsidiaries operate in a
mixed position. While they have the financial bases, access to markets, and other
benefits that might be derived from a parent company, they can also be seen as
ventures a corporation would hold for profit speculation. Independently owned
firms (sole ownership) are not constrained by the corporate policies of a parent
holder, but they face more limited resources. In light of this, it was assumed that
independent firms would have a greater tendency to employ undocumented
workers. The size of the firm was seen as another measure of corporate strength
based on the concept that larger firms would be more established in a market and
less dependent on undocumented workers. A final variable thought to be related
was unionization. The logic was that stronger firms (subsidiaries, large) would be
most likely targets for unionization, and the least likely to employ undocumented
workers. A variable that would have been useful, but unavailable, was corporate
profits.
A regression was run to test the relationship of these variables to the percent
of undocumented workers in a firm. The results showed that unionization and size
are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the subsidiary variable emerged with a
positive parameter which means that a subsidiary is more likely to hire
undocumented workers than an independent firm. As the regression indicates,
undocumented workers are well distributed among large and small firms, unionized
and non-unionized, and more likely among subsidiaries, suggesting that ownership
status is less of a distinguishing characteristic than had been expected. What the
firms that hire undocumented workers have in common are low wages and high
labor turnover (high variability in employment during the year and low average job
tenure).
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In order to explain the percentage of undocumented workers in a firm, the
following variables were selected:
Hourly = average hourly wage of workers
Subsidiary (Sub) = 1 if the plant is a subsidiary, 0 if independent, for each
worker
Time (T) = average years on the job of a worker
Employment variability
(EV) = employment variability in the national 4-digit SIC to
which the firm belongs (1980) for each worker, 1
where EV, a variable that measures percent change in the amount of employment,
was developed from the following formula:
EMaxim urn EMinimum
(the month with the - (the month with the
greatest employment) least employment) = EV
EMinimum
Analysis of standardized coefficients show that the leading variables
explaining the percent of undocumented workers in plant j given worker i are
hourly wages followed by the employment variability. From this equation, each $1
in average wage subtracts 9.6%, and each average year of employment tenure in a
firm by the workers subtracts another .3%. A subsidiary firm contributes 6.5% to
the total, while a 100% level of employment turnover in the SIC adds 20.6%.
Sixty-seven percent of the variation in the percent of undocumented workers in a
given plant is accounted for by this model. Since the model is derived from a small
sample (21 firms), these results should be seen as preliminary, yet indicative of
characteristics of firms employing undocumented workers. From this equation, the
firms with a larger percent of undocumented workers would tend to pay lower
wages, experience high labor turnover, and operate as a subsidiary.
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Table 5.4
Model I Results2
Dependent variable = percent undocumented in the jth plant where the
ith person works (PUNDOC. .)
JJ
Mean = 0.43
R2 = 0.67
N = 2,321 workers in 21 firms
Variable
b (intercept)
Hourly..
Time..
Subsidiary.
Employment
Variability.
J1
* - probability
** - probability
Mean
6.70
6.40
0.66
Slope
0.984
-0.096
-0.003
0.065
0.36 0.206
of result due to
of result due to
t-ratio
69.54
-48.41
- 3.74
6.91
8.32
*
*
**
*
*
chance smaller
chance smaller
Standardized
Co-ef ficient
0
-0.81
-0.06
0.09
0.10
than
than
0.001.
0.002.
The final regression equation is:
PUNDOC.. = 0.984 - 0.096Hourly . - 0.003T . + 0.065Sub. + 0.206EV
13 13 13 J21
Standard
Error
0.014
0.002
0.001
0.009
0.025
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To illustrate application of this model, in a firm paying $3.35 per hour on
average (the legal minimum), whose workers have been employed for 10 years on
average, that is a subsidiary, and in an average year will have a 10% variability in
employment, the percent of undocumented workers is 71.8%. If everything is held
constant but the average wage is $10.00 per hour, the percent of undocumented
workers drops to 8.0%. Again, if everything is held constant, and the average wage
is $3.35 per hour, but the change in employment rises to 100%, the percent of
undocumented workers increases to 90.3% (see Table 5.5).
Table 5.5
Model 1 Predictions Comparing Firms With Respect to
Wages and Employment Variability
b
0
(intercept)
Hourly
Time
Employment
Variability
Total
Variable (x 100 =)
0.984
-0.096
(10 x -0.003)
110-100
100 10
(.1 x 0.206)
100
Predicted % Undocumented Per Variable
100% Change
$3.35/Hour $10.00/Hour in Employment
98.4 98.4 98.4
-32.2
- 3.0
2.1
71.8%
-96.0
- 3.0
2.1
8.0%
-32.2
- 3.0
100-50 
= 1.
50
=20.6
90.3%
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The regression results are indicative of areas requiring further research.
Least developed in the literature is now ownership patterns contribute to the
demand of undocumented workers. Studies of plant closing show that absentee-
owned corporations are responsible for the greatest amount of job loss due to plant
shutdowns, and are the first to reduce employment during recessionary periods. 3 In
border areas, like Los Angeles, locally-owned and independent firms have easy
access to foreign production sites, so capital flight for the purpose of
internationalizing production may be equally pervasive among non-absentee
controlled firms here. If firms that move retain their domestic product markets,
they force their U.S. competitors to follow suit or find alternative ways to lower
costs. However, without detailed studies of how firms in border regions behave, it
is difficult to know whether capital mobility is spreading across firms
differentiated by ownership, how this affects the ownership of firms remaining in
the U.S., and whether ownership patterns provide insight into the employment of
undocumented workers in places like Los Angeles. The case studies and the
statistical analysis suggest that ownership is probably important and worthy of
further inquiry.
The relationship between high turnover, low job tenure and an increased
incidence of undocumented workers is not surprising. Since these workers are
easily released, fluctuation in employment could result from a firm's need for
constant economic adjustment, especially during periods of unstable product
demand. The lack of tenure reflects their recent entry into subordinate primary
jobs. One study of unapprehended undocumented workers residing in the U.S. for
more than one year found that the longer they remained in the U.S., the greater
their likelihood of realizing a rise in occupational status. 4 However, their length
Table 5.6
Average Wage of Workers By Percent Undocumented in the Companies
Firm
Size
2,400
150
270
1,500
Studied
259
113
185
108
Percent
Undocumented
0
Company
% Number
0
0
0
0
3
*12(F)
*13(G)
21
Average for Company
Citizen Greencard Undocumented Company Status**
$10.88
$ 9.07
$11.38
$ 8.48
$10.91
$ 9.75
$11.42
0
0
0
0
0
$10.89
$ 9.11
$11.40
$ 8.48
S
S
S
S
Union
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Average for Group $10.09 $11.21 0 $10.35
150 113 1-24 16 4 $ 6.89 $ 6.19 $5.37 $ 6.37 I No
320 154 25-49 46 1 $ 6.11 $ 5.98 $5.77 $ 5.83 S No
300 122 33 * 6(B) $ 6.73 $ 6.47 $6.19 $ 6.52 S No
150 98 32 *14(H) $ 5.20 $ 5.15 $4.92 $ 5.07 I Yes
Average for Group $ 6.44 $ 5.56 $5.71 $ 5.86
350 205 50-74 60 * 5(A) $ 5.82 $ 4.40 $4.15 $ 4.33 S Yes
120 83 50 *11(C) $ 7.05 $ 6.74 $6.01 $ 6.40 1 Yes
300 93 63 15 $ 4.70 $ 5.34 $4.81 $ 4.94 S Yes
93 44 70 16 $ 7.10 $ 5.05 $3.85 $ 4.34 I No
140 55 67 17 $ 7.10 0 $3.57 $ 4.73 I Yes
1,000 339 73 18 $ 8.06 $ 6.86 $5.38 $ 5.86 S Yes
150 64 67 20 $ 4.08 $ 4.02 $4.00 $ 4.01 I Yes
Average for Group $ 6.83 $ 5.72 $4.81 $ 5.18
150 113 75-99 95 2 0 $ 4.63 $4.05 $ 4.08 1 No
1,000 10 80 7 0 $ 5.38 $3.97 $ 4.55 1 No
53 46 92 9(D) $ 4.40 $ 5.10 $3.57 $ 3.68 I 110
110 74 89 10(E) $ 5.48 0 $4.82 $ 4.00 S Yes
55 25 76 19 $ 4.25 $ 4.69 $4.03 $ 4.15 S 
Yes
Average for Group $ 5.04 $ 4.80 $3.90 $ 4.01
550 18 100 100 8 0 0 $3.35 $ 3.35 I No
Case Study
A,B = Wheeln
C,D,E = Headers
F,c,11 = Batteries
** = S=Subsidiary; I-Independent
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Table 5.7
Production Worker Average Hourly Earings--
National and In Firms Studied (1981)
Mobile Homes
Misc. Plastics
Hardware
Fabricated Platewoi
Metal Stampings
Ordnance and
Accessories
Industrial Trucks
Storage Batteries
Motor Vehicles
Motor Vehicle Part
Travel Trailers
National
Hourly Earnings($)
6.40
6.55
8.15
rk 8.74
7.27
8.24
8.26
8.61
12.29
s 10.39
6.76
Firms Studied
Hourly Earnings($)_
5.91
5.85
4.73
4.15
4.91
8.48
6.35
9.21
10.89
4.99
4.08
N
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
9
1
Undocumented
46
73
67
73
67
0
16
0-32
0
37-100
95
* 3-digit SIC statistics
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Supplement to
Employment and Earnings Revised Establishment Data, June 1982.
SIC
2451
3079*
3429
3443
3469
3489*
3537
3691
3711
3741
3792
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of employment across manufacturing industries, or within firms, and in contrast to
other workers has no precedence in the literature for comparison.
The correlation between low wages and the percent of undocumented workers
was also to be expected, though specification of this relationship, again has no
counterpart research. In a study that attempted to hold constant occupational,
industry, and regional variables, it was found that with "considerable and
consistent" disparity, these workers were paid less than citizen workers. Among
the employers in this study (which drew from a number of sectors), undocumented
workers earned an average of $2.66 per hour while for U.S. workers in comparable
production and non-supervisory positions, the average wage was $4.47 per hour. 5 In
this same study, the authors speculate that a relationship exists between the
average wage and the percent of undocumented workers in a firm, but evidence to
this effect has been lacking. This wage relationship is sometimes referred to as a
"depressant effect" because the presence of undocumented workers is hypothesized
to be coincident with a downward pressure on the prevailing wage structure.
However, these parallel tendencies result from complex, mutually reinforcing
reasons (e.g., low wage jobs may be more acceptable to undocumented than to U.S.
workers, but the availability of the undocumented workers supports the offering of
low wages), and should not be mistakenly assumed to imply causality. The findings
from Model 1 support the case study observations of wage stratification based on
citizenship. In fact, this phenomenon was prevalent among all twenty-one firms of
the broader sample. As the percent of undocumented workers increased, the
average rate of pay decreased. This data is clearly displayed in Table 5.6.
As shown in Table 5.7, the firms studies generally had wage levels below the
national average. The only two SIC's that had wages above the national average
were composed of firms with no undocumented (though SIC 3714 also had no
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undocumented workers, but fell below the national average), thus suggesting that a
"depressant effect" exists.
Lastly, the variables that proved to be statistically insignificant challenge
some widely held conceptions. First, the case studies and statistical analysis
reveal that unionization is unrelated to the percent of undocumented workers in a
firm. Some unions aggressively organize in firms with undocumented workers, but
that many won't is understandable. Current labor legislation affects union behavior
since, if enforced as written without guaranteed anonymity, it could lead to the
deportation of undocumented workers. 6 The possibility of deportation makes the
cost of organizing excessive, especially in the face of emploeyr resistance. Many
unions choose not to organize undocumented workers after weighing the
alternatives. Due to the lack of legal protection and union hesitancy,
undocumented workers are also cautious, and thereby appear that they can't be
unionized. It is not that they can't be organized, it is that the obstacles are
formidable. Thus, the basis for unionization, or the lack of a union, is unrelated to
the extent of undocumented workers in a place of employment.
Secondly, the size of employment was shown to be statistically insignificant.
In two studies, more than 50% of the firms observed to employ undoucmented
workers were composed to 25 or fewer employees. 7 However, these studies did not
compare firm size to the percent of undocumented workers, nor did they
differentiate employment patterns among industrial sectors. What is suggested in
this analysis is that the size of a manufacturing firms is not correlated with the
percent of undocumented workers, though further research on both size and
unionization would provide further insight into both situations.
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Overview of the Workers
Because this research was based on individual firms and workers within firms,
it provided an opportunity to develop a comparison among workers with respect to
individual characteristics. The two initial areas of study are average wages and
average time on the job in light of the workers' citizenship, race, sex, and union
status. This information is displayed in Tables 5.8 through 5.12. (See Appendix 2
for a complete outline of this data by company.)
Table 5.8 illustrates several consistent trends. Taken as a whole, men earn
more than women; citizens earn more than greencard holders, who in turn earn
more than undocumented workers; and unionized workers earn more than non-
unionized. In these cases, those receiving higher wages had also been employed
longer on average suggesting either higher turnover among the lower paying groups,
or more recent entry into the job market, or both. The racial picture is unusual.
Blacks have the highest average wage, followed by Anglos, Latinos, and Other (e.g.,
Asians, Native Americans), although the wage structure corresponds with the
average years on the job. The plants studied were predominantly Latino, leaving a
smaller sample of the other groups, but the data suggests that Latinos and Others
tended to hold lower paid jobs.
Analysis of Table 5.9, which arrays the data according to citizenship,
provides added insight. Again, in all three categories (citizens, greencard holders,
undocumented), men earn more than women, though their wages decrease with
each category respectively. Average length of employment varies in
correspondance with the average wage. The racial data is more complicated.
Latino citizens have the highest wage followed by Blacks, Anglos, and Others,
which is supported by the average years of employment except for the Other
category, which had the longest tenure. Among greencard holders, the highest to
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Table 5.8
Average Wages and Years on the Job of Workers by
Citizenship, Race, Sex, and Union Status
All cases:
Sex
Males:
Females:
Citizenship
Citizens:
Greencarders:
Undocumented:
Race
Anglos:
Blacks:
Latinos:
Others:
Union
Unionized:
Non-unionized:
N
2,321
2,183
138
758
557
1,006
254
125
1,893
49
1,673
(13 firms)
648
(8 firms)
Average
Wa2e
$6.70
$6.79
$5.14
$9.02
$7.07
$4.74
$8.72
$8.90
$6.31
$5.61
$7.20
$5.39
Standard
Deviation
2.76
2.78
1.91
2.21
2.79
1.29
2.32
2.08
2.68
2.20
2.96
1.51
Average
Years
6.40
6.54
4.26
10.69
6.40
3.17
9.98
10.62
5.70
3.95
7.19
4.35
Standard
Deviation
6.14
6.24
3.71
7.18
5.58
2.59
7.30
7.11
5.61
5.50
6.81
3.08
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Table 5.9
Average Wages and Years on the Job of Workers by Citizenship
Average Standard Average Standard
N Wage Deviation Years Deviation
CITIZENS
Sex
758 $9.02All cases:
Males:
Females:
Race
Anglos:
Blacks:
Latinos:
Other:
eGREENCARDERS
Sex
All cases:
Males:
Females:
733
25
215
122
413
8
557
519
38
24
2
490
41
Race
Anglos:
Blacks:
Latinos:
Other:
AlNDOCasENTED
All cases :
Sex
Race
$9.06
$7.80
$8.81
$8.94
$9.17
$8.00
$7.07
$7.22
$5.09
$9.12
$8.74
$7.13
$5.15
1,006 $4.74
931
75
Males:
Females:
Anglos:
Blacks:
Latinos:
Other:
$4.78
$4.27
15 $6.89
1
990
$4.25
$4.71
2.21
2.19
2.45
2.28
2.03
2.21
2.57
2.79
2.81
1.43
2.43
4.04
2.78
1.82
1.29
1.31
0.79
1.99
1.25
10.69
10.83
6.66
10.21
10.82
10.88
11.77
6.40
6.51
4.91
11.33
4.00
6.50
2.42
3.17
3.17
3.13
4.47
0.50
3.15
7.18
7.20
5.25
7.52
7.08
7.04
6.74
5.58
5-.68
3.70
5.93
1.41
5.48
3.71
2.59
2.59
2.49
1.91
2.59
159
Table 5.10
Average Wages and Years on the Job of Workers by Race
Average Standard Average Standard
N Wage Deviation Years Deviation
e ANGLOS
All cases: 254 $8.72 2.32 9.98 7.30
Sex
Males: 250 $8.75 2.29 10.00 7.33
Females: 4 $6.91 3.48 8.75 5.38
Citizenshio
Citizens: 215 $8.81 2.28 10.21 7.52
Greencarders: 24 $9.12 2.43 11.33 5.93
Undocumented: 15 $6.89 1.99 4.47 1.91
* BLACKS
All cases: 125 $8.90 2.08 10.62 7.11
Sex
Males: 118 $8.89 2.06 10.78 7.14
Females: 7 $9.13 2.58 7.92 6.49
Citizenship:
Citizens: 122 $8.94 2.03 10.82 7.08
Greencarders: 2 $8.74 4.04 4.00 1.41
Undocumented: 1 $4.25 . 0.50
e LATINOSI
All cases: 1,893 $6.31 2.68 5.70 5.61
Sex
Males: 1,775 $6.40 2.71 5.82 5.72
Females: 118 $4.88 1.45 4.02 3.25
Citizenship
Citizens: 413 $9.17 2.21 10.88 7.04
Greencarders: 490 $7.13 2.78 6.50 5.48
Undocumented: 990 $4.71 1.25 3.15 2.59
All cases: 49 $5.61 2.20 3.95 5.50
Sex
Males: 40 $5.85 2.14 4.25 5.84
Females: 9 $4.56 2.28 2.58 3.64
Citizenship
Citizens: 8 $8.00 2.57 11.77 6.74
Greencarders 41 $5.15 1.82 2.42 3.71
Undocumented - - - - -
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lowest wages were earned by Anglos, Blacks, Latinos, and Others, respectively,
though Latinos had more years on the job than Blacks. For the undocumented, the
order was Anglos, Latinos, and Blacks, corresponding with their job tenure. This
suggests that Latino citizens tend to be paid quite well relative to other racial
groups, and have longer time on the job. In contrast, immigrant Latinos are paid
less than other groups and have less job tenure. Again, this could reflect either
greater job turnover, more recent entry into the laborforce, or both by the
immigrants.
A correlation analysis was applied to the variables hourly wage and time on
the job for each worker based on their citizenship. The purpose was to mesure the
strength of the relationship between the two variables through a correlation
coefficient. As shown in Table A, the variables are positively correlated, but the
relationship weakens slightly among the greencard holders and the undocumented.
Table A
Correlation Between Hourly Wage and Time on the Job by Citizenship
Category Correlation Coefficient N
All 0.65 2,321
Citizens 0.65 758
Greencard 0.46 557
Undocumented 0.47 1,006
Table 5.11, Average Wages and Years on the Job by Sex, supports the
previous findings. Lastly, Table 5.12, summarizing the data with respect to
union status indicates that in the aggregate, unionized workers have both higher
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Table 5.11
Average Wages and Years on the Job of Workers by Sex
Average Standard Average Standard
N Wage Deviation Years Deviation
All cases: 2,183 $6.79 2.78 6.54 6.24
Citizenship
Citizens: 733 $9.06 2.19 10.83 7.20
Greencarders: 519 $7.22 2.81 6.51 5.68
Undocumented: 931 $4.78 1.31 3.17 2.60
Race
Anglos: 250 $8.75 2.29 10.00 7.33
Blacks: 118 $8.89 2.06 10.78 7.14
Latinos: 1,775 $6.40 2.71 5.82 5.72
Others: '40 $5.85 2.14 4.25 5.84
* WOMEN
All cases: 138 $5.14 1.91 4.26 3.71
Citizenship
Citizens: 25 $7.80 2.45 6.66 5.25
Greencarders: 38 $5.09 1.43 4.91 3.70
Undocumented: 75 $4.27 0.79 3.13 2.49
Race
Anglos: 4 $6.91 3.48 8.75 5.38
Blacks: 7 $9.13 2.58 7.92 6.49
Latinos: 118 $4.88 1.45 4.02 3.25
Others: 9 $4.56 2.28 2.58 3.64
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Average Wages and Years
9 UNIONIZED FIRS
All cases
Sex
Males:
Females:
Table 5.12
on the Job of Workers by Union Status
Average Standard Average Standard
N Wage Deviation Years Deviation
1,673 $7.20
1,590 $7.29
83 $5.53
2.96
2.97
2.23
7.19
7.33
4.48
6.81
6.88
4.46
Citizenship
Citizens:
Greencarders:
Undocumented:
610 $9.59
419 $7.45
644 $4.78
Race
Anglos:
Blacks:
Latinos:
Others:
e NON-UNIONIZED FIRMS
All cases:
178
122
1,332
41
$9.57
$8.92
$6.78
$5.43
648 $5.39
Sex
Males:
Females:
Citizenship
Citizens:
Greencarders:
Undocumented:
Race
Anglos:
Blacks:
Latinos:
Other:
593
55
148
138
362
76
3
561
8
$5.47
$4.55
$6.65
$5.93
$4.68
$6.75
$8.28
$5.18
$6.57
2.02
3.08
1.21
11.93
6.67
3.05
11.54
10.80
6.40
3.37
4.35
4.39
3.93
5.60
5.58
3.38
6.32
3.67
4.05
6.91
7.21
6.13
2.87
7.61
7.11
6.36
5.15
3.08
3.16
2.13
4.16
3.24
1.96
4.85
2.31
2.56
6.63
2.20
2.09
2.92
2.33
1.51
1.53
1.07
1.10
0.96
1.41
1.05
1.54
1.45
1.05
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average wages, and more time on the job indicating either that the non-unionized
plants have higher turnover, or are newer firms. In this sample, men again earned
more than women in both instances, and had been employed longer. The same
pattern of wage and tenure distribution evident previously for workers based on
citizenship was repeated in unionized and non-unionzed firms. However, the racial
pattern was mixed. In unionized plants, the highest paid were Anglos, followed by
Blacks, Latinos, and Others (supported by comparable time on the job). But in non-
unionized plants, Blacks were paid the most, followed by Anglos, Others and
Latinos (though Blacks had the least tenure, and those in the Other category had
been employed the longest).
The unusual racial patterns that emerged repeatedly are particularly
interesting. First, national income data indicates that Chicanos (Mexican
descendant, U.S. born citizens) earn less than whites, but more than Blacks (this
relationship holds for families, male wage earners, and female wage earners.) 8
However the introduction of citizenship reverses the order for Blacks and Latinos
in this study. Secondly, previous studies have found that racial groups will
sometimes be separated by establishments, or within job sites, by departments or
occupations (e.g., production vs. supervisory roles). 9 Here, the situation is again
further complicated by the introduction of citizenship status. Within a plant that
is predominantly Latino, citizen Latinos hold preferred positions. In a plant with
mixed races, citizen groups of all races tend to have the better jobs (with Latinos
earning the most), while Latino undocumented and greencard holders are less well
off than their counterparts of other races. Since Latinos comprised 82% of the
workers studied, comparison with other sites employing workers of other races
differentiated by citizenship would be valuable. This is extremely difficult to
come by since large numbers of undocumented persons of other races appear to
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work in mono-racial job sites, or enclave industries.1 0 The issue differs from one
of the discrimination based on race because undocumented workers have unequal
personal attributes (i.e., undocumented workers have presumably less job
experience, are risky employees in that they are "illegal," and often have poor
command of English). Rather, it is a matter of job allocation creating a de-facto
segregation among workers based on citizenship and race; a situation that works
against those who do not (or can not) regularize their status, and who are further
subjected to frequent job turnover (and cannot establish seniority).
Wage Allocation Among Workers
From the overview of the workers, it is evident that knowing a worker's
personal attributes, in light of job characteristics, one could assign him or her a
probable wage. Given key information on a firm (since the type of labor demanded
reflects the economic well-being of a firm, and the production technology
employed), a worker's hypothetical wage is further defined. Drawing on firm and
worker data established through this study, a regression was developed to learn how
the workers' personal backgrounds, their job type and tenure, and the firms'
corporate status were related to the wages paid.
In this regression (Model II), hourly wage was the dependent variable. The
personal characteristics included sex, citizenship, and race. Employment factors
were the jobs held by the workers, and the years they were on the job. Corporate
status was represented by unionization, ownership (subsidiary or independent), and
size of firm employment. It was expected that hourly wages would be higher on
average for males, citizens, and Anglos; with increases in a worker's occupational
prestige (as determined by the Treiman scale), 1 1 and time on the job; and in
unionized, subsidiary, large firms (a proxy for corporate strength). The regression
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analysis showed that although the signs to the variables fit the initial theory, one
variable, occupation, was not statistically significant.
In order to explain hourly wages, the following variables were selected:
Male (S) = 1 for males, 0 for females
Citizens (Cl) = I for citizens, 0 for others
Greencarders (C2)* = I for greencard holders, 0 for others
Undocumented (C 3 ) = 1 for undocumented, 0 for others
Anglos (Rj) = 1 for Anglos, 0 for others
Blacks and Other (R 2 )* = I for Blacks and Other, 0 for others
Latinos (R 3 ) = 1 for Latinos, 0 for others
Time (T) = years on the job
Union (U) = I for unionized, 0 for non-unionized
(for each worker)
Subsidiary (Sub) = 1 for subsidiaries, 0 for independent
(for each worker)
Size = actual size of firm (employment)
(for each worker)
*-these variables were assumed in the intercept
By comparing the standardized coefficients, the conclusion can be made that
the variable contributing the most to hourly wages is time on the job (T), followed
by the variable indicating whether or not a worker is undocumented (C3). 63% of
the variation in hourly wages of the sample selected is explained as a function of a
worker's sex, citizenship, race, time on the job, and of the firm size and status
(unionized or not, subsidiary or independent).
As an application of this model that tested the concept of job stratification,
the hourly wages of two people were predicted: a male, citizen, Anglo who has
been in a unionized subisidary firm of the mean size for the mean number of years,
versus a worker who is a Latino and undocumented with all of the other
characteristics staying the same. The comparison shows the citizen Anglo making
$2.96 more per hour.
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Analysis of Occupations
From this analysis, it appears that occupations, per se, are less important in
determining wage levels than such factors as citizenship, race, or time on the job.
Though occupations were not significant in the regression, they are nonetheless
interesting. There were 45 occupations identified in the 21 firms (classified
according to the 1970 Census Standard Occupational Codes). Fifty-eight percent
of all the workers were clustered in 6 occupations (mechanics, assemblers, welders,
machine operators, machine operators not specified, and laborers). Undocumented
workers were most concentrated as assemblers and welders. In each of these
occupations, citizenship and years on the job corresponded with the wage paid. On
average, undocumented workers received half of the hourly wage paid to citizens,
though they had been employed one quarter the period of time. In all likelihood,
undocumented workers, being less senior, were allocated entry level positions,
while citizens and greencard holders moved into better jobs within the same
occupation. Undocumented workers were prominent in jobs that require little skill
(e.g., assemblers), though they also held skilled positions (e.g., mechanics, welder),
illustrating that their usefulness to employers was not exclusive to the least
desirable jobs. Table 5.15 shows the citizenship breakdown for the six occupations.
When average wage earned in the six occupations are contrasted with
national data, three occupations fall above the national average, and three below.
The two occupations with the greatest number of undocumented workers,
assemblers and machine operators, are below the national average, again
suggestive of a wage "depressant effect." Table 5.16 compares the various wage
levels.
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Dependent variable =
Mean =
2
R =
N =
Table 5.13
Model II Results12
Hourly Wages (HOURLY)
$6.70
.63
2,321 workers
Variable
b0 (intercept)
S
Cl
C
3
R 1
R
3
T
U
Sub
Size
* - probability
** - probability
- probability
Mean
0.94
0.33
0.43
0.11
0.82
6.40
0.72
0.68
639.14
of result
of result
of result
Slope
4.02
0.69
0.85
-1. 79
0.81
0.49
0.15
0.39
0.98
0.0002
Standardized
t-ratio P Coefficient
19.08
4.61
7.83
-19.12
4.80
3.41
18.12
4.38
10.88
3.02
*
*
*
*
*
**
*
*
*
due to chance smaller than
due to chance smaller than
due to chance smaller than
0
0.06
0.14
-0.32
0.09
0.07
0.34
0.06
0.17
0.06
0.0001
0.0006
0.0026
Thus, the final regression for Model II is:
HOURLY = 4.02 + 0.69S + 0.85C - 1.79C3 + 0.81R + 0.49R3 + 0.15T + 0.39U +
0.98Sub + 0.0002Size
Standard
Error
0.211
0.149
0.108
0.094
0.170
0.144
0.083
0.090
0.090
0.00007
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Table 5.14
A Comparison of Two Workers
Variable
b (intercept)
S
C1
C
3
R 1
R
3
T (6.40 x .15)
U
Sub
Size (639.14 x .0002)
Cit izen
Anglo
$4.02
.69
.85
.81
.96
.39
.98
.13
$8.83
Undocumented
Latino
$4.02
.69
-1.79
.49
.96
.39
.98
.13
$5.87
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Table 5.15
Average Wages and Average Years on the Job for
Six Occupations by Citizenship
Citizen Greencard Undocumented Total
Occupational Wage Wage Wage Wage
Code* N ($) Years N ($) Years N ($) Years N ($) Years
492 84 9.67 14.47 44 9.05 14.09 57 7.26 4.40 185 8.78 11.28
602 105 7.95 9.79 72 5.12 4.19 153 4.38 3.01 330 5.68 5.43
680 205 10.27 14.53 76 8.24 9.13 69 5.03 3.07 350 8.80 11.10
690 29 8.03 7.84 38 7.16 4.99 122 4.67 2.72 189 5.69 3.97
692 15 6.85 3.61 46 4.47 2.85 46 4.11 2.27 107 4.65 2.71
780 83 9.29 10.85 58 9.13 6.06 52 4.37 2.85 193 7.92 7.26
Total 521 9.33 12.29 334' 7.19 6.85 4 9 9 4.84 3.02 1354 7.15 7.54
* 492 Mechanics; 602 Assemblers; 680 Welders; 690 Machine Operators;
692 Machine Operators (not specified; 780 Laborers.
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Table 5.16
Average Hourly Wages in Six Occupations for the Nation and in the 21 Firms Studied (1981)
Occupation
(492) Mechanics
(602) Assemblers
(680) Welders
(690) Machine Operators
(692) Machine Operators,
not specified
(780) Laborers
National Average
Wage ($)13
8.15
6.05
8.30
6.82
6.27
7.42
Firm Average
Wage ($)
8.78
5.68
8.80
5.69
4.65
7.92
At the plant level, occupational detail shows how jobs are distributed in light
of the employment of undocumented workers. In firms with few or no
undocumented workers, the average wage for an occupation was consistently higher
than in firms with high percentages of undocumented. For example, in the six case
study firms (which contained 28 occupations), only Companies F and G (batteries)
had no undocumented workers. As shown in Graph I, they were also paid
considerably more by occupation than the other six firms, all of whom employed
undocumented workers. Graph II illustrates the average length of employment
associated with each occupation. A list of the occupations is found below. The
complete breakdown of the occupations by wage, years on the job, and citizenship
for the case study firms is contained in Appendix 3. Appendix 4 shows this data for
all 21 firms.
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Summary
The statistical analsyis demonstrates the necessity for further studies on the
employment effects of undocumented workers to better understand the conditions
of work, especially during periods of change. In particular, these findings
underscore the importance of the methodology used in this research for developing
industry profiles. In this instance, the case study approach yielded detailed insight,
but the regressions enriched the data with a high level of statistical reliability.
As shown in the regressions, it is possible to estimate characteristics of firms
in basic manufacturing that employed undocumented workers during the recent
period of rapid transformation, as well as the process of wage allocation among
workers based on citizenship within the firms. Though in the aggregate, the firms
exhibited a wage differential that correlated with the citizenship of the workforce,
detailed observations revealed a picture complicated by other factors, such as
race, sex, occupation, and most prominantly, length of employment. Furthermore,
wage was only one key predictor of the tendency for firms to employ
undocumented workers. Another important variable was the extent of labor
turnover, or lack of employment stability in a workforce.
The consistency of characteristics common to employers of undocumented
workers, and of wage patterns within these firms with respect to citizenship
illustrates the pervasiveness of these findings in the region. It would be tempting
to dismiss the findings as applicable only to Los Angeles due to its proximity to an
international border. However, other major industrial cities, such as Chicago and
New York, also have significant concentrations of undocumented workers, and it is
likely that these trends would appear elsewhere, though in modified form. From
this perspective, the findings should be understood as integral to the process of
industrial restructuring, in that the underlying practices provided a temporary
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advantage to those regions and firms that utilize undocumented workers. This
advantage could change, however, with new directions in national immigration,
urban, or industrial policies. The following chapter will address major policies
under consideration in light of the transitional role of undocumented workers in
manfuacturing.
173
Chapter 5 Notes
1. U.S. Department of Labor.
Establishment Data, Burea
1981.
Supplement to Employment and Earnings, Revised
u of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C., August
2. The original parameter estimates with
follows (union = 1 yes, 0 no; size refers
the two insignificant variables were as
to actual employment of firm):
Variable
intercept
Hourly
Sub
Time
EV
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0.06
-0.004
0.21
0.004
Standardized
t-ratio Coefficient
63.21
-48.14
5.80
- 3.64
8.10
(0.37)
0.000006 (0.80)
0
-0.812
0.087
-0.067
0.105
0.005
0.014
The correlation matrix for this regression was:
PUNDOC Hourly Sub
1.00
-0.81 1.00
Time EV U Size
-0.25 0.37 1.00
-0.55 0.65 0.22 1.00
0.03 0.06 -0.20 0.10 1.00
-0.24 9.29 0.44 0.21 -0.31 1.00
-0.41 0.52 0.45 0.65 -0.02 0.35 1.00
The correlation matrix for Model I is as follows:
PUNDOC Hourly Time Sub
1.00
EV
-0.81 1.00
-0.55 0.65 1.00
-0.25 0.39 0.22 1.00
0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.20 1.00
Stan da r
Error
0.016
0.002
0.010
0.001
0.026
0.010
0.000008
PUNDOC
Hourly
Sub
Time
EV
U
Size
PUNDOC
Hourly
Time
Sub
EV
174
3. See Arthur Hochner and Daniel Zibman, "Plant Closings and Job Loss in
Philadelphia--The Role of Multinationals and Absentee Control," manuscript,
Philadelphia, Temple University, 1981; and David Barkley, "Plant Ownership
Characteristics and the Locational Stability of Rural Iowa Manufacturers,"
Land Economics, Vol. 54, No. 1, February 1978, p. 92-99.
4. Wayne A. Cornelius, "The Future of Mexican Immigrants in California: A
New Perspective for Public Policy," Working Papers Center for United
States-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, No. 6, 1981.
5. David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role of
Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study, Litton and
Co., Inc., Washington, D.C., March 1976, p. 124-126.
6. Rebecca Morales, "Unions and Undocumented Workers," Southwest Economy
and Society, Winter 1982.
7. Gilbert Cardenas, Manpower Impact and Problems of Mexican Illegal Aliens
in an Urban Labor Market, University of Illinois Center for Advanced
Computations, December 1976 (sample size = 74); and Wayne A. Cornelius,
"Illegal Migration to the United States: Recent Research Findings, Policy
Implications and Research Priorities," M.I.T. Migration Study Group, May
1977 (sample size = 994).
8. See Walter Fogel, "Research on the Chicago Worker," The State of Chicano
Research in Family, Labor and Migration Studies, Armando Valdez, Albert
Camarillo, and Tomas Almaguer (eds.), Stanford, Stanford Center for Chicano
Research, 1983.
9. See for example, Robert Howard, "Second Class in Silicon Valley," Working
Papers, September/October 1981; or Alan Bernstein, Bob DeGrasse, Rachel
Grossman, Chris Paine, and Lenny Siegel, "Silicon Valley: Paradise or
Paradox," in Mexican Women in the United States: Struggles Past and
Present, Magdelena Mora and Adelaida R. del Castillo (eds.), Los Angeles,
Chicago Studies Research Center, University of California, 1980; or Kenneth
T. Arrow, "Models of Job Discrimination," in Racial Discrimination in
Economic Life, Anthony Pascal (ed.), Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books,
1972.
10. See, Alejandro Portes, "Modes of Structural Incorporation and Present
Theories of Labor Immigration," in Global Trends in Migration: Theory and
Research on International Population Movements, Mary M. Kritz, Charles B.
Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi (eds.), New York, Center for Migration Studies,
1981.
11. Donald T. Treiman, Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective, New
York, Academic Press, 1977. The structural theory of prestige determination
argues that the division of labor creates inherent differences in power
associated with various occupational roles based on education and income.
The prestige scale, though biased in that it reflects a class-based concept of
presitge, was -applied because it weights occupations for regression analysis.
175
12. The original parameter estimates with the one insignificant variable
were as follows (Occw = occupations scaled to the Treiman scale):
Slope
3.78
0.69
0.86
-1.81
0.79
0.50
0.40
0.97
0.0002
0.15
0.007
t-ratio
14.81
4.55
7.92
-19.20
4.69
3.48
4.46
10.76
2.87
17.91
(1.54)
Standardized
Coefficient
0
0.059
0.146
-0.324
0.090
0.070
0.065
0.166
0.054
0.333
0.020
Standard
Error
0.255
0.152
0.109
0.094
0.169
0.144
0.090
0.090
0.00007
0.008
0.005
The correlation matrix for this regression was:
Hourly S
1.00
0.14 1.00
0.59 0.08
-0.62 -0.06
0.26 0.06
-0.30 -0.03
0.29 0.07
0.39 0.08
0.52 0.05
0.65 0.09
0.13 0.12
C1 C3 R1 R3
1.00
-0.61
0.39
-0.49
0.13
0.26
0.40
0.49
0.10
1.00
-0.26
0.38
-0.16
-0.17
-0.27
-0.46
-0.06
1.00
-0.74
-0.02
-0.01
0.10
0.20
0.06
1.00
-0.08
-0.06
-0.15
-0.24
-0.05
U Sub Size Time Occw
1.00
0.44
9.35
0.21
-0.04
1.00
0.45
0.22
0.05
1.00
0.65
0.18
1.00
0.16 1.00
The correlation matrix for Model II is as follows:
Hourly S
1.00
0.14 1.00
0.58 0.08
-0.62 -0.06
0.26 0.06
-0.30 -0.03
0.65 0.09
0.29 0.07
0.39 0.08
0.52 0.05
C1  C3  R, R3
1.00
-0.61 1.00
0.39 -0.26 1.00
-0.49 0.38 -0.74 1.00
0.49 -0.46 0.20 -0.24
0.13 -0.16 -0.02 -0.08
0.26 -0.17 -0.01 -0.06
0.40 -0.27 0.10 -0.15
T U Sub Size
1.00
0.21
0.22
0.65
1.00
0.44 1.00
0.35 0.45 1.00
Variable
intercept
S
Cl
C
3
R 1
R 3
U
Sub
Size
Time
Occw
Mean
0.94
0.33
0.43
0.11
0.82
0.72
0.67
641.42
6.41
33.90
Hourly
S
Cl
C
3
R 1
R
3
U
Sub
Size
Time
Occw
HOURLY
S
Cl
C
3
R,
R 3
T
U
Sub
Size
176
13. Nancy F. Rytina, "Earnings of Women and Men: A Look at Specific
Occupations," Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Department of Labor, Vol. 105,
No. 4, April 1982, p. 2 5 - 3 1. Weekly earnings were divided by 40 hours per
week to estimate hourly wages.
177
CHAPTER 6
IMMIGRANTS AND NATIONAL POLICIES:
INTENTS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
Introduction
From one perspective, the economic of crisis is over. Acccording to a recent
account, the nation's economy had reportedly stabilized at a growth rate of 7%,
prices were projected to increase at a low inflationary annual rate of 3.8%, second
quarter corporate profits had grown by 17.6%, and the gross national product for
1983 was projected to increase 5.5% by the end of 1983.1 At the same time
growth statistics were cited came a reference to immigrant workers: "Because the
workforce grows every year, fed by a stream of new American workers entering
the labor market and by immigrants entering the country, the gross national
product must expand by 3% simply to keep the employment level stable. A growth
rate of greater than 3% is required to reduce the numbers of Americans out of
work, now numbering about 10.7 million." 2 Though it is troubling to see immigrants
liked to the economy in a way that appeals to nativist arguments, the objective
association is nevertheless valid. It is also reasonable to claim that the economy is
turning around. However, it is essential to note that the employment of
immigrants and the economic recovery have been happening together, they have
not been discrete events with one cancelling out the benefits created by the other.
But now that the economy has stabilized, the transitional role once performed by
undocumented and other immigrant workers may become less important, though
other immigrant roles are emerging as the new economic order takes definition.
The findings of this research provide insight into the way the global economy is
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shaping and being shaped by local labor market conditions. Consequently, it is of
relevance for public policy. Thus, this section will summarize the salient points of
the research, and relate them to policies of current national debate.
The Transitional Period in Retrospect
Throughout the text, the argument has been made that undocumented
workers were significant during a period of transition. The transition refers to the
change between periods of capitalist structural forms. The current period has been
termed global capitalism. What is being witnessed is the breakdown of this system
and the evolution into one that is not yet defined. During the transition,
undocumented workers functioned as a latent reserve laborforce within basic
manufacturing. Thus, they helped to usher in a new capitalist period at the same
time that they were instrumental in the transformation of manufacturing. So while
the concept of a latent reserve labor can be applied solely to a sectoral context, in
this instance, it was actually more far reaching.
Implicit in this analysis is the notion that society reflects fundamental work
relations embodied in the labor process. Earlier, the labor process was defined as
the way in which labor is used in the orgranization of work so as to control
production. Under the previous period of monopoly capitalism, the labor process
was described as consisting of Taylorism and Fordism. Because the labor process
defines the way in which production is structured, and therefore is the basis for the
wage relationship underlying economic and social institutions supporting working
class consumption, Fordism became another term to describe the period. In its
broadest sense, Fordism referred to a society organized around Taylorist and
Fordist principles, generalized mechanization, mass production, and macro
economic policies directed at welfare economics. Monopoly capitalism later gave
way to global capitalism, where the labor process was characterized as Neo-
179
Fordism. Here the term refers to a more spatially dissaggregated concept of
production which has been described as consisting of:
(a) further reductions in skill content and control over work by workers
through the use of electronic information systems and computer
programming; (b) the increasing breakdown and dispersal of functions that
had previously been carried out under one roof into multiple locations
(epitomized in the production of the "World Car"); and (c) the intensified
fragmentation of tasks outside direct production in management and control
functions, technical design, research and development, and the full range of
supportive production services. These changes have been associated with an
intensification of capital mobility as a strategy for increasing both profits
and labor control. 3
The labor processes underlying the periods of monopoly and global capitalism
reflect times in the history of capitalism when basic manufacturing was the driving
force for the rest of the economy. During monopoly capitalism, the labor
processes were associated with the factory setting of the industrial revolution.
Later, under global capitalism, the labor process termed Neo-Fordism referred to
the organization of production in ways that disregarded spatial boundaries. The
new period appears to be very different since services are now the primary force
behind the economy, thus the labor process reflects a very different set of
relations.
Though the transitional period is not yet complete, there are some interesting
observations that bring the emerging labor process into focus. First is the work by
Stanback and Noyelle in which they chart the rise of the service sector and make
distinctions among distributive, producer and final output services. In Noyelle's
words, the rise of services indicates "...that although the United States has
remained very much a goods-oriented society, it is an economy in which service
activities have come to play a very important role, partly because of their
complementarity to final goods, partly because of the need to deal with the
increasing complexity and size of firms and markets, and partly because direct
production of goods for domestic consumption is increasingly carried out
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abroad ... these trends reflect the dual transformation undergone by the U.S.
economy during the most recent decades--a transformation in what the economy
produces and in how it produces." 4 The how, according to Stanback and Noyelle, is
through a new dual economy, both in terms of labor market segmentation, that is a
structural dualism, and geographically, among nations and at the intra- and
intermetropolitan level.
The recent research of Michael Storper and Susan Christopherson sheds
further light on the emerging organization of economic activity. Their analysis of
the motion picture industry depicts a situation where virtually every step of
production and nearly every person employed is on a contractual arrangement. 5
Though the motion picture industry exemplifies an extreme case, other industries
such as garment, electronics, and to some degree, auto are increasingly
subcontracting out rationalized work to firms employing the most vulverable labor.
This tendency to transfer risks to the most powerless segments of society was
described by Peter Marris in his book, Loss and Change, in which he notes that the
trend prevades all aspects of society, not merely the workplace. 6
These observations regarding the new dualism, the contracted society, and
the transference of societal risks adds another dimension to the research on the
automobile industry and its use of undocumented workers as transitional labor
presented here. The points that surfaced through the research can be viewed as
pertaining to: (1) the transformation of the automobile industry; (2) the structure
of labor markets and employment; and (3) the spatial implications of the changing
organization of work. These subjects will be addressed in the order listed above.
The automobile industry illustrates several significant trends. Industrial
restructuring among the parts producers often involved a strategy for survival that
included the employment of undocumented workers. This was a short-term solution
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until they could later mechanize, move to foreign sites, or take other measures to
make themselves competitive. In the process, a circuit was being established,
particularly with Mexico, but also with other developing nations, and the U.S.
during this period. As undocumented Mexican workers were being absorbed into
good paying and often unionized jobs in basic manufacturing in the U.S., U.S.
manufacturers were, in turn, moving production to Mexico, and when possible,
automating as well. 7 Some have called this the importation of labor and export of
capital.
The long term tendency for capital to move coupled with automation has
generated considerable debate over future directions in the U.S. Of concern here
is whether capital mobility from the U.S. to Mexico will continue to be
accompanied by automation, or whether producers will tend to reconcentrate in the
U.S., adopt a method employed by the Japanese of using inventories "just in time"
(kanban), and automate in the process. Moving to Mexico requires extensive
capital outlay and trust in the stability of the government. Yet, many firms from
the most sophisticated (i.e., assemblies, and producers of engines) to those that
make relatively peripheral products (i.e., headers) are beginning to automate and
move, with an eye towards selling in the U.S. market. Among the parts producers,
the competitors left behind must also automate, or engage in other cost cutting
practices, such as operating as sweatshops. As a result, parts producers are
beginning to adopt characteristics of both the corporate giants on the one hand,
and sweatshops on the other. This unusual industrial pattern is actually in keeping
with the general trends just identified, that is, with extreme contractual
arrangements dependent on transferring work to the most vulnerable workers. It is
a situation created by capital but made possible by the availability of
undocumented labor.
182
The research also demonstrated some important points with respect to labor
market and employment trends. It was repeatedly illustrated that the functions
performed by undocumented and immigrant workers are more complex than simply
filling the lowest jobs. The contention here is that they fill three types of
positions: those that facilitate changes in production technology, especially among
declining industries; those that support the qualitatively new employment base
surfacing at the urban centers; and those that have traditionally reinforced
peripheralized immigrant industries. These distinctions are important because they
imply different short-term and long-run effects on urban labor markets, and among
the various sectors.
Viewed in broad terms the aggregate effect of the employment of
undocumented workers, coupled with the direction already assumed by the
economy, is a downward pressure on working class wages, and a breakdown of
working class consumption. Caught in a difficult spiral, workers have been taking
lower paying jobs only to be able to buy less which means producers confront a
shrinking market that leads them to reduce costs of production, such as through the
wage bill. The undocumented transitional workers are only one piece in this
scenario, but they embody all of the significant elements needed by employers till
market pressures force them to take more permanent solutions, such as engaging in
overseas produciton, automating or taking the direction of sweatshops.
This, in turn, leads to the third point. The spatial arrangement of economic
activities is one that reflects the locational choices and mobility of capital, the
structure of labor markets, institutional constraints, and the limitations of the
build environment. Looking selectively at the significance of the employment
structure, the major centers of economic activity in the U.S. have been
distinguished by Stanback, Noyelle and others by the growing numbers of low-wage
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jobs. These jobs, by definition, are generally unstable and lead to low job
attachment. This implies that the characteristics associated with immigrants and
undocumented workers will have to be assumed by a broader population if they are
to be employed. Ultimately, this could also lead to a more mobile laborforce, in
essence a counterpart to the concept of capital mobility. Thus, the spatial "fix" of
economic activities may become more fluid in the future.
These observations regarding industrial, labor market, and urban spatial
trends suggest guidelines for analyzing public policy. To illustrate their
significance, three public policy issues will be touched on briefly in light of the
previous discussion. The focus will be on industrial, immigration, and urban policy,
respectively. Each of these policies are intended to rectify employment disparities
that have persisted despite signs of economic recovery.
Industrial Policy: National Solutions, Local Realities
During the 1980's, after production in entire industries, such as rubber, steel,
and electrial appliances, was nearly gone from the U.S., and auto, among others,
was seriously challenged by foreign competition, talk of the need for a concerted
industrial policy re-emerged, reminiscent of the issues raised during the post-
Depression reconstruction era. Industrial policy refers to stated or implied
national efforts to stimulate economic growth by favoring some forms of business
activity over others. Faced with a significant loss of productive capacity, many
felt it was necessary to assess the economic trajectory we were headed on. For
some, the call for strengthening the U.S. industrial base translated into a need for
national planning, while others argued for greater state and local control. 8 Seen
sectorally, ideological positions also centered around favoring growth sectors
versus assisting industries in decline.9 Inevitably, arguments also surfaced on both
sides of the underlying trade issue: pursuing protectionist policies; or supporting a
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further breakdown of trade barriers. Here, the focus will be on the implications of
the "domestic content" bill, one element of an industrial policy intended to insulate
U.S. manufacturers and workers from foreign competition.
"Domestic content" is the name given to legislation requiring a certain
percentage of a good to be made by the workers in the country where the product
is either produced or consumed. Many industrializing nations which are more a site
of production than for final consumption will include stipulations regarding the
amount of locally produced intermediate products that must go into the final good.
In the U.S., the issue has been one of employment. Workers are beginning to
demand that products sold in the U.S. demonstrate a commitment to keeping them
employed. The proposed Fair Practices in Automobile Products Act of 1983 (HR
1234 and S707) illustrates how this would work.
The domestic content bill applies to all (U.S. and foreign) auto manufacturers
selling more than 100,000 vehicles annually in the U.S. It sets a ratio of U.S.
materials and labor on the components a company would have to use based on the
number of vehicles sold over a four year period. At the end of four years, a
company selling 100,000 cars would have to include 25 percent U.S. made parts,
while a company with sales of over 500,00 would be comprised of 90 percent local
content. The UAW and the AFL-CIO have argued that because auto was a highly
linked industry in the U.S., this bill would effectively create a "ripple effect"
throughout the economy. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of
the Committee on Ways and Means, UAW President Douglas A. Fraser noted that in
1981, "the auto industry employed well over 700,00 auto workers and 1,650,000,
supplier workers, for a total of 2.35 million jobs." 10 During that period, U.S. auto
makers sold approximately three-quarters of the value of new cars and trucks sold
in this country. Consequently, Fraser projected that: "In the absence of the local
185
content law, by the end of the decade U.S. automotive production as a share of the
market can be expected to fall to about one-half of U.S. auto sales. A fall in U.S.
production from three-quarters to one-half of the auto market would eliminate jobs
of more than 200,000 auto workers--and 5.5 times that many outside the auto
industry." II
However, the domestic content bill faces stiff resistence from the auto
industry. In a study generated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
"Future of the Automobile Program," it was reported: "The high cost of
transporting assembled vehicles helps to explain the predominance of the developed
countries in the production of automobiles. The developed countries that produced
81% of the world's vehicles in 1980 also consumed about 74% of those vehicles. Or
looked at another way, in 1978 only about 16% of the motor vehicles sold in the
world were exported beyond their region of manufacture."1 2 Foreign producers
wanting access to this market have opened assembly plants in the U.S., while U.S.
producers selectively out-sourced, taking into account labor and material costs,
transportation, foreign exchange rates, and local content policies. Foreign local
content laws have been particularly important especially where countries have
adopted policies of allowing a higher level of imports in return for increased
exports, often sweetened by tariff reductions.1 3 By outsourcing more, they have
been granted a larger share of these markets, and in the process, manufacture low
cost parts. These parts have been allocated for production selectively around the
globe: "For bulkier parts the nearest low wage country--Mexico--is favored. For
more compact ones, the lowest wage locale--Korea--has the advantage."' 4 By out-
sourcing, U.S. manufacturers have been able to lower their labor costs, despite
restrictions set by other countries, so they have stronger opposed enactment of any
such legislation in the U.S.
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Nevertheless, on the supposition a domestic content bill were enacted in the
U.S., it is reasonable to assume that automation would increase in order to reduce
labor costs, especially among the assemblers and parts producers that are
subsidiaries of the auto makers, or that are unionized. Firms that remained labor
intensive would find low-cost labor invaluable, consequently, sub-contracting to
companies employing immigrant and undocumented workers could become even
more prominent as a way to minimize production costs. The result would be
perverse dichotomy spatially, with auto makers trying to consolidate operations in
the U.S., and parts producers moving to immigrant sites (assuming labor is a
sufficient cost to warrant the pull). Another split would occur within the industry;
on the one hand, the trend toward automation would be accelerated, while on the
other hand, would be shift towards immigrant labor (and perhaps sweatshops). In
this situation, the immigrant worker could develop a more significant role in
society first as transitional and later as highly exploited labor.
Immigration Legislation: Regulating the Supply of Labor
While one approach to stabilizing employment in the U.S. is to alter the
conditions affecting the demand for labor (such as through a domestic content bill),
another is to regulate the supply. This is one outcome of immigration legislation.
Immigration policy reform has engendered a hotly contest debate that exends back
to 1972. For over a decade, five interagency taskforces and one Congressional
Commission, spanning the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, have
investigated the issues. The proposed Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983
(HR 1510 and S 529), commonly known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, captures the
main points. The findings on undocumented workers generated by the research are
particularly insightful here.
187
To briefly summarize the main points of Simpson-Mazzoli, if enacted, it
would:
(1) Impose fines on employers and entities hiring, recruiting or referring for
employment persons not authorized to work in the United States by
Immigration and Naturalization Service...;
(2) Require the President, within three years of enactment of the law, to
develop a "secure" system to determine workers' eligibility to be
employed in the United States;
(3) Restructure the categories of immigrants who may lawfully enter the
United States by establishing an overall annual immigration ceiling of
425,000. This system would include a new "independent" group of
immigrants having access to 75,00 visas annually, and would abolish the
ability of siblings of United States citizens to immigrant on the basis of
their family relationships;
(4) Streamline the process of United States agricultural employers to obtain
permission to import temporary foreign labor;
(5) Regularize the status of many undocumented immigrants by granting
them either lawful permanent resident status or "temporary resident
status" depending on the length of their residence in the United States;
and
(6) Eliminate various procedural protections available to immigrants and
refugees in INS administrative proceedings. 1 5
The key features to employment pertain to: (a) employer sanctions; (b) a
national identity card as the basis for employment; (c) the regularization of
undocumented immigrants; and (d) the temporary worker program. The first item
applies to all U.S. employers, the second to all U.S. workers, the third to
undocumented workers wanting to remain in the U.S., and the fourth is sector
specific and is intended only for agriculture. Here the discussion centers on the
joint effect of the changing employment base and the role of undocumented
workers in determining policy outcomes.
Employer sanctions refers to fines on employers of undocumented workers,
and labor unions or other groups that recruit or assist in the employment of these
workers. On the surface, this provision appears to have reasonable intentions: the
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imposition of civil and criminal penalties on legal abusers. Twelve states and one
city, including the state of California, have adopted employers sanctions laws, as
have Canada, France, and Germany. 1 6 In all of these locations, this law has never
been credited as an effective deterrent in illegal hirings. Reasons cited are that it
is difficult to enforce, it has not been a high priority, or in the case of California,
the "courts consistently reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of the law on the
grounds that it constituted a violation of the federal preemption of immigration
law and that it was ambiguous."1 7 If it has been ineffective, why is it retained in
national legislation? Kitty Calavita provides this analysis:
On the one hand, undocumented workers are used ideologically as scapegoats;
on the other, their labor is used as a critical component in America's
increasingly troubled industries. The outcome is likely to be a symbolic law
which, for the moment, "resolves" this dilemma, but which in fact solves
nothing. The legislation is likely to be symbolic in two senses: it will serve
as a symbolic validation of the immigrant-as-enemy myth; and it will remain
a symbolic gesture, addressing political needs, but not altering at all the
underlying economic reality. 18
If national employer sanctions do eventually become enacted and are actively
enforced, employers should respond in ways that reflect an assessment of their
alternatives. For example, with undocumented workers driven further underground
creating an extremely cheap labor pool, immigrant dependent industries based on
subcontracting to sweatshops and homeworkers could proliferate. Aiternatively,
other immigrant dependent firms could accelerate the trend towards
internationalization and mechanization. A combination of both of these paths, that
is, the employment of immigrants coupled with mechanization, has already
surfaced, as evidenced through this research and that of hotels and fast food
businesses in New York.19 Lastly, a commonly held fear among immigration
analysts is that urban employers could successfully make a case that they, too,
need temporary foreign workers (guestworkers) if they are to remain in the U.S., a
speculation based on the experience in agriculture.
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Enforcement of employer sanctions would depend heavily on the
establishment of a tamper-proof worker identity card. This proposal has been
interpreted as an erosion of the civil rights of the entire U.S. laborforce
(approximately 112 million persons), in order to prohibit less than 3 to 6 million
people from entering the workforce. Civil libertarians and minority rights
organizations argue this would infringe on rights to privacy, and could affect other
rights, including the rights of assembly, speech, and association. 2 0 "As concluded
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, the great potential for
infringement of privacy rights and the impact that this could have on the
infringement of other rights strongly suggests that the national identity card
proposal, if adopted, will merely exchange one problem for a different and more
serious problem." 2 1 The effect of this provision would be greater control over
labor in general, a valuable trade-off in the name of job creation. The irony of the
situation is that many of the jobs working class people expect to gain in return for
their loss of civil rights may be lost in the industrial transformation. On the other
hand, firms that remain immigrant dependent could argue successfully for either
enactment of a guestworker program or for urban enterprise zones, neither of
which results in employment that meets the expectations of newly unemployed
blue-collar workers.
Regularization of undocumented workers, sometimes termed "amnesty,"
would create two sub-categories of citizens: (1) those who entered prior to
January 1, 1977, have resided in the U.S. continuously since that date, and qualify
for a lawful immigrant status, and (2) those who entered between January 1, 1977
and January 1, 1980, and qualify for a "temporary residence" status. 2 2
Documentation required to support a person's eligibility for legalized status is
argued to be more stringent than most undocumented people could meet, and would
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inhibit them from stepping forward. Furthermore, during their period of residency,
they would pay taxes, but would not have access to welfare, food stamps, federally
assisted housing, and unemployment insurance. The result would be a second class
citizen which in their desperate situation could easily be channelled into the latent
and stagnant reserve labor force.
Lastly, the special temporary worker program for agriculture, though sector
specific, has raised a considerable amount of concern. This proposal would
"streamline" the existing H-2 Program; institute a Transitional Agriculture
Program (TAP) which allocates visas to alien farmworkers in the first year to be
phased out over three years and provide easier access to foreign workers. The
following analysis summarizes the problems with this section:
Several studies indicate that the employment of temporary foreign workers in
agriculture adversely affects wages and working conditions. The Department
of Labor has concluded that use of temporary labor in agriculture tends to
lower prevailing wage rates. A comprehensive agriculture prevailing wage
survey conducted by the New York Department of Labor illustrates the
harmful impact on wages and working conditions experienced as a result of
the employment of these workers. This survey compared wage rates in areas
where employers used temporary foreign workers and areas where domestic
workers were used. Wages were consistently depressed in areas where
employers relied upon temporary foreign labor. As recognized by the
Department of Labor, employers can make temporary workers work for lower
wages and under depressed working conditions because they fear
repatriation. 2 3
Though temporary workers have been discussed only with respect to
agriculture, it is conceivable that a similar argument could be made for the
creation of an urban guestworker program. The potential beneficiaries,
transitional and marginal employers of undocumented workers, would gain time to
improve on their production technology. As ex-emplified by the agricultural
employers of Braceros, these workers would provide firms with a temporary latent
reserve capacity.
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The overall effect of Simpson-Mazzoli on the working class would be an
erosion of civil rights, institutionalization of sub-classes of workers, and an
acceleration of trends toward marginalization, internationalization, or
mechanization among the immigrant dependent industries. If this bill presents such
a threat to working class interests, why has it been so popular and likely to be
reintroduced? For one, the employment issues are complex and easily reduced to a
matter of the quantity of jobs. Though employment issues are usually not isolated
(social welfare concerns and a sense of degradation of the quality of life are
integral to the broader justification), they generate mass appeal. This has been
legitimized by the position of organized labor which opposes the temporary worker
program, but supports the other elements. 2 4  Organized labor correctly
understands that their strength has dissipated coincident with the utilization of
immigrant labor. The fallacy is adoption of the prevailing notion that the situation
can be corrected by institutional means. This deflects from the structural causes
of labor displacement and unemployment which Simpson-Mazzoli does not address,
and which have the potential of over-whelming the new institutions once they are
put into effect.
Secondly, the public has been made to feel that issues of national sovereignty
are at stake. Words like "invasion" are used to describe the influx of immigrants.
As INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson has stated, "we are still far from controlling
our borders," so the logical extension is that we have lost control of the border. 2 5
Taking that a step further, this "loss" is seen as undermining our social fabric. In
the words of Senator Simpson:
If immigration is continued at a high level, but a substantial portion of these
new persons and their descendants do not integrate fully into the society, they
may well create in America some of the social, political, and economic
problems which exist in the countries from which they have chosen to depart.
Furthermore, if language and cultural separatism rise above a certain level,
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the unity and political stability of the Nation will--in time--be seriously
eroded. Pluralism within a united American nation has been our greatest
strength. That unity comes from a common language and a core public culture
of certain shared values, beliefs, customs, which make us distinctly
"Americans."26
The concept of what is "American," whether that is jobs, our culture, or national
stature underlies support of the bill. Here the observations of Alejandro Portes are
instructive. He writes:
In its official commentary on the Immigration Reform Bill, the Justice
Department echoes a sentiment repeated many times in recent months: "We
must regain control of our borders," declares the document, implying that
they have somehow been lost to foreign forces. In fact, if control has been
relinquished at all, it has been to a segment of America's own employers.
The fact that the present immigration confrontation has occurred between
the state and a sector of the dominant class explains why those at the
forefront of the reform movement are not the trade unions or the
organizations of the ethnic minorities...the interest of the state in this issue
has grown not so much because unauthorized immigrants are coming and are
being employed as because the entire process has become so visible. The
generalized perception that the government has "lost control of the borders"
seriously undermines its legitimacy and hence its ability to enforce other
rules domestically and negotiate with governments abroad. Had the flow
remained a low-key affair, as in previous decades, the state would surely
have remained willing to accommodate the interests of influential locals in
the Southwest. Hence, the oft-declared need to "do something" about
clandestine immigration will lead, ultimately, not to a serious attempt to
stop the flow, but to restoring the image of state control in this area. The
real gap which separates proponents of immigration reform in Washington
from events in the rest of the country lies in their belief that once the law
has passed, social and economic reality will adjust to the legal writ. 2 7
Thus, the need to relegitimize the state in the aftermath of a period of crisis is the
fundamental purpose of the legislation. That it could ultimately weaken the
position of working class people is further exacerbated by proposed urban
legislation, specifically, urban enterprise zones.
Urban Enterprise Zones: Spatial Concentration of Underemployment
In contrast to legislation specifically aimed at changing the supply or demand
of labor, another approach is to redefine the spatial context in which economic
activity takes place. This is essentially the effect of the urban enterprise zone
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concept. Historically, the first enterprise zone legislation was adopted in England
in 1980, modeled after the free-trade zones in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.
The idea was to attract businesses into underutilized or non-productive areas
through preferential tax treatment and relaxation of public regulations. This idea
caught on quickly in the U.S. among advocates of a "free enterprise" economy
operating with the minimum of constraints as a means to stimulate distressed
communities. Subsequently, an urban enterprise zone program was announced as
the priority item by President Reagan in his State of the Union address of 1982.
At the national level, the most evolved proposal was introduced in 1981
(S2298 and HR 7563). As the legislation was shaping up, it was taking on the
following attributes: (1) the Department of Housing and Urban Development would
select 25 zones annually for three years (resulting in 75 zones); (2) selection would
be based on state and local efforts to reduce regulations in the zones, increased
local services, the inclusion of private organizations in the delivery of services, and
the creation of neighborhood development associations; (3) specific criteria for
eligibility include the minimum Urban Development Action Grant distress criteria
plus one of the following: an annual average unemployment rate of at least 1.5 the
national average; a poverty rate of 20 percent or more; at least 70 percent of the
population must have had incomes below 80 percent of the population of the
surrounding community; or the zones must have experienced a population decline of
at least 20 percent between 1970 and 1980; (4) federal tax provisions would include:
investment tax credit; nonrefundable wage credits; elimination of capital gains
taxes on the sale of zone property; and the provision of a maximum 15-year loss
carryforward; (5) federal regulatory relief would apply to all federal rules except
those affecting public health, the environment, occupational health and safety,
civil rights, and the minimum wage (as well as others mandated by law), however
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the Labor Department would be given discretionary authority to relax or eliminate
application of minimum wage legislation to teenagers; (6) the zones would be
designated such that one third would be located in rural areas; (7) they would range
between one and five square miles in size; and (8) lastly, the federal phase out
period would consist of a 25 percent annual decrease in assistance starting from
the initial period (ie lasting for four years), though state and local commitments
are expected to last for 20 years with a four year final phase-out (shorter program
periods are conceivable). 2 8
The most important aspect of this potential legislation is that it begins to
adopt employment standards designed for export processing zones. Incentives to
capital to locate in the zones could most probably lead to a lowering of the
minimum wage paid to youths, to an erosion of work place standards, and to
essentially a "capturing" of a second-class workforce. The parallel to the Third
World experience is obvious. Employment within the zones would begin to
approximate the situations confronted by the transitional workers discussed in this
research. The difference is that work place relations among the transitional
workers were, to some extent negotiable. Within the zones, they would be more
highly regulated. This would essentially create a situation where U.S. citizens
were forced to take on some of the attributes of the undocumented workforce.
Overview
Each of the proposed pieces of legislation discussed illustrates the unsettled
nature of the economy created by the hypermobility of capital and labor. To some
extent, these proposed bills represent policies that attempt to put brakes on rapidly
moving economic trends without addressing the underlying structural causes.
Consequently, they either force non-immigrant segments of labor to become like
the immigrant workforce (since immigrants perform specific functions to perform),
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or they accelerate the trends by capital towards greater mobility, automation, and
the like. Like the parable about the three blind persons who touch a different part
of an elephant each and proceed to describe the entire animal in terms of the piece
being held, the legislation discussed take discrete parts of the economy as if they
are unconnected and construct frameworks for policy intervention. At the
minimum, some method of setting and analyzing policies at the naitonal level
should be developed (a national planning board?). This would result in an
institutional response to the loss of political will created by the internationalized
economic order. But the critical step is in recognizing that marginalization of the
working class is a growing and permanent factor in the "development" of advanced
post-industrial societies; that this situation is not created by the immigrant
workforce; and that the situation is one of international interdependence rooted in
the hypermobility of capital and labor.
In sum, the workers studied in this research were seen as transitional as if to
imply impermanence. However, if employment instability; an increase in working
class absorption of the costs of social reproduction; and a lack of accountability by
capital to communities characterize the up-and-coming situation, then
impermanence is a spreading way of life. The social, economic, and political
implications are enormous, and beyond the scope of this discussion. However, they
bring to our attention the extent to which work place relations and the labor
process have moved out of the shop floor and must be seen in terms of the total
construction of society.
Observations on the Research
From the beginning to it's completion, this research unfolded in ways that
were unanticipated. Though the initial research questions were retained
throughout, insights emerged that could not be fully addressed by the study. One
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was the importance of sub-contracting among firms employing immigrants.
Whether in garment, electronics, auto, or the emerging services, it is apparent that
immigrant (and undocumented) workers, parallel to the export processing zone
workforce, are highly coincident with a trend to subcontract out rationalized work
to firms employing the most vulnerable labor. This tendency to transfer risks to
the most powerless segments of society was described by Peter Marris, as noted
earlier. The availability of immigrants for production is one element that
currently contributed to the character of industrial organization in a way that
supports Marris' analysis.
Secondly, the incidence of race and citizenship with respect to employment
posed more questions than could be answered. Future comparative research on
race and immigrant status, especially under the new economic order (and urban
hierarchy) would shed light on this issue. For example, the experiences of Black
Caribbean workers, Asian refugees, and others compared to their citizen
counterparts and to the Latino undocumented workers would clarify how race
factors into the absorption of immigrant labor.
In addition, theories on the organization of economic activities in space
should begin to address the way in which proximity to international borders
presents locational advantages. As in the concept of"sunbelt" and "snowbelt"
regions, a distinct "borderbelt" phenomenon may warrant further investigation.
Lastly, future research will need to concern itself with the outcome of
transitional labor on U.S. society. Like guestworkers, after their purpose has been
met, will they still remain in the U.S.? Will they then be upwardly mobile, locked
into the bottom of the bifurcated structure of employment opportunities, or
become part of a growing mass of mobile workers that enter in and out of
international settings?
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These questions, stimulated by the research, arose out of recognition that
some immigrants serve in a transitional capacity. The main purpose of the study
was to underscore that immigrant and undocumented labor have specific roles best
understood by analyzing the nature of demand for labor. The concept of
transitional labor is itself transitory and most applicable to the recent period of
massive labor and capital migration. Phases of rapid industrial transformation are
particularly significant times for the employment of immigrant labor. During
expansionary periods, the legal immigrants are absorbed into the economy, but
during decline, they become redundant. In this way, undocumented workers are
ideal. Lacking legal protection, they unwittingly benefit employers seeking union
and wage erosion. Ironically, they may actually be preferable to legalized
guestworkers from the point of view of assiting the transition, if guestworkers
temper the momentum toward automation. From this perspective, the market
found an alternate solution to guestworkers. Though the economy appears to have
weathered the worst of the downturn, the transformation is still working its way
out. Some sectors may see many industries devolve into sweatships, in which case,
the demand for undocumented workers will continue, while others may complete
the trend towards capital mobility and automation. As the latter occurs, the
demand for undocumented workers should decline. In the process, U.S. workers are
coming to expect lower wages and benefits, thereby lessening the attractivity of an
"illegal" laborforce. Consequently, in time, the transitional role of undocumented
workers will be completed, and in its place will be a new labor demand associated
with a restructured employment base.
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APPENDIX I
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Design
In contrast to most immigration studies that use the individual as the unit of
analysis, this research is a study of firms, primarily in the auto industry and in the
greater Los Angeles region that were, at the time of investigation, themselves
employers of undocumentd workers, or faced competitors who employed
undocumented workers. At the broadest level, the study addresses the historical
transformation of labor and the role of immigrant labor and the role of immigrant
labor relative to structural changes in the industrial base of the U.S. Within this
context, developments in the structure of the auto industry nationwide and the
evolution of the auto industry regionally, given Los Angeles product and labor
markets, further situate the study. The most specific observations are at the shop
floor level and consist of comparative analyses of competitor firms within certain
product lines, some of whom employ undocumented workers, while others do not.
These three levels of discussion (nationwide and in the context of the entire
economy; regional and with an industry focus; and at the shop floor, among firms)
are necessary in order to make the appropriate connections between firms'
behaviour on one hand, and national policy on the other.
The firm specific case studies provided the basis for the broader analysis and
theoretical discussion. The case studies were completed in four steps: (1)
identification of the firms; (2) identification and surveying of the workers; (3)
confirmation of the data; and (4) data analysis. Each of these steps will be
discussed in detail. The method used to develop the data base was derived from
techniques that have been applied in oral history, industrial anthropology, and labor
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sociology. Informed persons explained the evolution of market conditions in Los
Angeles, and identified firms and key individuals within the firms who could
describe the labor process explicitly. These key informants were interviewed, and
their information was then confirmed with other available material and analyzed.
There were two reasons for the seemingly indirect route for learning about firms.
First, it was felt that employers would probably not provide the information
desired as much of it focused on highly sensitive internal labor relations. Secondly,
after initial discussions with workers in several firms, it was felt that, in most
cases, there were certain individuals who were very knowledgable and could give
fairly accurate information about the relations of production. Consequently, this
data was developed from workers' observations.
The purpose of the interviews was to obtain enough quantitative and
qualitative information to test hypotheses about firm behaviour. Given that the
workers central to the study were, by definition, clandestine and unapprehended,
and that market conditions firms encountered were changing rapidly in response to
the crisis in the economy, further shaped the interpretability of the data. The
information gained in the study was used as verification of certain tendencies that
lead one to support or suspect the logic or assumptions behind the hypotheses.
The first set of hypotheses concern observable conditions that should appear
if primarily supply factors are shaping labor markets. Using the North and
Houstoun heuristic model as the conceptual framework, it is possible to develop a
four stage or category model of worker and firm (industry) behaviour. 1  Each
category reflects both an increasingly larger supply of undocumented workers, and
a progressively greater amount of risk that an employer is willing to assume. The
risk results because the workers are illegal and subject to deportation, thereby
bringing instability to the workplace. With a larger supply of workers, it is
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hypothesized that wage rates would drop and labor turnover would be greater.
Furthermore, each stage of the model is thought to correspond with different tacit
advantages undocumented workers bring to the employer. The model can be
thought of schematiclaly in the following way:
A Conceptual Model of Worker and Firm(/Industry) Behavior
Undocumented
Workers at the
Workplace*
negligible
few
many
majority
Wage Rates
unchanged
average wage
at low end
substandard
below minimum
Tacit Advantage
to Employers
none
control over labor
flexible lay off,
substitute for
other labor
same as above
plus possible
violation of labor
standards
extreme case of
the above
manifested in
sweatshops
*This is a categorical variable.
The method for testing the hypotheses was to compare the percent of
undocumented workers at the workplace, the wage rate effect, and the tacit
funciton performed by the worker. Determination of the function or advantage
associated with the workers were derived from worker interviews and other source
data, such as from unions or the State of California. It was important that the
firms studied not be considered secondary labor market dependent in order to test
this model, otherwise it would have been impossible to distinguish between supply
Category
1
2
3
4
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created effects and secondary labor market conditions (e.g., low wages, high
turnover).
A second hypothesis was developed in lieu of accepting or rejecting a null
hypothesis to the above. That is, instead of simply accepting or rejecting supply
arguments on the basis of the findings previously described, the intention was to
also find specific conditions related to the demand of undocumented workers. In
this case, it was necessary to see whether the employment for undocumented
workers was a strategy for survival by firms in light of their product demand,
production technology, and availability of capital relative to the product and labor
markets for each firm. Whereas the first set of hyptotheses could be tested on
cross-sectional data, this hypothesis requires times-series information that
specifies how firms actually behave over time. If the employment of
undocumented workers seemed to explain a point of transition in a firm's long-run
behaviour (e.g., until a firm eventually mechanized, moved, or changed the product
line), then demand factors were thought to largely influence market forces.
A firm's long-run demand for labor can be understood by examining product
market positions. Like labor markets, product markets are also segmented, but in
this case it refers to the differentiation among firms that have a substantial
amount of control over products (also known as core firms), as opposed to those
which are more competitive (or peripheral firms).
Product demand can be thought of as composed of relatively stable and less
stable components. The stable part is the base demand while the unstable portion
tends to exhibit more cyclical and seasonal fluctuations. Park of the work force is
applied toward the stable product demand, while part is attached to the unstable
demand and is the basis for eocnomic adjustments. Firms sustaining a long term
drop in product demand, or chronic fluctuaitons, are better off if they can blur the
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distinction between stable and unstable labor. They would want to retain a
commitment to the firm a more stable labor force would exhibit. Yet they would
also want to be able to treat these workers as part of the less stable labor force by
holding down or cutting back wages, or reducing the numbers or hours of
employment among these workers, if they had to due to difficult demand
conditions.
For most firms, discharging labor is costly, and reducing the wage rate is
difficult. Lay-of fs usually must comply with an accepted means of due process and
understood preference systems, such as on the basis of seniority. Wage rate
reduction may result in worker resistance, whether or not the labor force is
unionized. An employer gains more control over these particular labor costs with
an undocumented labor force, although this is not the only recourse for employers.
For example, they could also force union concessions, or move to low cost labor
areas. In the long run, these firms would have to adapt to a problemmatic product
market by: moving out of that product line altogether; finding more permanent
means to reduce production costs, such as through mechanization; or changing its
positions in the product market through mergers with competitor firms (these being
only a few of their alternatives). Consequently, the employment of undocumented
workers may be seen as a short-run solution, and one in which the ultimate
resolution may display a very different demand for labor than might have been
apparent during the period of transition. It was anticipated that this type of
defensive strategy would be most evident among peripheral firms. In order to test
this concept, it was important to analyze firms in core and periphery product
market positions, and facing a depressed product demand. The objective was to
understand, through case studies, the short- and long-term role played by
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undocumented workers for these firms. As previously mentioned, the case studies
were undertaken in four steps. These steps will be explained in order.
(1) Identification of the firms: Two decisions were made prior to choosing
the firms. The first was to limit the study area to Los Angeles County, and the
second was to focus on Mexican and other Spanish-speaking undocumented persons.
Both of these decisions were made in response to exisitng opportunities. Los
Angeles is important because it has become a major point of entry for Latin, Asian,
and other immigrants and refugees. It also has a well-developed industrial base,
which made it possible to study the employment of undocumented persons in heavy
manufacturing. To have added other locations would have meant that regional
variables could not be held constant, and would have shifted the research from one
of a mirco-level plant study to one of regional variation.
The second decision was to focus on Mexican and other Spanish-speaking
persons. This was decided largely due to the author's cultural background
(Mexican) and ability to communicate in Spanish. Establishing credibility in the
Latino community and among the workers was fundamental for carrying out the
research.
Given the location and segment of the labor market to be studied, the next
decision centered on the industries to be researched. This was largely conditioned
by three factors: product market characteristics; applicability to other sectors;
and the extent of cooperation that allowed entry into the work force. As
previously noted, if product demand in an industry is unstable, it translates into an
unstable demand for labor. When firms are especially sensitive to cyclical
fluctuations or variations in economic activity, they require a highly variable cost
structure for which undocumented labor represents a potential escape valve.
Similarly, if a firm with a price or income elastic demand for its product faces
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either a rapid decline in product demand, or if product costs are rapdily increasing,
employers may substitute low cost undocumented labor for other labor as a short
run solution, given that production technology is essentially fixed. The auto
industry was particularly good for studying both situations. Demand for this
industry's product is highly dependent upon major customers' (consumers and
assemblies) willingness to invest in capital goods. The health of the economy and
the durability of capital both contributed to an exaggerated bunching of orders.
The result is a pattern of cyclical demand typified by severe fluctuations in
amplitude. Coupled with the recession and rising foreign competition, the auto
industry has had to cope with a sustained low volume of sales.
A second reason for working with auto is that this is a highly linked industry.
The health of this industry affects many other sectors. Consequently, how firms in
the auto industry behave is probably illustrative of strategies firms in other
consumer durable product lines facing similar problems would also be inclined to
take.
Lastly, but equally important, it was possible ot learn about firms only if
cooperation by workers could be obtained. Initially, time was spent in the field
talking to union representatives, academicians, low enforcement personnel, and
others to obtain an understanding of the industries in which unapprehended
undocumented workers could be found. It was particularly necessary to obtain
union cooperation because union officials identified the specific firms they thought
employed undocumented persons, as well as the names of knowledgable persons
(key informants) who could provide detailed information on the firm. Non-
unionized plants were usually ones in which a union had waged an unsuccessful
campaign, or had been decertified, so a certain amount of union data could be used
to corroborate the workers' information. The unions that proved to be most
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cooperative were those organizing in the automobile industry, although other
unions were helpful and provided entree into non-auto related firms. 2 These latter
studies were used for comparative purposes. In order to assure anonymity, names
of the union locals, firms, and individuals are withheld.
Twenty-one firms were analyzed in the study. The firms were organized into
the following categories: (A) assemblies, (B) wheels, (C) headers (an optional
modified exhaust manifold attached to a car for the purpose of improving
performance), (D) batteries, (E) auto related, and (F) non-auto related (a broad
category that included a range of firms from manufacturers of nails to military
equipment). The assemblies represented "core" firms that dominated product
market conditions. Wheels and batteries are original equipment sub-contractors,
while batteries and headers are after-market items. The auto-related and non-auto
categories provided supplemental material on each product market position:
assemblies, original equipment sub-contractors, and after-market producers.
(2) Identification and surveying of the workers: The study of unapprehended
undocumented persons, at the workplace, is much different and much harder than a
study of apprehended persons. It is possible to obtain samples of an unapprehended
undocumented population if the data base consists of return migrants in their home
country, or immigrants who have since legalized in the U.S. However, both of
these approaches makes analysis of specific industries particularly difficult.
Wayne Cornelius discussed this problem at length and noted that "...a clandestine
population cannot be sampled through any strict randomization procedure, and the
total number of cases which can be observed or interviewed is likely to be
substantially smaller than in the conventional sample survey, regardless of the
sampling procedure," and further stated "in the final analysis.. .researchers--as well
as consumers of their work--will simply have to accept something less than
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conventionally rigorous standards of population sampling, if they want to find
answers to many of the empirical questions that are at the heart of the debate over
undocumented immigration and its impact on U.S. society." 3 The problem of trying
to obtain information on an ill-defined population led to procedures used in this
study: key informants identified through union officials or other workers.
The key informants were named by union representatives or by co-workers or
acquaintances as persons who were knowledgable about their firms. These persons
were both undocumented and documented, and of various backgrounds, Latino,
Black, and Anglo. They supplied information on their workplaces through an
extensive person-to-person interview lasting 3 to 4 hours each. There were forty-
two interviews ranging from one to five interviews per firm with 2 1/2 respondents
being the average. The objective was to conduct as many interviews as necessary
in order to obtain good information about the workplaces.
As noted in Chapter 4, the majority of the data used in this research was
derived from extensive worker questionnaires. In order to determine the flow and
organization of work, including the placement of workers, the respondents were
asked to draw a lay-out of the job site and then disucss the workers they could
identify at each station. It was found that asking respondents about departments in
the abstract was confusing because work tended to be task or flow oriented.
Instead, a method of cognitive mapping was adopted from environmental
psychology where researchers seek information on the use of space. The primary
advantage was that it did not assume a prior order to the organization of work. In
addition, the respondents identified with their visual presentations, often referring
back to specific locations, or pointing to their lay-out as they discussed the place
of work.
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The questionnaire consisted of some open-ended questions, some with limited
answers, and some questions that required the participant to draw with a pencil
how work was conducted. These latter questions were particularly important for
breaking the ice and for getting at the details of workplace interaction. The
questions focused on the organization of work, workplace relations, attributes of
the workers, and the history of ownership and production at the firms (see
Appendix for a copy of the questionnaire). Occasionally information requested
could not be obtained, and most respondents could only discuss their departments
or shift. On the basis of the questionnaire and supplementary union data,
information was obtained on 2,321 persons in 21 firms. The number of key
informants for each of the firms were: (1) 2; (2) 3; (3) 5; (4) 2; (5) 2; (6) 2; (7) 1; (8)
1; (9) 2; (10) 1; (11) 2; (12) 2; (13) 2; (14) 2; (15) 3; (16) 3; (17) 1; (18) 1; (19) 1; (20) 2;
(21) 1. The total number of key informants came to 42. It should be noted that the
majority of the interviews were conducted in Spanish.
(3) Confirmation of the Data: The data on the firms was used to develop
case studies. Initially, the data was checked against other source material, the
most important being union lists of workers (these were generally available even if
a campaign had been unsuccessful or if the workers voted to decertify). Only the
most correct information was retained. Amplifying the data set were interviews
with union personnel, industrial engineers, labor economists, and numerous other
informed persons; historical material supplied by unions; and newspaper and trade
journal articles. Consequently, the case studies consist of two types of data, some
that is quantifiable, and the historical, contextual material.
(4) Analysis: The final task, data anlayis, was discussed in the case studies
and statistical overview. In brief, the data was subjected to descriptive statistics
and regression analysis. In the case studies, the firms were studied in light of their
competitive situation over time.
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Appendix I Notes
1. Adopted from David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, The Characteristics
and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study,
Linton and Company, Inc., Washington, D.C., March 1976, p. 155-156.
2. Unions that assisted in this research include locals in the United Auto
Workers (UAW), International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU),
United Electrical Workers (UE), and International Union of General Workers
(IUGW). It should be noted that most of the locals organized outside of the
industries are identified by name. Five union locals assisted in substantiating
the data, identifying the key informants, and providing other pertinent
information.
3. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Interviewing Undocumented Immigrants:
Methodological Reflections Based on Fieldwork in Mexico and the U.S."
Working Papers in U.S.-Mexican studies, Program in United States-Mexican
Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1982, p. 5 and 4 respectively.
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INDUSTRY STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
223
CONFIDENTIAL
I.D.#:
INTRODUCTION. READ EXACTLY AS WORDED TO RESPONDENT ONLY.
I'm working on a research project conducted through UCLA. We are inter-
viewing workers in Los Angeles in order to learn about their work. The
information we get from this study will be used for improving methods
of economic development planning.
Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. However, your
cooperation is very important because others have described you as know-
ledgeable about your particular employment situation.
You may be assured that your answers are strictly confidential; all
responses will be combined with those of others into statistical re-
ports. There will be no way for anyone to identify individuals who
provided the information.
INTERVIEWER ACKNOWLEDGES READING INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT.
I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE READ THE INTRODUCTION EXACTLY AS
WRITTEN.
INTERVIEWER SIGNATURE DATE
AM
PMTIME BEGINNING:
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I.D. #:
INDUSTRY STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
(FOR QUESTIONS RESPONDANT IS UNABLE
BE ABLE TO ANSWER.)
TO ANSWER, ASK WHOEVER ELSE MIGHT
In this survey, I will be asking you questions about the factory where
you work. I would first like to ask you some questions about what is
made at the factory where you work and who the factory owners are.
1. What are the main products produced at your factory?
LIST IN ORDER OF MENTION.
PRODUCT 1:
PRODUCT 2:
PRODUCT 3:
OTHERS: -
A. Which one of these is the most important?
quantity of units produced.)
(in terms of the
MOST
IMPORTANT
PRODUCT:
2. To your knowledge, have other products been made here which have
been discontinued?
YES..........ASK Q2A..............1
NO...........SKIP TO Q3...........2
DON'T KNOW.. .SKIP TO Q3..........8
IF ONLY ONE
MENTIONED..............SKIP TO Q2..............1
IF MORE THAN
ONE MENTIONED..........ASK QlA.................2
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A. What were these products? LIST IN ORDER OF MENTION.
DISCONTINUED 1:
DISCONTINUED 2:
DISCONTINUED 3:
OTHERS:
B. FOR EACH MENTION, ASK: In which year did they stop making (...)?
YEAR FOR 1:
YEAR FOR 2:
YEAR FOR 3:
OTHERS:
3. Who is the owner?
An individual,..........................1
A corporation, or.......................2
Some other type of owner................3
SPECIFY:
Don't Know..............................8
4. What year was the factory started at the present location?
YEAR STARTED:
DON'T KNOW.............................998
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5. Do the owners own any other businesses?
YES..........ASK Q5A................1
NO...........SKIP TO Q6.............2
DON'T
KNOW.........SKIP TO Q6.............8
A. Are they in the U.S.?
YES..........PROBE FOR FOLLOWING....1
NO...........ASK Q5B................2
DON'T
KNOW ......... ASK Q5B................8
Where? How many? Product(s):
B. Are there some outside the U.S.?
YES..........PROBE FOR FOLLOWING........1
NO...........SKIP TO Q6.................2
DON'T
KNOW.........SKIP TO Q6.................8
Where? How many? Product(s):
SAY: In some of the following questions, I will use the term
"resident workers" to refer to persons who have work per-
mits (green cards), or are citizens of the U.S.
IF WORKERS ARE
NIONIZED.....................ASK Q6..............1
IF NO UNION...................SKIP TO Q18.........2
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6. In what year were the workers at the factory where you work first
represented by the ...(STATE UNION)?
YEAR UNIONIZED:
7. Was there a specific incident or series of events that led the
workers to organize a union?
YES........ASK Q7A.....................1
NO.........ASK Q7B.....................2
DON't
KNOW.......ASK Q7B.....................8
A. Describe the incident or events.
B. What was the reason most workers gave for unionization?
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8. Compare the following workplace conditions before and after you
obtained a union contract:
BEFORE
WAGE
RATES
BENEFITS
PROMOTIONS
JOB
SECURITY
WORK
CONDITIONS
9. Were there other significant changes at the workplace that occurred
as a result of the union?
YES.....................................1
NO............SKIP TO Q10..............2
> SPECIFY:
AFTER
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10. Describe the workers who were leaders in establishing the union.
11. Describe the workers who voted in favor of the union.
12. Describe the workers who voted against the union.
13. What role did undocumented workers play during the organizing
campaign? RECORD VERBATIM
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14. How did the factory managers act during the following periods:
ORGANIZING
ELECTIONS
NEGOTIATIONS
15. Has the original union contract ever been renewed?
YES..........ASK Ql5A................1
NO............SKIP TO Q16.............2
DON'T
KNOW.........SKIP TO Q16.............8
A. Have there been any'significant changes in the terms?
YES..........ASK Ql5B................1
NO...........SKIP TO Q16.............2
DON'T
KNOW.........SKIP TO Q16.............8
B. Describe those changes.
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16. Have the workers at your factory ever been represented by a
different union?
YES..........ASK Q16A..............1
NO...........SKIP TO Q17...........2
DON'T
KNOW..........SKIP TO Q17...........8
A. Which union?
B. What events led to decertification of the other union?
17. What factors did the workers consider when they chose to be
represented by the ... (PRESENT UNION) as opposed to any other
union?
SKIP TO Q20
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18. Is there an active campaign to unionize workers at your factory
at the present time?
YES...........ASK Q18A.................1
NO............ASK Ql8B.................2
DON'T
KNOW..........ASK Q19..................8
A. What stage of organizing are you in? (For example, signing
cards, holding meetings...)
B. In this attempt to organize workers in your factory, what type
of reactions are there?
1. by the top management:
2. by the formen:
3. by the resident workers:
4. by the undocumented workers:
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19. Has there ever been a vote to unionize workers in your factory?
YES............ASK Q19A.................1
NO.............SKIP TO Q20..............2
DON'T
KNOW...........SKIP TO Q20..............8
A. Did the vote lead to unionization?
YES............ASK Q19B.................1
NO.............ASK Q19C.................2
B. What events led to decertification of the union?
C. What was the outcome of the vote?
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D. Describe the workers who are leaders in the organizing effort.
E. Describe the workers who are in favor of a union.
F. Describe the workers who are against the union.
G. What role have undocumented workers played during the organizing
campaign?
H. What union would the workers prefer a contract with?
Why is the (STATE UNION) preferred to other unions?
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20. Have there ever been strikes or work stopages at this factory?
YES............ASK Q20A..............1
NO.............SKIP TO Q21...........2
DON'T
KNOW...........SKIP TO Q21...........8
A. When was the last strike or stoppage?
B. What was the reason for this strike or stoppage?
ECONOMIC (WAGES, BENEFITS, ETC)......1
UNION RECOGNITION.....................2
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES...............3
WORKING CONDITIONS....................4
OTHER................................5
EXPLAIN:
ASK Q20C ONLY IF WORKERS ARE UNIONIZED
C. How was the strike called? Was it:
INITIATED BY THE WORKERS.............1
CALLED BY THE UNION..................2
WILDCAT...............................3
D. Describe the events that led to the strike or work stoppage.
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E. Were undocumented workers involved in the strike?
YES..............ASK Q20El...............1
NO...............SKIP TO Q21.............2
DON'T
KNOW.............SKIP TO Q21.............8
1. What role did undocumented workers play in the strike?
SUPPORT THE STRIKE..........ASK FOLLOWING................1
a. How did they show support?
OPPOSE THE STRIKE...........ASK FOLLOWING................2
b. How did they show opposition?
c. What were the reasons for opposition?
ACT AS STRIKEBREAKERS.......ASK FOLLOWING................3
d. Where did the strikebreakers come from?
21. In the next section, I'll be asking questions about jobs in your
factory. Before I continue, is there anything you would like to
add or do you have any opinions about the products, ownership. or
or organizing at the factory where you work?
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22. How many people total are employed at the factory where you work?
(total, i.e. production and managemnt)
EMPLOYEES:
23. How many undocumented people are employed.at your factory?
UNDOCUMENTED:
24. Here is a blank piece of paper. Sketch a layout of all the
buildings at your factory site.
IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE BUILDING, ASK THE
FOLLOWING AND WRITE THE ANSWERS ON THE BUILDINGS:
A. What type of work goes on in each building?
B. Show with arrows how the work flows from one building to
another.
25. Here is another blank sheet of paper. For the buildings you know
the best, draw a floor plan that shows what kind of work is done
where.
IDENTIFY DEPARTMENTS
26. FOR EACH PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT ASK: What type of machinery is
used here? Note comments here.
WRITE THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT ON THE FLOOR PLAN
SHOW WITH ARROWS THE PROGRESSION OR FLOW OF WORK
A. Which machines are new? INDICATE ON FLOOR PLAN. Note comments
or answer NONE here.
B. Which machines are not regularly maintained and are being
allowed to run down? INDICATE ON FLOOR PLAN. Note comments
or answer NONE here.
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27. How many work shifts are there?
SHIFTS:
IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE SHIFT, ASK:
A. How many people work per shift?
DAY SHIFT:
SWING OR NIGHT SHIFT:
GRAVEYARD:
OTHER:
B. Do you know when did multiple shifts begin?B - YES..............ASK WHEN? . .. .. .. . .. .. ..1
NO...............SKIP TO Q37C...........2
- SHIFT DATE:
C. Why is there a need for multiple shifts?
28. Let's go through this together. Beginning with the main office
and going on to the production departments, list all of the de-
partments. List which departments you can describe in detail.
Note with a checkmark.
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29. FOR EACH DEPARTMENT ON THE LIST THAT THE RESPONDANT IS FAMILIAR
WITH, ASK THE FOLLOWING AND NOTE ON THE JOB SHEETS:
A. How many people work in this department?
B. What are the job titles or job classifications of each of the
workers?
30. FOR EACH WORKER, IDENTIFY THE FOLLOWING ON THE JOB SHEETS:
A. SEX (M or F)
B. RACE ( W white, B black, L latino, A asian, 0 other)
C. AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS
D. LENGTH OF TIME ON THE JOB
E. CITIZENSHIP STATUS (R resident, G greencard, or U undocumented)
31. How do most people learn about job openings at your factory?
FOR Q31 ON, NOTE CODE BOX ON LEFT.
ASK Q; IF NOT MARKED, SKIP.
IF BOX IS MARKED WITH X,
32. What is required for a worker to get hired into the factory?
A. Is hiring different for men and women?
YES..............ASK Q31Al...............1
NO...............SKIP TO QB..............2
1. How is it different?
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B. Does it make a difference in hiring if a person is undocumented1
YES..............ASK Q32B1..........1
NO...............SKIP TO Q33........2
1. What is the difference?
33. What determines how people are promoted?
W- A. Is promotion different for men and women?
YES.............ASK Q33A1...........1
NO..............SKIP TO Q33B........2
1. How is it different?
[ljB. Does it make a difference in promotions if a person is un-
documented?
YES.............ASK Q33B2...........1
NO..............SKIP TO Q34.........2
2. What is the difference?
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IN Q34, USE "RESIDENT" ONLY IF BOTH RESIDENT AND
UNDOCUMENTED ARE AT WORKPLACE; OTHERWISE, DELETE
34. How are (resident) workers paid for:
straight time work?
CHECK ............................. 1
CASH .............................. 2
overtime work?
CHECK ............................. 1
CASH...............................2
S35. How are undocumented workers
straight time work?
paid for:
CHECK..
CASH...
......................................................1
............................ 2
D overtime work?
............................ 1
............................ 2
36. Is the rate of overtime pay
A. What is the pay rate for
the same as for straight time?
YES... GO TO INSTRUCTION..........1
NO.... ASK Q36A ..................-.2
overtime work?
OVERTIME RATE:
CHECK
CASH
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D- B. Are undocumented workers paid at the same rate for overtime
work as resident workers?
YES ............ ASK Q36B1 ........ 1
NO ............. SKIP TO Q37.......2
1. What is the difference in the rate of overtime pay?
UNDOCUMENTED OVERTIME:
37. Does the employer provide benefits?
YES ....... ASK THE FOLLOWING......1
NO ........ SKIP TO Q38 .......... 2
A. What vacation time and pay is provided?
NONE ...... SKIP TO Q37B ......... 1
VACATION:
B. What sick leave is provided?
NONE....... SKIP TO Q37C .......... 1
SICK LEAVE:
C. What health insurance is provided?
NONE........SKIP TO Q37D...........1
HEALTH INSURANCE:
D. What holiday time and pay is provided?
NONE........SKIP TO Q37E...........1
HOLIDAY:
E. What pension plan is provided:
NONE........SKIP TO Q37F...........1
PENSION:
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F. Are any other benefits provided?
YES..........ASK Q37Dl.............1
NO .......... GO TO INSTRUCTION.....2
1. What is provided?
OTHER:
m E. Do the deductions for fringe benefits from the pay of un-
documented workers differ from those of resident workers?
YES..........ASK Q37El.............1
NO...........SKIP TO Q38...........2
DON'T KNOW... SKIP TO Q38...........8
1. Describe the difference for each benefit provided
38. FOR EACH SHIFT, ASK: This is a calendar for one month. Circle
the days of the week an average production worker would have
worked.
A. Is the schedule more or less the same during other months
of the year?
YES..........SKIP TO Q39B..........1
NO .......... ASK Q39Al.............2
DON'T KNOW... SKIP TO Q39B..........8
1. Describe the work schedule during other times of the
year.
B. Indicate with star (on the calendar) those days a person
would be paid overtime.
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C. Is the work shift schedule different between resident and
undocumented workers?
YES ......... ASK Q39C1.............1
NO .......... SKIP TO Q40........... 2
DON'T KNOW... SKIP TO Q40...........8
1. Explain the difference in schedules.
39. Is there currently overtime work?
YES..........ASK Q39A..............1
NO .......... SKIP TO Q40...........2
A. Who usually works overtime?
IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE SHIFT, ASK:
B. Which shifts are working overtime?
OVERTIME SHIFTS:
C. Does the amount of overtime work differ between resident
workers and undocumented workers?
YES..........ASK Q39C1.............1
NO...........SKIP TO Q40...........2
DON'T KNOW... SKIP TO Q40...........8
1. What is the difference?
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40. Have there been lay-offs recently?
YES.............ASK Q40A.................1
NO..............SKIP TO Q41..............2
A. What was the reason for the lay-offs?
B. Which departments lost employees?
C. Which job classifications were reduced as a result of the lay-
offs?
D. What types of people were laid-off?
41. Has this factory expanded the number or workers recently?
YES.............ASK Q41A.................1
NO..............SKIP TO Q42..............2
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A. What is the reason for the increase in the workforce?
B. Which departments have been hiring lately?
C. What jobs are the new workers taking?
D. Who is getting these new jobs?
42. The next set of questions focus on the product made at the factory
where you work. Before proceeding, do you have anything to add
concerning the work schedule or the jobs?
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43. Who are the main purchasers of the product(s) made at your factory?
LIST IN ORDER OF MENTION.
PURCHASER 1:
PURCHASER 2:
PURCHASER 3:
OTHERS:
44. Is the demand for thd product(s) stable throughout the year?
YES............SKIP TO Q45..........1
NO.............ASK Q44A.............2
A. Describe how demand for the product(s) changes throughout the
year.
45. At what price does the product (do the products) sell?
PRICE PRODUCT 1:
PRICE PRODUCT 2:
PRICE PRODUCT 3:
PRICE OTHERS:
46. Have sales of the product(s) increased or declined significantly
in the recent past?
YES............ASK Q46A.............1
NO.............SKIP TO Q47..........2
DON'T
KNOW...........SKIP TO Q47..........8
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A. Was the change in sales an increase or a decrease?
INCREASE............................
DECREASE............................2
B. When did the change occur?
SALES CHANGE:
C. What was the reason for the change in sales?
47. How many competitor firms are there in the Los Angeles area?
LOCAL COMPETITORS:
ASK Q48 AND Q49 ONLY IF THE RESPONDANT IS
AWARE OF LOCAL COMPETITORS
48. Do the local competitor firms employ undocumented workers?
YES.............ASK Q48A...........1
NO..............SKIP TO Q49........2
DON'T
KNOW............SKIP TO Q49........8
A. How are undocumented workers treated by the competitors?
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49. Do you know if the factory where you work uses similar machinery
as that used by the local competitor(s)?
YES............SKIP TO Q50..........1
NO.............ASK Q49A.............2
DON'T
KNOW...........SKIP TO Q50..........8
A. Describe the difference in machinery.
50. Do you know if there are important non-local, perhaps international
competitor firms?
YES............ASK Q50A.............1
NO..........SEE INSTRUCTION.........2
DON'T
KNOW........SEE INSTRUCTION.........8
A. Where are the non-local competitor firms located? LIST IN
ORDER OF MENTION.
NON-LOCAL
COMPETITION 1:
NON-LOCAL
COMPETITION 2:
NON-LOCAL
COMPETITION 3:
IF THERE ARE NO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
AT THE FACTORY WHERE RESPONDANT WORKS,
SKIP TO Q55.
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51. Do you know when undocumented workers were first employed at your
factory?
FIRST
UNDOCUMENTED:
A. Do you know the reason for the employment of undocumented
workers at that time?
YES............ASK Q5lAl............1
NO.............SKIP TO Q52..........2
1. What was the reason?
52. Since you've been there, has the factory where you work ever been
raided by INS?
YES............ASK Q52A.............1
NO.............SKIP TO Q53..........2
A. Why did INS raid the factory?
B. Describe what occurred during the (last) raid.
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C. Was anyone apprehended?
YES............ASK Q52Cl............1
NO.............SKIP TO Q53..........2
1. How many people were apprehended?
APPREHENSIONS:
2. Did any of the apprehended workers ever return to work at
your factory?
YES............SKIP TO Q53..........1
NO.............SKIP TO Q53..........2
DON'T
KNOW................................8
53. How would you characterize, perhaps with an example, your employ-
er's attitude toward the employment of undocumented workers?
54. Do undocumented workers and resident workers get along?
YES............SKIP TO Q55..........1
NO..................................2
A. Describe the situation.
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55. What job do you hold?
RESPONDANT'S JOB:
56. How long have you worked at the factory?
TIME WORKING:_
57. Are you undocumented?
YES. ................................1
NO.................................2
58. Thank you for answering these questions. You have been very
helpful. But before we end, is there anything you would like to
add about your employer or about undocumented workers?
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APPENDIX 2
APPENDIX 2
Table 1
Average Hourly Wage By Company By Worker Characteristics
Vari- Average Vari- Average Vari- Average
Company able N Wage S.D. Company able N Wage S.D. Company able N Wage S.D.
1 2 3
TOTAL 154 5.91 0.43 TOTAL 113 4.08 0.46 TOTAL 259 10.89 0.04
Sex * 1 132 5.94 0.43 Sex 1 98 4.09 0.47 Sex 1 255 10.89 0.04
2 22 5.73 0.39 2 15 4.01 0.35 2 4 10.86 0.00
Citizenship** 1 24 6.11 0.38 Citizenship 1 - - - Citizenship 1 221 10.88 0.04
2 59 5.98 0.35 2 - - - 2 38 10.91 0.05
3 71 5.78 0.47 3 107 4.05 0.44 3 - - -
Race*** 1 25 6.18 0.37 Race 1 - - - Race 1 57 10.91 0.05
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 35 10.86 0.00
3 128 5.85 0.42 3 113 4.08 0.46 3 166 10.88 0.04
4 1 6.35 . 4 - - - 4 1 10.96
Union No Union No Union Yes
4 5 6
TOTAL 113 6.35 1.15 TOTAL 205 4.32 0.53 TOTAL 122 6.89 1.20
Sex 1 - 6.35 1.15 Sex 1 205 4.32 0.53 Sex 1 - - -
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - -
Citizenship 1 49 6.89 1.02 Citizenship 1 11 5.82 0.60 Citizenship 1 69 6.73 1.15
2 46 6.19 1.11 2 71 4.39 0.40 2 12 6.47 0.40
3 18 5.37 0.81 3 123 4.15 0.32 3 41 6.19 0.48
Race 1 42 7.06 0.89 Race 1 10 6.00 0.00 Race 1 7 7.79 1.29
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 3 7.79 1.29
3 64 5.86 1.06 3 194 4.24 0.37 3 112 6.79 1.15
4 7 6.61 1.13 4 1 4.00 . 4 - - -
Union No Union Yes Union No
7 8 9
TOTAL 10 4.25 1.00 TOTAL 18 3.35 0.00 TOTAL 74 3.69 0.74
Sex 1 10 4.25 1.00 Sex 1 18 3.35 0.00 Sex 1 62 3.75 0.79
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 12 3.37 0.07
Citizenship 1 2 5.37 0.88 Citizenship 1 - - - Citizenship 1 1 4.40
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 1 4.40
3 8 3.97 0.85 3 18 3.35 0.00 3 68 3.57 0.57
Race 1 - - - Race 1 1 3.35 . Race 1 1 4.40
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - -
3 10 4.25 1.00 3 17 3.35 0.00 3 73 3.68 0.74
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 - - -
Union No Union No Union No
APPENDIX 2 Table 1 continued
Vari- Average Vari- Average Vari- Average
Company able N Wage S.D. Company able N Wage S.D. Company able N Wage S.D.
19 20 21
TOTAL 25 4.15 0.65 TOTAL 64 4.01 0.95 TOTAL 108 8.48 1.11
Sex 1 25 4.15 0.65 Sex 1 47 4.12 1.08 Sex 1 102 8.51 1.12
2 - - - 2 17 3.69 0.25 2 6 7.92 0.74
Citizenship 1 2 4.25 0.71 Citizenship 1 2 4.07 0.11 Citizenship 1 108 8.48 1.11
2 4 4.69 0.75 2 19 4.02 1.13 2 - - -
3 19 4.03 0.60 3 43 4.00 0.91 3 - - -
Race 1 - - - Race 1 2 5.07 1.52 Race 1 14 9.06 1.65
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - -
3 25 4.15 0.65 3 48 4.05 1.03 3 66 8.44 1.14
4 - - - 4 14 3.68 0.28 4 - - -
Union Yes Union Yes Union Yes
* Sex: 1 = Male
2 = Female
** Citizenship:
1 = Citizen
2 = Greencard
3 = Undocumented
*** Race:
1
2
3
4
Anglo
Black
Latino
Asian and Other
APPENDIX 2 Table 1 continued
Vari- Average Vari- Average Vari- Average
Company able N Wage S.D. Company able N Wage S.D. Company able N Wage S.D.
10 11 12
TOTAL 46 4.00 0.91 TOTAL 83 6.40 0.95 TOTAL 113 9.19 1.61
Sex 1 40 4.07 0.96 Sex 1 83 6.40 0.95 Sex 1 110 9.22 1.61
2 6 3.53 0.08 2 - - - 2 3 8.00 1.32
Citizenship 1 5 5.48 1.19 Citizenship 1 9 7.05 0.70 Citizenship 1 107 9.07 1.81
2 - - - 2 32 6.74 0.63 2 6 9.75 1.29
3 41 3.82 0.70 3 42 6.01 1.04 3 41 3.82 0.70
Race 1 1 5.35 . Race 1 - - - Race 1 26 9.38 1.58
2 - - - 2 1 4.25 . 2 38 8.75 1.76
3 45 3.97 0.90 3 82 6.43 0.93 3 46 9.43 1.45
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 3 9.17 2.83
Union Yes Union Yes Union Yes
13 14 15
TOTAL 185 11.40 1.22 TOTAL 98 5.09 0.81 TOTAL 93 4.94 0.66
Sex 1 181 11.40 1.23 Sex 1 98 5.09 0.81 Sex 1 81 4.95 0.69
2 4 11.22 0.50 2 - - - 2 12 4.83 0.32
Citizenship 1 86 11.38 1.10 Citizenship 1 10 5.20 0.86 Citizenship 1 9 4.70 0.45
2 99 11.42 1.32 2 57 5.15 0.88 2 25 5.34 1.00
3 - - - 3 31 4.92 0.60 3 59 4.81 0.39
Race 1 28 11.63 0.90 Race 1 1 5.00 . Race 1 - - -
2 7 10.79 0.90 2 5 5.35 0.60 2 7 4.47 0.05
3 149 11.39 1.28 3 91 5.05 0.80 3 80 4.96 0.63
4 1 10.50 . 4 1 7.00 . 4 6 5.11 1.12
Union Yes Union Yes Union Yes
16 17 18
TOTAL 44 4.34 1.50 TOTAL 55 4.73 1.83 TOTAL 339 5.85 1.80
Sex 1 38 4.40 1.59 Sex 1 55 4.73 1.83 Sex 1 308 5.93 1.87
2 6 3.95 0.74 2 - - - 2 31 5.06 0.51
Citizenship 1 3 7.10 2.59 Citizenship 1 18 7.10 1.23 Citizenship 1 22 8.06 2.46
2 10 5.04 1.65 2 - - - 2 68 6.86 1.99
3 31 3.85 0.88 3 37 3.57 0.39 3 249 5.37 1.37
Race 1 - - - Race 1 18 7.10 1.23 Race 1 21 8.37 2.60
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 1 5.88
3 44 4.34 1.50 3 37 3.57 0.39 3 303 5.68 1.60
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 14 5.73 2.03
Union No Union Yes Union Yes
U
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Table 2
Average Hourly Years By Company By Worker Characteristics
Vari- Average Vari- Average Vari- Average
Company able N Years S.D. Company able N Years S.D. Company able N Years S.D.
1 2 3
TOTAL 154 6.35 2.09 TOTAL 113 3.37 0.77 TOTAL 259 17.88 3.43
Sex* 1 132 6.47 2.11 Sex 1 98 3.36 0.76 Sex 1 255 17.99 3.32
2 22 5.66 1.90 2 15 3.47 0.83 2 4 11.00 3.46
Citizenship** 1 24 7.21 3.12 Citizenship 1 - - - Citizenship 1 221 17.66 3.36
2 59 6.94 2.14 2 6 4.33 0.82 2 38 19.16 3.58
3 71 5.58 1.21 3 107 3.32 0.73 3 - - -
Race*** 1 25 6.06 2.29 Race 1 - - - Race 1 57 18.39 3.91
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 35 16.54 1.65
3 128 6.37 2.03 3 113 3.37 0.77 3 166 18.00 3.48
4 1 11.00 . 4 - - - 4 1 16.00
4 5 6
TOTAL 113 5.86 4.87 TOTAL 205 2.54 1.95 TOTAL 122 4.26 1.64
Sex 1 113 5.86 4.87 Sex 1 205 2.54 1.95 Sex 1 122 4.26 1.64
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - -
Citizenship 1 49 7.54 5.77 Citizenship 1 11 4.62 5.07 Citizenship 1 69 3.88 1.53
2 46 4.99 3.94 2 71 2.74 1.96 2 12 4.56 3.08
3 18 3.50 2.23 3 123 2.24 1.25 3 41 4.80 1.01
Race 1 42 7.37 5.85 Race 1 10 5.07 5.11 Race 1 7 2.71 2.14
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 3 3.67 2.31
3 64 4.82 3.56 3 194 2.43 1.56 3 112 4.37 1.56
4 7 6.32 6.94 4 1 0.17 . 4 - - -
7 8 9
TOTAL 10 2.52 3.09 TOTAL 18 0.08 0 TOTAL 74 2.24 1.87
Sex 1 10 2.52 3.09 Sex 1 18 0.08 0 Sex 1 62 2.27 2.00
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 12 2.12 0.98
Citizenship 1 2 5.37 6.54 Citizenship 1 - - - Citizenship 1 1 0.50
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 5 4.80 3.83
3 8 1.81 1.81 3 18 0.08 0 3 68 2.08 1.54
Race 1 - - - Race 1 1 0.08 . Race 1 1 0.50
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 - - -
3 10 2.52 3.09 3 17 0.08 0 3 73 2.27 1.87
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 ~ ~ -
APPENDIX 2 Table 2 continued
Vari- Average Vari- Average Vari- Average
Company able N Years S.D. Company able N Years S.D. Company able N Years S.D.
10 11 12
TOTAL 46 3.75 3.93 TOTAL 83 3.43 2.43 TOTAL 113 9.88 8.42
Sex 1 40 4.22 4.01 Sex 1 83 3.43 2.43 Sex 1 110 10.02 8.48
2 6 0.57 0.24 2 - - - 2 3 4.67 3.51
Citizenship 1 5 11.00 2.92 Citizenship 1 9 7.33 2.00 Citizenship 1 107 9.70 8.32
2 - - - 2 32 4.12 1.62 2 6 13.17 10.42
3 41 2.86 3.03 3 42 2.06 1.85 3 - - -
Race 1 1 10.00 . Race 1 - - - Race 1 26 12.00 8.96
2 - - - 2 1 0.50 . 2 38 6.51 4.67
3 45 3.61 3.86 3 82 3.46 2.43 3 46 11.13 9.81
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 3 15.00 5.33
13 14 15
TOTAL 185 6.19 3.72 TOTAL 98 6.03 6.81 TOTAL 93 3.04 1.88
Sex 1 181 6.19 3.75 Sex 1 98 6.03 6.81 Sex 1 81 3.20 1.93
2 4 6.00 2.94 2 - - - 2 12 1.92 0.95
Citizenship 1 86 6.47 4.08 Citizenship 1 10 16.35 13.82 Citizenship 1 9 0.41 0.08
2 99 5.95 3.39 2 57 5.77 4.49 2 25 2.70 1.97
3 - - - 3 31 3.17 3.29 3 59 3.58 1.60
Race 1 28 8.16 5.83 Race 1 1 4.00 . Race 1 - - -
2 7 4.43 1.24 2 5 27.80 5.40 2 7 0.43 0.07
3 149 5.90 3.16 3 91 4.83 4.56 3 80 3.44 1.67
4 1 6.00 . 4 1 8.00 . 4 6 0.75 1.59
16 17 18
TOTAL 44 1.99 1.99 TOTAL 55 2.60 1.49 TOTAL 339 5.05 5.24
Sex 1 38 1.94 1.98 Sex 1 55 2.60 1.49 Sex 1 308 5.01 5.33
2 6 2.33 2.23 2 - - - 2 31 5.48 4.22
Citizenship 1 3 2.33 2.31 Citizenship 1 18 4.11 0.80 Citizenship 1 22 7.27 7.23
2 10 2.62 2.75 2 - - - 2 68 9.05 6.84
3 31 1.76 1.70 3 37 1.87 1.15 3 249 3.77 3.72
Race 1 - - - Race 1 18 4.11 0.80 Race 1 21 8.40 7.14
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 1 5.00
3 44 1.99 1.99 3 37 1.87 1.15 3 303 4.92 5.05
4 - - - 4 - - - 4 14 2.83 4.30
rQ
APPENDIX 2 Table 2 continued
Vari- Average Vari- Average Vari- Average
Company able N Years S.D. Company able N Years S.D. Company able N Years S.D.
19 20 21
TOTAL 25 2.46 1.91 TOTAL 64 2.81 2.64 TOTAL 108 11.04 5.11
Sex 1 25 2.46 1.91 Sex 1 47 3.11 2.72 Sex 1 102 11.10 5.02
2 - - - 2 17 1.97 2.23 2 6 10.00 7.01
Citizenship 1 2 1.75 1.06 Citizenship 1 2 5.50 4.95 Citizenship 1 108 11.04 5.11
2 4 4.62 2.36 2 19 2.22 2.57 2 - - -
3 19 2.07 1.61 3 43 2.94 2.55 3 - - -
Race 1 - - - Race 1 2 2.75 1.06 Race 1 14 10.36 5.27
2 - - - 2 - - - 2 28 11.14 4.73
3 25 2.46 1.91 3 48 3.24 2.89 3 66 11.14 5.30
4 - - - 4 14 1.34 0.62 4 - - -
262
APPENDIX 3
263
APPENDIX 3 AND 4 REFERENCE
1970 Census Code
374
413
415
424
430
440
441
443
446
461
481
492
502
503
522
534
602
610
612
615
620
621
622
643
644
650
651
652
653
656
665
680
690
692
705
706
710
715
753
762
770
780
903
962
Standard Occupational Classification
Shipping and Receiving Clerks
Cabinetmakers
Carpenters
Cranemen, Derrickmen, and Hoistmen
Electricians
Floor Layers
Foremen
Furniture and Wood Finishers
Heat Treaters, Annealers, and Temperers
Machinists
Heavy Equipment Mechanics
Miscellaneous Mechanics and Repairmen
Millwrights
Molders (metal)
Plumbers and Pipefitters
Roofers and Slaters
Assemblers
Inspectors (manufacturing)
Cutting Operators
Dry Wall Installers
Dyers
Filers, Polishers, Sanders, and Buffers
Furnacemen, Smeltermen, and Pourers
Packers and Wrappers
Painters (manufactured articles)
Drill Press Operators
Grinding Machine Operators
Lathe Operators
Precision Machine Operators
Punch Press Operators
Solderers
Welders and Flame-Cutters
Machine Operators (miscellaneous)
Machine Operators (not specified)
Deliverymen
Forklift Operators
Motormen
Truck Drivers
Freight and Material Handlers
Stockhandlers
Warehousemen
Miscellaneous Laborers
Janitors
Guards
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Table 1
Average Hourly Wage and Years on the Job by
Occupation for Each Case Study Company
11 Average Hourly Average Years
Wage on the Job
Q -w
Company o Mean S.D. Mean S.D. N
A 4 430 6.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2
(Wheels) 446 4.17 0.00 2.80 1.55 10492 6.00 0.00 11.00 0.00 4
610 4.80 0.00 3.00 0.00 3
622 4.20 0.24 2.58 0.00 60
643 3.70 0.00 1.17 0.00 30
644 4.50 0.00 2.31 2.40 3
650 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3
653 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3
680 5.07 0.92 2.72 2.21 3
692 4.47 0.00 2.82 2.27 66
705 6.00 0.00 1.17 0.00 4
706 4.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 3
780 3.75 0.00 1.71 1.72 11
B 6 430 9.17 0.00 5.00 0.00 3
(Wheels) 492 9.17 0.00 5.00 0.00 22
602 6.12 0.00 4.33 0.00 20
622 6.23 0.06 4.02 0.93 30
644 6.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 7
680 6.54 0.39 4.41 2.73 27
692 5.85 0.00 4.33 0.00 10
780 6.35 0.00 6.00 2.00 3
C 10 446 6.15 0.00 5.50 0.52 12
612 5.01 1.04 2.33 2.92 12
(Headers) 644 5.75 0.52 2.50 1.43 10
680 7.40 0.00 3.53 2.98 31
690 6.15 0.00 3.11 1.28 18
D 8 441 4.40 1.82 1.83 0.29 3
446 3.59 0.41 3.28 1.95 9
(Headers) 492 5.32 1.31 1.25 1.06 2
602 3.39 0.02 1.33 0.25 9
612 3.57 0.38 4.67 5.51 3
621 5.32 0.08 2.25 1.84 6
644 3.35 0.00 1.50 0.50 3
651 3.35 0.00 2.92 3.06 6
680 3.62 0.67 3.08 1.32 6
692 3.35 0.00 1.47 0.13 15
706 3.35 . 0.50 . 1
753 3.41 0.12 2.75 1.26 4
762 3.35 0.00 0.50 0.00 3
770 3.57 0.31 3.37 1.89 4
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APPENDIX 3 Table 1 continued
Average Hourly Average Years
Wage on the Job
U0
Company Mean S.D. Mean S.D. N
E 9 446 4.12 0.68 5.11 4.13 9
492 7.50 0.00 13.50 2.12 2(Headers) 602 3.52 0.07 1.52 1.49 9
644 3.50 0.00 4.50 2.12 2
680 4.01 0.55 3.85 3.27 13
706 4.05 0.62 4.73 4.57 5
780 3.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 6
F 11 446 11.00 0.00 15.50 6.36 2
492 8.50 0.00 15.00 0.00 8
(Batteries) 502 9.00 0.00 3.33 2.52 3
503 11.56 1.24 6.61 7.09 9
602 9.54 0.40 6.08 6.65 12
610 7.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 4
690 8.14 1.00 6.73 5.50 22
692 8.50 0.55 2.17 1.94 6
715 7.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 7
753 10.83 1.15 17.33 10.02 3
762 7.00 . 5.00 . 1
780 10.31 0.92 16.72 9.47 32
903 6.50 0.00 4.00 0.00 4
G 12 481 11.40 0.85 1.50 0.71 2
492 11.50 0.52 7.66 2.52 16
(Batteries) 503 14.00 0.00 9.00 5.68 14
610 11.46 0.19 6.85 1.11 10
680 10.50 0.00 6.82 1.22 22
690 11.95 0.14 3.54 1.45 13
715 13.00 0.00 8.52 5.34 20
753 10.51 1.03 5.58 4.43 19
770 10.68 0.17 2.58 2.02 12
780 10.82 0.85 5.64 2.82 57
H 13 446 4.75 0.00 5.50 0.58 4
492 6.79 0.19 9.80 5.76 5(Batteries) 503 6.10 0.82 7.44 7.82 9
602 4.69 0.19 6.62 5.45 21
610 4.60 0.14 4.60 2.30 5
644 5.00 . 8.00 . 1
690 5.05 0.45 8.83 11.69 13
706 5.00 0.00 3.67 0.58 3
715 6.95 0.27 8.20 2.17 5
753 4.70 0.28 3.00 1.41 2
762 4.50 0.00 0.25 0.00 9
780 4.79 0.24 5.31 7.67 18
903 4.25 0.00 4.00 1.00 3
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Table 2
Average Hourly Wage By Occupation and Citizenship For Each
Case Study Company
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
.0 Av. Av. Av.
Company 0 W N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D.
A 430 2 6.00 0.00 - - - - - -
(Wheels) 446 - - - 6 4.17 0.00 4 4.17 0.00
492 4 6.00 0.00 - - - - - -
610 - - - 3 4.80 0.00 - - -
622 - - - 4 4.63 0.91 56 4.17 0.00
643 - - - 9 3.70 0.00 21 3.70 0.00
644 - - - - - - 3 4.50 0.00
650 - - - - - - 3 5.00 0.00
653 - - - 9 - - 3 5.00 0.00
680 1 4.00 . 2 5.60 0.00 - - -
692 - - - 46 4.47 0.00 20 4.47 0.00
705 4 6.00 0.00 - - - - - -
706 - - - 1 4.00 . 2 4.00 0.00
780 - - - 1 - - 11 3.75 0.00
B 430 3 9.17 0.00 - - - - - -
(Wheels) 492 9 9.17 0.00 - - - 13 9.17 0.00
602 15 6.12 0.00 - - - 5 6.12 0.00
622 22 6.23 0.07 - - - 8 6.24 0.02
644 7 6.75 0.00 - - - - - -
680 5 6.19 0.45 12 6.47 0.40 10 6.80 0.11
692 7 5.85 0.00 - - - 3 5.85 0.00
780 1 6.35 . - - - 2 6.35 0.00
C 446 - - - 6 6.15 0.00 6 6.15 0.00
(Headers) 612 1 8.00 . - - - 11 4.74 0.47
644 - - - 6 6.15 0.00 4 5.15 0.00
680 5 7.40 0.00 15 7.40 0.00 11 7.40 0.00
690 3 6.15 0.00 5 6.15 0.00 10 6.15 0.00
D 441 - - - 1 6.50 . 2 3.35 0.00
(Headers) 446 - - - - - - 9 3.59 0.41
492 1 4.40 . 1 6.25 . - - -
602 - - - - - - 9 3.39 0.02
612 - - - 1 4.00 . 2 3.35 0.00
621 - - - 1 5.15 . 5 5.35 0.00
644 - - - - - - 3 3.35 0.00
651 - - - - - - 6 3.35 0.00
680 - - - - - - 6 3.62 0.67
692 - - - - - - 15 3.35 0.00
706 - - - - - - 1 3.35
753 - - - 1 3.60 . 3 3.35 0.00
762 - - - - - - 3 3.35 0.00
770 - - - - - - 4 3.57 0.31
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C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
u Av. Av. Av.
Company 0 N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D.
E 446 3 4.85 0.43 - - - 6 3.75 0.43
(Headers) 492 1 7.50 . - - - 1 7.50
602 - - - - - - 9 3.52 0.07
644 - - - - - - 2 3.50 0.00
680 1 5.35 . - - - 12 3.89 0.39
706 - - - - - - 5 4.05 0.62
780 - - - - - - 6 3.50 0.00
F 446 2 11.00 0.00 - - - - - -
(Batteries) 492 8 8.50 0.00 - - - - - -
502 3 9.00 0.00 - - - - - -
503 8 11.62 1.30 1 11.00 . - - -
602 10 9.60 0.39 2 9.25 0.35 - - -
610 4 7.00 0.00 - - - - - -
690 21 8.14 1.03 1 8.00 . - - -
692 6 8.50 0.55 - - - - - -
715 7 7.00 0.00 - - - - - -
753 2 10.50 1.41 1 11.50 . - - -
762 1 7.00 . - - - - - -
7O 31 10.34 0.93 1 95 . - - -
903 4 6.50 0.00 - - - - - -
G 481 2 11.40 0.85 - - - - - -
(Batteries) 492 13 11.62 0.51 3 11.00 0.00 - - -
503 - - - 14 14.00 0.00 - - -
610 1 11.40 . 9 11.47 0.20 - - -
680 19 10.50 0.00 3 10.50 0.00 - - -
690 2 12.00 0.00 11 11.94 0.16 - - -
715 18 13.00 0.00 2 13.00 0.00 - - -
752 1 11.60 . - - - - - -
753 8 10.06 1.36 10 10.76 0.58 - - -
770 5 10.75 0.27 7 10.63 0.00 - - -
780 17 11.16 0.63 40 10.68 0.89 - - -
H 446 - - - 2 4.75 0.00 2 4.75 0.00
(Batteries) 492 1 7.00 . 4 6.74 0.17 - - -
503 1 5.00 . 4 6.24 0.82 4 6.24 0.82
602 1 4.75 . 10 4.62 0.17 10 4.74 0.20
610 - - - 5 4.60 0.14 - - -
644 - - - 1 5.00 . - - -
690 2 6.00 0.00 7 4.85 0.19 4 4.94 0.12
706 - - - 3 5.00 0.00 - - -
715 - - - 5 6.95 0.27 - - -
753 - - - 2 4.70 0.28 - - -
762 2 4.50 0.00 3 4.50 0.00 4 4.50 0.00
780 2 5.00 0.00 9 4.79 0.25 7 4.73 0.26
903 1 4.25 . 2 4.25 0.00 - - -
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Table 3
Average Years on the Job by Occupation and Citizenship
For Each Case Study Company
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
.U Av. Av. Av.
U r- v v v
Company C 4 N Years S.D. N Years S.D. N Years S.D.
A 430 2 1.00 0.00 - - - - - -
(Wheels) 446 - - - 6 4.00 0.00 4 1.00 0.00
492 4 11.00 0.00 - - - - - -
610 - 3 3.00 0.00 - - -
622 - - - 4 2.58 0.00 56 2.58 0.00
643 - - - 9 1.17 0.00 21 1.17 0.00
644 - - - - - - 3 2.31 2.40
650 - - - - - - 3 3.00 0.00
653 - - - - - - 3 3.00 0.00
680 1 0.17 . 2 4.00 0.00 - - -
692 - - - 46 2.85 2.27 20 2.75 2.31
705 4 1.17 0.00 - - - 20 - -
706 - - - 1 2.00 . 2 2.00 0.00
780 - - - - - - 11 1.71 1.72
B 430 3 5.00 0.00 - - - - - -
(Wheels) 492 9 5.00 0.00 - - - 13 5.00 0.00
602 15 4.33 0.00 - - - 5 4.33 0.00
622 22. 4.02 0.98 - - - 8 4.04 0.82
644 7 1.00 0.00 - - - - - -
680 5 2.27 3.29 12 4.56 3.08 10 5.30 1.32
692 7 4.33 0.00 - - - 3 4.33 0.00
780 1 6.00 . - - - 2 6.00 2.83
C 446 - - - 6 5.00 0.00 6 6.00 0.00
(Headers) 612 1 11.00 . - - - 11 1.55 1.10
644 - - - 6 3.50 0.84 4 1.00 0.00
680 5 8.00 0.00 15 4.13 2.20 11 0.67 0.51
690 3 5.00 0.00 5 3.80 0.84 10 2.20 0.63
D 441 - - - 1 2.00 . 2 1.75 0.35
(Headers) 446 - - - - - - 9 3.28 1.95
492 1 0.50 . 1 2.00 . - - -
602 - - - - - - 9 1.33 0.25
612 - - - 1 L1.00 . 2 1.50 0.70
621 - - - 1 6.00 . 5 1.50 0.00
644 - - - - - - 3 1.50 0.50
651 - - - - - - 6 2.92 3.06
680 - - - - - - 6 3.08 1.32
692 - - - - - - 15 1.47 0.13
706 - - - - - - 1 0.50
753 - - - 1 3.00 . 3 2.67 1.53
762 - - - - - - 3 0.50 0.00
770 - - - - - - 4 3.37 1.89
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C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
U - Av. Av. Av.
Company C - N Years S.D. N Years S.D. N Years S.D.
E 446 - 9.67 2.52 - - - 6 2.83 2.46
(Headers) 492 1 15.00 . - - - 1 12.00
602 - - - - - - 9 1.52 1.49
644 - - - - - - 2 4.50 2.12
680 1 11.00 . - - - 12 3.26 2.58
706 - - - - - 5 4.73 4.57
780 - - - - - - 6 0.50 0.00
F 446 2 15.50 6.36 - - - - - -
(Batteries) 492 8 15.00 0.00 - - - - - -
502 3 3.33 2.52 - - - - - -
503 8 7.19 7.35 1 2.00 . - - -
602 10 3.80 2.62 2 17.50 10.61 - - -
610 4 3.00 0.00 - - - - - -
690 21 6.95 5.53 1 2.00 . - - -
692 6 2.17 1.94 - - - - - -
715 7 6.00 0.00 - - - - - -
753 2 13.50 10.61 1 25.00 . - - -
762 1 5.00 . - - - - - -
780 31 16.77 9.62 1 15.00 . - - -
903 4 4.00 0.00 - - - - - -
G 481 2 1.50 0.71 - - - - - -
(Batteries) 492 13 7.92 2.74 3 6.50 0.00 - - -
503 - - - 14 9.00 5.68 - - -
610 1 6.50 . 9 6.89 1.17 - - -
680 19 6.71 1.28 3 7.50 0.00 - - -
690 2 3.00 0.00 11 3.64 1.57 - - -
715 18 8.81 5.58 2 6.00 0.00 - - -
752 1 10.00 . - - - - - -
753 8 3.75 5.02 10 6.60 3.66 - - -
770 5 3.40 3.13 7 2.00 0.00 - - -
780 17 5.56 3.70 40 5.67 2.41 - - -
H 446 - - - 2 5.50 0.71 2 5.50 0.71
(Batteries) 492 1 20.00 . 4 7.25 0.96 - - -
503 1 25.00 . 4 9.25 0.96 4 1.25 1.87
602 1 20.00 . 10 6.72 5.69 10 5.19 3.36
610 - - - 5 4.60 2.30 - - -
644 - - - 1 8.00 . - - -
690 2 30.00 0.00 7 7.46 8.77 4 0.62 0.25
706 - - - 3 3.67 0.58 - - -
715 - - - 5 8.20 2.17 - - -
753 - - - 2 3.00 1.41 - - -
762 2 0.25 0.00 3 0.25 0.00 4 0.25 0.00
780 2 17.50 23.33 9 3.72 2.20 7 3.86 3.70
903 1 3.00 . 2 4.50 0.71 - - -
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APPENDIX 4
Table 1
Average Hourly Wage and Years on the Job by Occupation for 21 Firms
(A), for Wheels, Headers and Batteries (B), and Non-Wheels,
Headers and Batteries Firms (C)
Average Hourly Wage Average Years on the Job
Occupation Code N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
374 A 8 7.30 1.71 7.81 3.80
B - - - -
C 8 7.30 1.71 7.81 3.80
413 A 41 4.53 1.02 3.22 0.99
B - - - -
C 8 5.76 0.52 7.69 1.75
415 A 8 5.76 0.52 7.69 1.75
B - - - -
C 8 5.76 0.52 7.69 1.75
424 A 3 4.25 0.43 3.83 3.69
B - - - -
C 3 4.25 0.43 3.83 3.69
430 A 14 7.99 2.52 5.96 3.30
B 5 7.90 1.74 3.40 2.19
C 9 8.04 2.97 7.39 2.99
440 A 19 6.26 0.16 6.21 0.92
B - - - -
C 19 6.26 0.16 6.21 0.92
441 A 30 5.18 0.76 5.70 2.15
B - - - -
C 30 5.18 0.76 5.70 2.15
443 A 30 5.18 0.76 5.70 2.15
B - - - -
C 30 5.18 0.76 5.70 2.15
446 A 46 4.91 1.66 4.84 3.44
B 46 4.91 1.66 4.84 3.44
C - - - -
461 A 38 8.36 1.79 7.71 6.49
B - - - -
C 38 8.36 1.79 7.71 6.49
481 A 2 11.40 0.85 1.50 0.71
B 2 11.40 0.85 1.50 0.71
C - - - -
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Average Hourly Wage Average Years on the Job
Occupation Code N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
492 A 185 8.78 2.14 11.28 8.69
B 59 9.11 1.86 8.05 4.21
C 126 8.62 2.24 12.79 9.78
502 A 23 6.40 1.05 6.15 2.43
B 3 9.00 0.00 3.33 2.52
C 20 6.01 0.24 6.57 2.17
503 A 35 11.16 3.28 8.23 7.06
B 32 11.09 3.42 7.89 6.59
C 3 11.85 0.74 11.83 12.35
522 A 15 4.87 1.13 5.07 2.63
B - - - -
C 15 4.87 1.13 5.07 2.63
534 A 10 6.03 0.11 6.20 0.63
B - - - -
C 10 6.03 0.11 6.20 0.63
602 A 330 5.68 2.13 5.43 5.26
B 71 5.60 2.05 4.57 4.46
C 259 5.70 2.16 5.66 5.44
610 A 53 7.12 2.35 5.73 4.06
B 22 8.18 3.18 5.11 2.13
C 31 6.36 1.03 6.17 4.99
612 A 15 4.72 1.11 2.80 3.46
B 15 4.72 1.11 2.80 3.46
C - - - -
615 A 24 5.10 0.92 4.92 2.00
B - - - -
C 24 5.10 0.92 4.92 2.00
620 A 10 5.27 0.85 4.60 1.07
B - - - -
C 10 5.27 0.85 4.60 1.07
621 A 31 4.04 0.74 1.96 1.65
B 16 4.09 0.98 0.90 1.52
C 15 3.99 0.38 3.10 0.81
622 A 92 4.91 1.01 3.22 1.36
B 90 4.88 0.98 3.06 0.86
C 2 6.46 1.19 10.25 0.35
643 A 77 4.32 0.92 3.16 3.37
B 30 3.70 0.00 1.17 0.00
C 47 4.71 0.99 4.43 3.82
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Average Hourly Wage Average Years on the Job
Occupation Code N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
644 A 64 5.40 1.51 4.15 4.13
B 26 5.40 1.25 2.32 1.91
C 38 5.41 1.68 5.41 4.76
650 A 3 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
B 3 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
C - - - -
651 A 22 7.14 3.56 7.20 4.79
B 6 3.35 0.00 2.92 3.06
C 16 8.56 3.13 8.81 4.34
652 A 12 7.54 1.21 4.00 0.90
B - - - -
C 12 7.54 1.21 4.00 0.90
653 A 3 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
B 3 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.00
C - - - -
656 A 28 4.82 1.84 3.95 2.93
B - - - -
C 28 4.82 1.84 3.95 2.93
665 A 18 7.58 3.89 11.15 10.18
B 8 3.35 0.00 0.08 0.00
C 10 10.96 0.00 20.00 0.00
680 A 350 8.80 2.61 11.10 6.42
B 102 7.12 2.19 4.46 2.84
C 248 9.49 2.46 13.83 5.41
690 A 189 5.69 2.18 3.97 5.00
B 66 7.74 2.47 5.53 6.39
C 123 4.58 0.76 3.14 3.85
692 A 107 4.65 1.16 2.71 2.15
B 107 4.65 1.16 2.71 2.15
C - - - -
705 A 4 6.00 0.00 1.17 0.00
B 4 6.00 0.00 1.17 0.00
C - - - -
706 A 18 4.13 0.68 3.16 2.62
B 12 4.21 0.63 3.43 3.13
C 6 3.95 0.80 2.61 1.14
710 A 2 6.50 1.77 6.50 7.78
B - - -
C 2 6.50 1.77 6.50 7.78
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APPENDIX 4 Table 1 continued
Average Hourly Wage Average Years on the Job
Occupation Code N Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
715 A 33 10.60 3.02 7.79 4.38
B 32 10.74 2.96 7.92 4.38
C 1 6.15 . 3.50
753 A 35 8.40 3.04 5.74 5.80
B 28 9.11 2.98 6.25 6.18
C 7 5.55 1.11 3.68 3.75
762 A 50 5.20 1.05 3.67 3.80
B 13 4.43 0.92 0.67 1.30
C 37 5.47 0.96 4.73 3.83
770 A 59 6.61 2.27 4.06 3.22
B 16 8.90 3.18 2.78 1.96
C 43 5.76 0.87 4.53 3.48
780 A 193 7.92 2.88 7.26 7.31
B 127 8.77 3.00 7.81 7.93
C 66 6.26 1.71 6.19 5.85
903 A 17 4.73 1.10 2.76 1.55
B 7 5.54 1.20 4.00 0.58
C 10 4.16 0.57 1.90 1.43
962 A 2 5.50 0.00 3.00 0.00
B - - - - -
C 2 5.50 0.00 3.00 0.00
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Table 2
Average Hourly Wage by Occupation and Citizenship for 21 Firms
(A), for Wheels, Headers and Batteries (B), and Non-Wheels,
Headers and Batteries Firms (C)
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation~ Code N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D.
374 A 7 7.46 1.78 1 6.16 . - - -
B - - - - - - - - -
C 7 7.46 1.78 1 6.16 . - - -
413 A 3 6.18 0.14 3 6.10 0.00 35 4.26 0.83
B - - - - - - - - -
C 3 6.18 0.14 3 6.10 0.00 35 4.26 0.83
415 A 2 6.35 0.00 1 6.35 . 5 5.40 0.22
B - - - - - - - - -
C 2 6.35 0.00 1 6.35 . 5 5.40 0.22
424 A 1 3.75 . 1 4.50 . 1 4.50
B - - - - - - - - -
C 1 3.75 . 1 4.50 . 1 4.50
430 A 8 9.44 2.49 6 6.06 0.14 - - -
B 5 7.90 1.74 - - - - - -
C 3 12.00 0.00 6 6.06 0.14 - - -
440 A 2 6.35 0.00 4 6.35 0.00 13 6.22 0.18
B - - - - - - - - -
C 2 6.35 0.00 4 6.35 0.00 13 6.22 0.18
441 A - - - 1 6.50 . 2 3.35 0.00
B - - - 1 6.50 . 2 3.35 0.00
C - - - - - - - - -
443 A 2 6.17 0.25 15 5.30 0.58 13 4.88 0.85
B - - - - - - - - -
C 2 6.17 0.25 15 5.30 0.58 13 4.88 0.85
446 A 5 7.31 3.38 14 5.10 0.96 27 4.37 1.07
B 5 7.31 3.38 14 5.10 0.96 27 4.37 1.07
C - - - - - - - - -
461 A 23 8.65 1.62 6 7.06 2.23 9 8.50 1.71
B - - - - - - - - -
C 23 8.65 1.62 6 7.06 2.23 9 8.50 1.71
481 A 2 11.40 0.85 - - - - - -
B 2 11.40 0.85 - - - - - -
C - - - - - - - ~
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APPENDIX 4 Table 2 continued
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D.
492 A 84 9.67 1.94 44 9.05 1.74 57 7.26 1.84
B 37 9.31 2.07 8 8.27 2.27 14 9.05 0.45
C 47 9.95 1.83 36 9.22 1.59 43 6.68 1.74
502 A 7 7.39 1.52 8 6.10 0.22 8 5.84 0.13
B 3 9.00 0.00 - - - - - -
C 4 6.17 0.29 8 6.10 0.22 8 5.84 0.13
503 A 11 11.14 2.33 20 12.15 3.18 4 6.24 0.82
B 9 10.89 2.52 19 12.21 3.26 4 6.24 0.82
C 2 12.28 0.11 1 11.00 . - - -
522 A - - - 7 5.82 0.90 8 4.03 0.39
B - - - - - - - - -
C - - - 7 5.82 0.90 8 4.03 0.39
534 A - - - 3 6.12 0.20 7 6.00 0.00
B - - - - - - - - -
C - - - 3 6.12 0.20 7 6.00 0.00
602 A 105 7.95 2.01 72 5.12 1.50 153 4.38 0.81
B 26 7.41 1.80 12 5.39 1.81 33 4.25 0.99
C 79 8.13 2.06 60 5.07 1.44 120 4.42 0.75
610 A 12 7.26 1.75 32 7.44 2.71 9 5.79 0.85
B 5 7.88 1.97 17 8.27 3.50 - - -
C 7 6.82 1.58 15 6.49 0.68 9 5.79 0.85
612 A 1 8.00 . 1 4.00 . 13 4.53 0.68
B 1 8.00 . 1 4.00 . 13 4.53 0.68
C - - - 1 - - - - -
615 3 6.35 0.00 4 5.75 0.29 17 4.73 0.81
C 3 6.35 0.00 4 5.75 0.29 17 4.73 0.81
620 A 3 4.92 0.14 3 5.42 1.15 4 5.44 1.03
621 B - -~o - - -s 4.73 0.8C 3 4.92 0.14 3 5.42 1.15 4 5.44 1.03
621 A - - - 2 4.55 0.85 29 4.01 0.74
B - - - 1 5.15 . 15 4.02 0.96
C - - - 1 3.95 . 14 4.00 0.39
622 A 22 6.23 0.07 4 4.63 0.91 66 4.49 0.78
B 22 6.23 0.07 4 4.63 0.91 64 4.43 0.69
C - - - - - - 2 6.46 1.19
643 A 2 6.02 1.38 18 4.41 0.88 57 4.23 0.87
B - - - 9 3.70 0.00 21 3.70 0.00
C 2 6.02 1.38 9 5.12 0.73 36 4.53 0.97
644 A
B
C
15
7
8
7.42 0.65
6.74 0.00
8.00 0.00
14
7
7
5.78 0.68
5.99 0.43
5.57 0.85
35
12
23
4.39 0.98
4.26 0.80
4.46 1.08
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APPENDIX 4 Table 2 continued
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D.
650 A - - - 7 - - 3 5.00 0.00
B - - - - - - 3 5.00 0.00
C - - - - - - - - -
651 A 10 10.86 0.00 1 6.18 . 11 3.84 0.82
B - - - - - - 6 3.35 0.00
C 10 10.86 0.00 1 6.18 . 5 4.44 0.94
652 A 12 7.54 1.21 - - - - - -
B - - - - - - - - -
C 12 7.54 1.21 - - - - - -
653 A - - - - - - 3 5.00 0.00
B - - - - - - 3 5.00 0.00
C - - - - - - - - -
656 A 6 7.90 0.00 2 5.70 3.11 20 3.80 0.34
B - - - - - - - - -
C 6 7.90 0.00 2 5.70 3.11 20 3.80 0.34
665 A 9 10.96 0.00 1 10.96 8 3.35 0.00
B - - - - - - 8 3.35 0.00
C 9 10.96 0.00 1 10.96 . - - -
680 A 205 10.27 1.43 76 8.24 2.21 69 5.03 1.49
B 31 8.93 2.11 32 7.23 1.22 39 5.59 1.72
C 174 10.51 1.13 44 8.97 2.47 30 4.31 0.59
690 A 29 8.03 1.60 38 7.16 3.20 122 4.67 0.78
B 28 8.05 1.63 24 8.50 3.31 14 5.80 0.57
C 1 7.50 . 14 4.86 0.90 108 4.52 0.68
692 A 15 6.85 1.46 46 4.47 0.00 46 4.11 0.75
B 15 6.85 1.46 46 4.47 0.00 46 4.11 0.75
C - - - - - - - - -
705 A 4 6.00 0.00 - - - - - -
B 4 6.00 0.00 - - - - - -
C - - - - - - - - -
706 A 1 5.50 . 4 4.75 0.50 13 3.83 0.46
B - - - 4 4.75 0.50 8 3.95 0.53
C 1 5.50 . - - - 5 3.64 0.28
710 A 1 7.75 . 1 5.25 . - - -
B - - - - - - - - -
C 1 7.75 . 1 5.25 . - - -
715 A 25 11.32 2.75 8 8.36 2.88 - - -
B 25 11.32 2.75 7 8.68 2.96 - - -
C - - - 1 6.15 . - - -
753 A 15 9.16 2.21 14 9.44 2.83 6 4.09 1.21
B 11 10.28 1.30 14 9.44 2.83 3 3.35 0.00
C 4 6.07 0.50 - - - 3 4.84 1.42
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APPENDIX 4 Table 2 continued
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D. N Wage S.D.
762 A 8 6.17 1.25 8 5.43 1.42 34 4.92 0.73
B 3 5.33 1.44 3 4.50 0.00 7 4.01 0.61
C 5 6.67 0.93 5 5.99 1.58 27 5.15 0.56
770 A 8 9.02 2.39 14 8.44 2.29 37 5.39 1.09
B 5 10.75 0.27 7 10.63 0.00 4 3.57 0.31
C 3 6.15 0.30 7 6.25 0.49 33 5.61 0.92
780 A 83 9.29 1.83 58 9.13 2.56 52 4.37 1.00
B 51 10.33 1.53 50 9.59 2.42 26 4.16 0.82
C 32 7.64 0.75 8 6.20 1.02 26 4.59 1.13
903 A 5 6.05 1.01 2 4.25 0.00 10 4.16 0.57
B 4 6.05 1.01 2 4.25 0.00 - - -
C - - - - - - 10 4.16 0.57
962 A 2 5.50 0.00 - - - - -
B - - - - -
C 2 5.50 0.00 - - - -
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Table 3
Average Years on the Job
for Wheels, Headers and
Headers and
by Occupation for 21 Firms (A),
Batteries (B), and Non-Wheels,
Batteries Firms (C)
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Years S.D. N Years S.D. N Years S.D.
374 A 7 8.21 3.91 1 5.00 . - - -
B - - - - - - - - -
C 7 8.21 3.91 1 5.00 . - - -
413 A 3 5.67 0.58 3 3.00 0.00 35 3.03 0.75
B - - - - - - - - -
C 3 5.67 0.58 3 3.00 . 35 3.03 0.75
415 A 2 10.00 1.41 1 9.00 . 5 6.50 0.00
B - - - - - - - - -
C 2 10.00 1.41 1 9.00 . 5 6.50 0.00
424 A 1 1.00 . 1 8.00 . 1 2.50
B - - - - - - - - -
C 1 1.00 . - 8.00 . 1 2.50
430 A 8 3.44 1.66 6 9.33 0.82 - - -
B 5 3.40 2.19 - - - - - -
C 3 3.50 0.00 6 9.33 0.82 - - -
440 A 2 8.00 2.83 4 6.00 0.00 13 6.00 0.00
B - - - - - - - - -
C 2 8.00 2.83 4 6.00 0.00 13 6.00 0.00
441 A - - - 1 2.00 . 2 1.75 0.35
B - - - 1 2.00 . 2 1.75 0.35
C - - - - - - - - -
443 A 2 10.00 0.00 15 6.27 2.12 13 4.38 0.77
B - - - - - - - - -
C 2 10.00 0.00 15 6.27 2.12 13 4.38 0.77
446 A 5 12.00 4.85 14 4.64 0.63 27 3.61 2.27
B 5 12.00 4.85 14 4.64 0.63 27 3.61 2.27
C - - - - - - - - -
461 A 23 9.44 6.32 6 4.43 3.96 9 5.50 7.29
B - - - - - - - - -
C 23 9.44 6.32 6 4.43 3.96 9 5.50 7.29
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APPENDIX 4 Table 3 continued
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Years S.D. N Years S.D. N Years S.D.
481 A 2 1.50 0.71 - - - - - -
B 2 1.50 0.71 - - - - - -
C - - - - - - - - -
492 A 84 14.47 8.93 44 14.09 8.31 57 4.40 2.70
B 37 9.39 4.65 8 6.31 1.89 14 5.50 1.87
C 47 18.47 9.47 36 15.82 8.20 43 4.05 2.85
502 A 7 6.36 3.76 8 6.56 2.23 8 5.56 0.90
B 3 3.33 2.52 - - - - - -
C 4 8.62 2.84 8 6.56 2.23 8 5.56 0.90
503 A 11 10.68 9.41 20 8.27 5.30 4 1.23 1.86
B 9 9.17 9.08 19 8.68 5.11 4 1.23 1.86
C 2 17.50 10.61 1 0.50 . - - -
522 A - - - 7 7.00 2.77 8 3.37 0.52
B - - - - - - - - -
C - - - 7 7.00 2.77 8 3.37 0.52
534 A - - - 3 6.67 1.15 7 6.00 0.00
B - - - - - - - - -
C - - - 3 6.67 1.15 7 6.00 0.00
602 A 105 9.79 6.22 72 4.19 4.58 153 3.01 1.96
B 26 4.73 3.50 12 8.51 7.37 33 3.00 2.63
C 79 11.45 6.03 60 3.33 3.25 120 3.01 1.74
610 A 12 5.10 3.65 32 5.34 2.80 9 7.96 7.18
B 5 3.70 1.57 17 5.53 2.12 - - -
C 7 6.09 4.47 15 5.12 3.47 9 7.96 7.18
612 A 1 11.00 . 1 11.00 . 13 1.54 1.02
B 1 11.00 . 1 11.00 . 13 1.54 1.02
C - - - - - - - - -
615 A 3 5.67 4.62 4 5.50 0.58 17 4.65 1.66
B - - - - - - - - -
C 3 5.67 4.62 4 5.50 0.58 17 4.65 1.66
620 A 3 4.67 1.53 3 4.33 0.58 4 4.75 1.26
B - - - - - - - - -
C 3 4.67 1.53 3 4.33 0.58 4 4.75 1.26
621 A - - - 2 3.75 3.18 29 1.84 1.51
B - - - 1 6.00 . 15 0.55 0.69
C - - - 1 1.50 . 14 3.21 0.70
622 A 22 4.02 0.98 4 2.58 0.00 66 2.99 1.41
B 22 4.02 0.98 4 2.58 0.00 64 2.76 0.56
C - - - - - - 2 10.25 0.35
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APPENDIX 4 Table 3 continued
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Years S.D. N Years S.D. N Years S.D.
643 A 2 3.00 1.41 18 4.17 4.93 57 2.85 2.75
B - - - 9 1.17 0.00 21 1.17 0.00
C 2 3.00 1.41 9 7.17 5.61 36 3.82 3.07
644 A 15 7.40 6.20 14 4.52 3.39 35 2.62 2.07
B 7 1.00 0.00 7 4.14 1.86 12 2.03 1.76
C 8 13.00 0.00 7 4.89 4.59 23 2.92 2.19
650 A - - - - - - 3 3.00 0.00
B - - - - - - 3 3.00 0.00
C - - - - - - - - -
651 A 10 11.00 0.00 1 16.00 . 11 2.95 2.46
B - - - - - - 6 2.92 3.06
C 10 11.00 0.00 1 16.00 . 5 2.98 1.85
652 A 12 4.00 0.90 - - - - - -
B - - - - - - - - -
C 12 4.00 0.90 - - - - - -
653 A - - - - - - 3 3.00 0.00
B - - - - - - 3 3.00 0.00
C - - - - - - - - -
656 A 6 7.00 0.00 2 6.75 7.42 20 2.76 2.02
B - - - - - - - - -
C 6 7.00 0.00 2 6.75 7.42 20 2.76 2.02
665 A 9 20.00 0.00 1 20.00 . 8 0.08 0.00
B - - - - - - 8 0.08 0.00
C 9 20.00 0.00 1 20.00 . - -
680 A 205 14.53 4.41 76 9.13 6.30 69 3.07 2.04
B 31 6.13 2.77 32 4.60 2.55 39 3.02 2.37
C 174 16.03 2.58 44 12.43 6.17 30 3.13 1.54
690 A 29 7.88 7.84 38 4.99 5.56 122 2.72 3.11
B 28 8.11 7.88 24 4.72 4.96 14 1.75 0.91
C 1 1.50 . 14 5.46 6.63 108 2.85 3.27
692 A 15 3.61 2.45 46 2.85 2.27 46 2.27 1.84
B 15 3.61 2.45 46 2.85 2.27 46 2.27 1.84
C - - - - - - - - -
705 A 4 1.17 0.00 - - - - - -
B 4 1.17 0.00 - - - - - -
C - - - - - - - - -
706 A 1 4.00 . 4 3.25 0.96 13 3.06 3.07
B - - - 4 3.25 0.96 8 3.52 3.86
C 1 4.00 . - - - 5 2.33 1.03
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APPENDIX 4 Table 3 continued
C I T I Z E N S H I P
Citizen Greencard Undocumented
Av. Av. Av.
Occupation Code N Years S.D. N Years S.D. N Years S.D.
710 A 1 12.00 . 1 1.00 . - - -
B - - - - - - - - -
C 1 12.00 . 1 1.00 . - - -
715 A 25 8.02 4.87 8 7.06 2.40 - - -
B 25 8.02 4.87 7 7.57 2.07 - - -
C - - - 1 3.50 . - - -
752 A 1 10.00 . - - - - - -
B 1 10.00 . - - - - - -
C - - - - - - - - -
753 A 14 4.82 6.09 14 7.14 6.18 6 3.87 3.82
B 10 5.70 7.00 14 7.14 6.18 3 2.67 1.53
C 4 2.62 2.21 - - - 3 5.08 5.46
762 A 8 5.69 4.96 8 1.34 1.59 34 3.75 3.66
B 3 1.83 2.74 3 0.25 0.00 7 0.36 0.13
C 5 8.00 4.64 5 2.00 1.73 27 4.63 3.61
770 A 8 5.00 4.07 14 5.57 4.59 37 3.28 2.05
B 5 3.40 3.13 7 2.00 0.00 4 3.37 1.89
C 3 7.67 4.62 7 9.14 3.98 33 3.27 2.09
780 A 83 10.85 9.25 58 6.06 3.51 52 2.85 2.70
B 51 12.85 10.01 50 5.51 2.80 26 2.34 2.74
C 32 7.66 6.91 8 9.50 5.48 26 3.36 2.62
903 A 5 3.80 0.45 2 4.50 0.71 10 1.90 1.43
B 5 3.80 0.45 2 4.50 0.71 - - -
C - - - - - - 10 1.90 1.43
962 A 2 3.00 0.00 - - - - - -
B - - - - - - - -
C 2 3.00 0.00 - - - - - -
